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The Law of Pseudonymous Litigation
EUGENE VOLOKH†
When may parties in American civil cases proceed pseudonymously? The answer turns out to be
deeply unsettled. This Article aims to lay out the legal rules (such as they are) and the key policy
arguments, in a way intended to be helpful to judges, lawyers, pro se litigants, and academics.
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Richards, Michael Rosman, Darpana Sheth, Joan Steinman, Lior Strahilevitz, Lauren Teukolsky, and Marketa
Trimble for helpful comments. Note that I acted as a lawyer or intervenor in some of the cases cited below:
Publius v. Boyer-Vine, 321 F.R.D. 358 (E.D. Cal. 2017); In re Murphy-Brown, LLC, 907 F.3d 788 (4th Cir.
2018); Doe v. Billington, No. 21STCV22207 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 2, 2021); Doe v. Regents of Univ. of Colo.,
No. 22-cv-00423-RM-NRN (D. Colo. May 10, 2022); Doe v. Wang, No. 1:20-cv-02765-RMR-MEH, 2021 WL
8445256 (D. Colo. Dec. 22, 2021); Doe v. Town of Lisbon, No. 1:21-cv-00944 (D.N.H. Apr. 21, 2022) (motion
pending); Doe v. Doe 1, No. 1:16-cv-07359 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2016); Doe v. MIT, No. 22-1056 (1st Cir. Apr.
17, 2022) (appeal pending); and M.R. v. Niesen, 2020-Ohio-4368, rev’d sub nom. State ex rel. Cincinnati
Enquirer v. Shanahan, 185 N.E.3d 1089, 1098–1100 (Ohio 2022).
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INTRODUCTION
One defining question about any system of procedure is: Public or secret?
American juvenile justice is secret. Criminal justice, generally public. Bar
discipline, mostly secret in many states. Internal employer and university
disciplinary proceedings, generally secret. Arbitration, generally secret. Civil
justice, public.
The answer to the public-or-secret question of course affects the level of
public supervision of the system, as well as the likely public confidence in the
system. But the answer can also sharply affect the shape of litigation within the
system: the incentives to bring or not bring various kinds of cases, the incentives
to settle (or plea bargain), the likely settlement values, which witnesses testify,
and more. Indeed, the implicit threat of publicity is common in many prefiling
negotiations, though it may need to be kept implicit to avoid negotiations being
treated as criminal extortion.1
The follow-up question, of course, is: When a system is generally public,
what provisions still allow some degree of secrecy?2 In particular, within our
civil justice system, how do courts decide what can or must be sealed or
redacted, and when parties can proceed pseudonymously? This too can sharply
affect what cases get filed, what cases get dropped, and on what terms cases
settle.
Yet the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unlike some state court rules,3
say little to answer this question.4 This Article’s overarching goal is to try to
push these questions—especially the one about pseudonymity—to their rightful
place in our discussions about civil procedure.
This question has become especially important because court records are
more visible than ever, including to casual Internet searchers. For many litigants

1. See, e.g., Flatley v. Mauro, 139 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2006).
2. A related question: When a system is generally secret, what provisions are there for public access?
3. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 2.550–2.551 (2016); 1 WESLEY W. HORTON, KAREN L DOWD, KENNETH J.
BARTSCHI, & BRENDON P. LEVESQUE, SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL RULE ANNOTATED, CONNECTICUT PRACTICE
SERIES § 11-20A(h)(1) (2021 ed.); PA. STAT. & CONS. STAT. § 1018 (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-15.1
(2022)—though all these statutes merely set forth procedures for seeking sealing or pseudonymity and offer a
general multi-factor balancing test, without elaborating further on how the test is applied. This article is mostly
about federal courts, because just reviewing what they do is daunting enough; but I will sometimes cite relevant
state cases, since many state courts seem to take an approach similar to that of the federal courts. See, e.g., Doe
v. Empire Ent., LLC, No. A16-1283, 2017 WL 1832414, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. May 8, 2017); Doe v. Hewitt,
No. 504-8-16 WNCV, 2016 WL 10860914, at *2 (Vt. Super. Ct. Dec. 06, 2016). I don’t compare American
practices to those of foreign courts, though that would be a very interesting article; as I understand it, for instance,
German and Austrian courts routinely pseudonymize all cases. Krisztina Kovács, The Anonymity Requirement
in Publishing Court Decisions, EUR. COMM’N FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH L., at 3, July 1, 2011, https://perma.
cc/JR2A-AKET.
4. Rules 5.2 and 10(a) do provide that minors are to be pseudonymized and adults are not, but federal
courts have viewed the nonpseudonymity of adult parties as just a presumption that can be rebutted—and the
Rules say nothing about the criteria for rebutting it. Though many local rules in federal trial courts discuss
sealing, I could find only one court’s local rules that discuss pseudonymity: U.S. TAX CT. R. 227, 345.
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these days, one of the most important questions is: Can I keep my name, and its
connection to the case and its facts, out of Google search results?5
Before, a typical employment lawsuit, for instance, would rarely be
reported in newspapers. But now, Googling people’s names will often find many
of the cases in which they have participated, even if no reporter has ever written
about those cases.6 Pseudonymity is thus a question of interest to privacy
scholars, and not just civil procedure scholars. (Note that this is a different issue
from whether private parties’ publishing information from court records is
restrictable—it isn’t7—or whether a European-style “right to be forgotten”
should be adopted. This Article focuses solely on what information should be
released by the government in government records in the first place.)
And many litigants would love pseudonymity. That’s particularly obvious
for defendants, most of whom are being sued over alleged misconduct.8 Say
someone sues you for alleged embezzlement, fraud, or sexual assault, or even
5. See, e.g., Doe v. Boulder Valley School Dist. No. RE-2, No. 11-cv-02107-PAB, at 3 (D. Colo. Aug.
30, 2011); Doe v. Regents of Univ. of Cal, No. D073328, 2018 WL 6252013, at *1 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29,
2018); Jayne S. Ressler, Privacy, Plaintiffs, and Pseudonyms: The Anonymous Doe Plaintiff in the Information
Age, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 195, 197 (2004).
6. “Over a century ago, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis . . . wrote that ‘modern enterprise and
invention have, through invasions upon [an individual’s] privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far
greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.’ The modern invention of today includes access to court
files by those surfing the Internet.” EW v. New York Blood Ctr., 213 F.R.D. 108, 112–13 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); see
also Gen. Orders of Div. III, Wash. Cts., In re the Use of Initials or Pseudonyms for Child Victims or Child
Witnesses, https://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts/?fa=atc.genorders_orddisp&ordnumber=2012_
001&div=III (ordering that child victims or witnesses be referred to using “initials or pseudonyms,” “[i]n light
of the increased availability of court documents through electronic sources”).
7. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (striking down ban on publishing names of rape
victims, which included names that had been erroneously released as government records); Gates v. Discovery
Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004) (holding that publishing information about past court cases can’t be
actionable disclosure of private facts); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000)
(arguing against such speech restrictions).
8. Indeed, defendants can claim a stronger case for pseudonymity, on the theory that such a defendant “is
not the one who has chosen to avail herself of the public forum of the Court.” Heineke v. Santa Clara Univ., No.
17-cv-05285-LHK, 2017 WL 6026248, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2017); see also Painter v. Doe, No. 3:15-cv369-MOC-DCK, 2016 WL 3766466, at *6 (W.D.N.C. July 13, 2016); Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 13 C
6312, 2014 WL 2514643, at *5 (N.D. Ill. June 4, 2014); cf. Doe v. Butler Univ., No. 1:16-cv-1266-TWP-DML,
at *9 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2018) (using this as an argument against pseudonymity for plaintiff, who sought
pseudonymity while naming particular defendants). On the other hand, practically speaking, plaintiffs are the
ones who can most easily seek pseudonymity. The plaintiff of course chooses how to style the case in the
Complaint, and thus how the case docket appears in Internet searches; if the plaintiff names the defendant, then
a defendant’s motion to proceed pseudonymously may come too late to do much practical good. See Adam A.
Milani, Doe v. Roe: An Argument for Defendant Anonymity When a Pseudonymous Plaintiff Alleges a
Stigmatizing Intentional Tort, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1659, 1707 (1995) (arguing that plaintiffs should be required
“to notify defendants before an anonymous complaint is filed,” so that defendants could “file a motion supporting
their own request for anonymity before their names become a matter of public record”); Colleen E. Michuda,
Comment, Defendant Doe’s Quest for Anonymity: Is the Hurdle Insurmountable, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 141, 177–
79 (1997) (arguing more generally for defendant anonymity in certain cases). Still, some defendants have
managed to litigate pseudonymously, perhaps in part because plaintiffs might think their own chances of getting
pseudonymity from the judge will be improved by showing a willingness to allow pseudonymity to the
defendant. See infra Part I.E.4.
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malpractice or breach of contract. You’d surely prefer that your friends,
neighbors, and prospective clients and business partners not know about it.9 And
while some defendants simply want to hide their misdeeds, others are innocent
and don’t want to be linked to incorrect accusations—whether temporarily,
pending the trial and verdict, or perhaps forever.10
Many plaintiffs would want pseudonymity, too; to offer a few examples:
• Sexual assault plaintiffs may not want to be publicly identified.11
• Libel plaintiffs may not want to further publicize the allegedly libelous
allegations over which they are suing.12
• Employment law plaintiffs who were fired for alleged misconduct, but
are claiming that this was a pretext, may not want a Google search for
their names to lead to those allegations (however forcefully denied).13
• People suing over politically controversial behavior (for example, an
employee fired for allegedly racist or unpatriotic statements14) or suing
using legal theories that some might condemn or mock15 may not want
to be publicly shamed or humiliated.
• Even ordinary employment law or housing law plaintiffs may not want
future employers or landlords to reject them as dangerously litigious.16
Yet for good reason, most lawsuits are nonetheless litigated in the parties’
own names. That is obviously true of adult criminal cases, even though nearly
all criminal defendants would much prefer pseudonymity.17 And it’s true of civil
cases—our legal system generally calls for public proceedings and publicly filed
9. “[I]t is the rare civil lawsuit in which a defendant is not accused of behavior of which others may
disapprove.” Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1–54, No. 11-cv-1602-PHX-GMS, 2012 WL 911432, at *4 (D.
Ariz. Mar. 19, 2012).
10. I am generally not discussing here (except briefly in the text accompanying notes 125–128 infra) the
separate question of defendants who are unknown to the plaintiffs (e.g., anonymous online libelers), and who
are anonymous because of that. Many other articles have been written on this subject. See, e.g., Helen
Norton, Setting the Tipping Point for Disclosing the Identity of Anonymous Online Speakers: Lessons from Other
Disclosure Contexts, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565 (2014); Paul Alan Levy, Developments in Dendrite, 14 FLA.
COASTAL L. REV. 1 (2012).
11. See infra Part III.E.4.
12. See infra Part III.F.1.
13. See infra Part III.F.1.e.
14. See Eugene Volokh, Private Employees’ Speech and Political Activity: Statutory Protection Against
Employer Retaliation, 16 TEX. REV. OF L. & POL. 295 (2012) (discussing statutes that authorize such lawsuits).
15. See, e.g., Jayne S. Ressler, #WorstPlaintiffEver: Popular Public Shaming and Pseudonymous
Plaintiffs, 84 TENN. L. REV. 779 (2017).
16. See infra Part III.F.1.
17. Pseudonymous prosecutions of adults are highly disfavored. See, e.g., United States v. Wares, 689 F.
App’x 719, 724 (3d Cir. 2017); United States v. Maling, 737 F. Supp. 684, 705–06 (D. Mass. 1990); United
States v. Pilcher, 950 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir. 2020) (concluding that pseudonymity is generally unavailable as to
habeas petitions as well); Doe v. Greiner, 662 F. Supp. 2d 355, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (likewise). But they do
happen, on rare occasions. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1156 n.1 (9th Cir. 2007) (keeping case
pseudonymous because the district court had allowed pseudonymity, but not describing the reasons for that or
whether they were sufficient); People v. P.V., 64 Misc. 3d 344 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2019) (pseudonymizing published
opinion discussing a transgender prostitute’s criminal conviction, and concluding that defendant was a victim of
sex trafficking).
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documents, and the names of the parties are viewed as part of the information
that needs to be kept public.18
Such openness is viewed as important for letting the public (usually
through the media) supervise what happens in courtrooms that are publicly
funded and exercise coercive power in the name of the people. Many major
stories and some scandals have been broken in part because of the availability
of civil court records.19 And even for the many cases that go largely unnoticed,
the possibility of public review helps deter shenanigans.
Some cases conclude that the First Amendment itself thus secures a
presumptive right of the public to know litigants’ names, as it has been held to
secure a presumptive right of public access to court records.20 And more broadly,
this openness is a matter of free speech and the public right to know (whether
constitutionally secured or not). Pseudonymity should thus interest free speech
and freedom of information scholars, as well as privacy and civil procedure
scholars.
How then are these interests reconciled? It turns out that the law is largely
unsettled, for instance with regard to:21
• whether plaintiffs alleging sexual assault can proceed pseudonymously
(Part III.E.4 below and Appendices I and II);
• whether plaintiffs may proceed pseudonymously to avoid disclosure of
their mental illnesses (Part I.F.8 bellow and Appendices III and IV);
• whether pseudonymity is more justified in lawsuits against
governmental defendants or less justified (Part I.G below);
• when defendants may proceed pseudonymously just to prevent possible
damage to reputation stemming from the allegations at the heart of the
lawsuit, allegations that defendants claim are false (Part III.F.1.f
below);
• when plaintiffs may proceed pseudonymously when they are suing
over allegedly false allegations, for instance in a libel lawsuit (Part
III.F.1.e below);
• whether minors’ parents may proceed pseudonymously to protect
minors’ pseudonymity (Part III.D.1 below);

18. See infra Part I.C.1.
19. The Boston Globe’s investigation of the Catholic Church’s coverup of sexual abuse by priests,
dramatized in the film Spotlight, is just one especially noted example. See Michael Rezendes, Church Allowed
Abuse by Priest for Years, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 6, 2002, at A1. And of course this is true of more minor stories
as well. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Shenanigans: Internet Takedown Edition, 2021 UTAH L. REV. 237, 288–91 (2021)
(discussing various frauds that the author uncovered in large part because of public access to court records).
20. See infra Part I.B.
21. Cf. Donald P. Balla, John Doe Is Alive and Well: Designing Pseudonym Use in American Courts,
63 ARK. L. REV. 691, 692 (2010) (noting the lack of uniformity); Ressler, supra note 5, at 234 (likewise); Carol
M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It Is Time for Federal Civil Procedure to Recognize John Doe Parties, 57 U. PITT. L.
REV. 883 (1996) (noting such lack of uniformity even then, before the recent spurt in pseudonymous litigation).
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•

whether young adults may proceed pseudonymously on the theory that
they are nearly minors (Part III.D.2 below);
• whether adult litigants may proceed pseudonymously when they allege
they were assaulted when they were minors (Part III.D.3 below).
And many of the distinctions that the cases do appear to implicitly draw are hard
to explain. Imagine, for instance, that Arnold is an adult university student
accused of sexually assaulting his classmate Veronica:
• The criminal prosecution would almost certainly be People v. Arnold,
not People v. Doe, notwithstanding the harm to Arnold’s reputation (a
harm that would be present even if he’s later acquitted or the charges
are dropped).
• The civil lawsuit would often be Veronica v. Arnold.
• But some courts would allow it to be Doe v. Arnold, to protect
Veronica’s privacy.22
• A few courts would allow it to be Doe v. Roe,23 seemingly on the theory
that, just as it can be unjustly humiliating for many sexual assault
victims to be publicly identified as such (assuming they are telling the
truth that they were indeed victimized), so too it can be unjustly
humiliating for many of the accused to be publicly identified as such
(assuming they are telling the truth that they were not guilty).24 But
most courts do not accept this theory.25
• If Arnold sues Veronica for libel, claiming Veronica’s accusations
were lies, most courts would require it to be Arnold v. Veronica or
perhaps Arnold v. Roe,26 but not Doe v. Roe.27
• But many courts routinely allow the pseudonymous Doe v. University
of Northern South Dakota, a lawsuit in which Arnold is claiming that
the university acted improperly in expelling him for the alleged

22. See infra Part III.E.4.
23. See infra Part I.E.4.
24. If the accused is guilty, and is lying about the defense, then it may be only fair that the public learns of
the guilt. But equally, if the accuser is lying about the claim, then it may be only fair that the public learns about
that.
25. Of course, as a general matter Arnold would need to know Veronica’s identity; I focus here on
pseudonymity that shields the parties’ identity from the general public, and not from other parties (or at least
their lawyers) or the court. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“We
are not aware of any case in which a plaintiff was allowed to sue a defendant and still remain anonymous to that
defendant. Such proceedings would, as Microsoft argues, seriously implicate due process.”); In re Sealed Case,
971 F.3d 324, 326 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2020); W.N.J. v. Yocom, 257 F.3d 1171, 1172 (10th Cir. 2001); Zocaras v.
Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 484 (11th Cir. 2006); Montgomery v. Wellpath Medical, No. 3:19-cv-00675, at 7 (M.D.
Tenn. Dec. 15, 2020); De Angelis v. Nat’l Ent. Grp. LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00924, 2019 WL 1071575, at *4–5 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 7, 2019); Doe 1 v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 963 N.W.2d 823, 834 (Wis. Ct. App. 2021); Doe v.
Heritage Academy, No. 2:16-cv-03001, 2017 WL 6001481, at *11 (D. Ariz. June 9, 2017).
26. See infra note 257.
27. See, e.g., Roe v. Does 1–11, No. 20-cv-3788-MKB-SJB, 2020 WL 6152174, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 14,
2020). But see Doe v. Doe 1, No. 1:16-cv-07359 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2016); Alexander v. Falk, No. 2:16-cv02268-MMD-GWF, 2017 WL 3749573, at *5 (D. Nev. Aug. 30, 2017).
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misconduct—even though there, as in the libel case, Arnold wants
pseudonymity to protect his reputation.28
It’s hard for me to see a sound justification for this pattern.
In this Article, I will try to (1) lay out the general legal rules, as reflected
in court decisions (which I hope will be useful to judges and lawyers as well as
academics) and (2) lay out the main policy arguments cutting in favor of and
against pseudonymity. I may also offer (3) some normative suggestions about
what should be done. In general, I’m not sure what the right answer is in most
of those cases, but I do want to make five related observations:
a. The ubiquity of the desire for pseudonymity: I noted above that many
plaintiffs and defendants would prefer to keep their names out of the court record
and therefore off Google and out of the newspapers. Courts have observed this
and often cite this as a reason to reject pseudonymity—if we let this litigant be
pseudonymous, we’d, in fairness, have to let all these other litigants do the same,
and then we’d have a very different and much less transparent system of
procedure.29
b. The puzzle of dealing with reputational damage: In particular, a vast
range of cases involves material risk of reputational damage to one or both
parties—chiefly, damage to the ability to earn a living. Courts often remark that
mere risk of reputational damage (including unjust reputational damage, for
instance, if the accusations against a defendant ultimately prove to be
unfounded) is not enough to justify pseudonymity.30 But not all cases so hold.
This is in part because the reputational concerns can seem so serious and salient.
And the cases that allow pseudonymity to protect privacy rather than to protect
reputation sometimes boil down to risk of reputational damage as well (for
instance, if a plaintiff seeks pseudonymity to conceal information about a mental
illness).
c. Settlement skew: The settlement value of a case generally turns in large
part on the ongoing costs of the lawsuit to the two parties—litigation costs,
emotional costs, or reputational costs. All else being equal, if the plaintiff’s costs
go down, the plaintiff will be emboldened, and the settlement value of the case
will likely increase. Likewise, if the defendant’s costs go down, the settlement
value of the case will likely decrease; most obviously, the settlement value will
decrease if the defendant can reduce its litigation costs, perhaps if a defendant
gets ideologically minded pro bono counsel.
It follows that, in cases where both sides have reputational or privacy costs
stemming from the litigation, giving pseudonymity to one party but not the other
would decrease the pseudonymous party’s costs and would change the likely
settlement value. All else being equal, a Doe v. Smith will tend to yield a larger
settlement than Jones v. Smith or Doe v. Roe, which in turn will tend to yield a
28. See infra Part III.F.3; Appendices 5 and 6.
29. See infra Part I.C.5; Appendix 6.
30. See Appendix 7.
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larger settlement than Jones v. Roe.31 This can be an argument for rejecting
pseudonymity—or for pseudonymizing both parties.
d. Pseudonymity creep: Simply pseudonymizing a party seems easy
enough, and seems like only a modest restriction on public access. But, of
course, other information in the case can lead interested researchers to the
party’s identity. Even if a minor’s name is abbreviated L.V., if the case is Volokh
on behalf of L.V. v. Los Angeles Unified School District, it might not be hard for
people to identify L.V. based on her representative’s (likely her parent’s)
name.32 Likewise, if a complaint filed by John Doe in a libel case quotes the
alleged libel, a quick Google search for the libel could identify its target. If a
woman sues her ex-boyfriend alleging sexual assault, people who know the exboyfriend may easily identify the woman.33
To make pseudonymity effective, more needs to be done than just
pseudonymizing one particular party. This may include sealing important
material outright, pseudonymizing the other party as well, or enjoining the other
party from revealing the pseudonymous party’s name (or other details of the
lawsuit) in public comments.34 But then pseudonymity would also interfere more
with public right of access and may further undermine the interests of the
opposing parties.35
e. Sharp variability among cases: As noted above, and as Part II documents
in detail, cases are sharply split on whether to allow pseudonymity, in nearly
every category of cases. And that is unsurprising, given how vague the factors
are—factors such as “the bases upon which disclosure is feared or sought to be
avoided, and the substantiality of these bases” and “the magnitude of the public
interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the litigant’s identity” (quoted in
more detail at p. 13).
There are three possible explanations for these different results (all of
which may be present in some measure):
• Differences in circumstances: Perhaps the multi-factor balancing tests
that various courts have announced are working well, and judges are
carefully drawing distinctions based on real differences between the
cases.
• Differences in litigants: Or perhaps courts sometimes just decide based
on sympathies (perhaps subconscious) for certain kinds of litigants36—
31. See infra Part I.E.3.
32. See infra Part III.D.1.
33. See infra note 263.
34. See infra Part I.C.4.
35. See infra Part I.C.2.
36. This risk has often been noted as to balancing tests in other fields, and there’s no reason to think it
would be absent here. Cf. Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1147–57 (2012); Craig Nickerson, Gender Bias in a Florida
Court: “Mr. Mom” v. “The Poster Girl for Working Mothers,” 37 CAL. W. L. REV. 185, 203 (2000); Mary
Kreiner Ramirez, Into the Twilight Zone: Informing Judicial Discretion in Federal Sentencing, 57 DRAKE L.
REV. 591, 635 (2009).
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for example, for fellow lawyers,37 promising young college students,38
or people who are bereaved (even though such bereavement is
generally not seen as a basis for pseudonymity).39
• Differences in judges: Or maybe different judges have different
attitudes about pseudonymity generally, with some taking a sharp
public-right-to-know attitude40 and others being much more
sympathetic to litigant privacy.41
To the extent the explanation is a difference in circumstances, it is a virtue
of the vague balancing tests that appellate courts have set forth for pseudonymity
decisions. To the extent the explanation is a difference in litigants or judges (or
both), it is a vice.

37. See Doe v. Doe, No. 20-cv-5329, 2020 WL 6900002, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2020) (allowing
pseudonymity because defendant “is a partner of a well-known law firm in New York and an adjunct law school
instructor”).
38. Doe v. Univ. of St. Thomas, No. 16-cv-1127, 2016 WL 9307609, at *4 (D. Minn. May 25, 2016)
(discussing the “permanent[] harm” potentially facing “a young man found to have committed a non-consensual
sexual act at a university—in an administrative proceeding requiring a preponderance of the evidence—. . . even
if he later prevails in his challenge to the validity of the process that judged him guilty”); see also Doe v. Alger,
317 F.R.D. 37, 41 (W.D. Va. 2016) (allowing pseudonymity because, though the plaintiff and other students
were adults, “they are young adults and so ‘may still possess the immaturity of adolescence,’ as many college
students do”).
39. See, for example, C.R.M. v. United States, No. 1:20-cv-00404 (E.D. Va. Apr. 13, 2020), which allowed
pseudonymity based on the deaths of plaintiff’s three newborn children, and miscarriage of two fetuses at
nineteen weeks of pregnancy. Anyone would sympathize with the plaintiff’s desire “‘to preserve privacy in a
matter of sensitive and highly personal nature’—a soul shattering family tragedy,” Motion ¶ 9, id. (Apr. 10,
2020). But it is hard to meaningfully distinguish this plaintiff from almost any wrongful death plaintiff, since all
such cases stem from family tragedies that can be “soul shattering” in their own ways; yet wrongful death
litigation routinely happens under the plaintiff’s real name, and it seems unlikely that the decision in C.R.M.
would be applied evenhandedly to other such cases.
40. See, e.g., Student PID A54456680 v. Mich. State Univ., No. 1:20-cv-984, 2020 WL 12689852, at *2
(W.D. Mich. Oct. 15, 2020) (noting that “the undersigned normally denies pseudonym requests in Title IX
cases”); Doe v. Bodwin, 326 N.W.2d 473, 476 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (reversing denial of pseudonymity on the
grounds that the trial judge “would never permit anonymity”).
41. See Balla, supra note 21, at 695 (noting the risk that pseudonymity decisions often “boil down to the
arbitrary leanings of individual judges”).
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I. THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST PSEUDONYMITY
Different circuits have come up with similar but differently worded multifactor balancing tests42 for pseudonymity43 (also often labeled “anonymity” or
“the use of a fictitious name”); consider for instance, the Third Circuit test, from
Doe v. Megless:44
The factors in favor of anonymity include[]: “(1) the extent to which the
identity of the litigant has been kept confidential; (2) the bases upon which
disclosure is feared or sought to be avoided, and the substantiality of these
bases; (3) the magnitude of the public interest in maintaining the
confidentiality of the litigant’s identity; (4) whether, because of the purely
legal nature of the issues presented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak
public interest in knowing the litigant’s identities; (5) the undesirability of an
outcome adverse to the pseudonymous party and attributable to his refusal to
pursue the case at the price of being publicly identified; and (6) whether the
party seeking to sue pseudonymously has illegitimate ulterior motives.”
On the other side of the scale, factors disfavoring anonymity include[]: “(1)
the universal level of public interest in access to the identities of litigants; (2)
whether, because of the subject matter of this litigation, the status of the
litigant as a public figure, or otherwise, there is a particularly strong interest
in knowing the litigant’s identities, beyond the public’s interest which is
normally obtained; and (3) whether the opposition to pseudonym by counsel,
the public, or the press is illegitimately motivated.”
[The] list of factors is not comprehensive, and that trial courts “will always
be required to consider those [other] factors which the facts of the particular
case implicate.”45

But, to quote District Judge Matthew Brann, “even well-crafted multifactor
tests can be difficult to apply, difficult to predict, and invite needless litigation.
And the Megless factors are not the crown jewels of multifactor tests.”46

42. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2008); Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d
404, 409 (3d Cir. 2011); James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993); Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185–
86 (5th Cir. 1981); Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 2004); Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile
Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000); Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323 (11th Cir. 1992); In re Sealed
Case, 931 F.3d 92, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2019). Two circuits have not articulated specific factors, but have recognized
that pseudonymity is an exception and have identified some cases in which the exception is justified. Doe v.
Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2016); M.M. v. Zavaras, 139 F.3d 798, 802–03 (10th Cir.
1998). The remaining circuits have not opined on pseudonymity, but have announced a broad presumption of
public access and against sealing. Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 70 (1st Cir. 2011); IDT Corp.
v. eBay, 709 F.3d 1220, 1223 (8th Cir. 2013); In re Violation of Rule 28(D), 635 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
43. I refer here to any replacement of a known person’s name with something intended to hide identity,
whether John Doe, A.B., Alice B., Hester Prynne (from The Scarlet Letter), Whistleblower #579, or the like. For
a brief discussion on the pluses and minuses of each kind of pseudonym, see Eugene Volokh, If Pseudonyms,
Then What Kind?, 107 JUDICATURE __ (forthcoming 2023).
44. 654 F.3d at 409.
45. Id. (citations omitted).
46. Doe v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., No. 19-1584, 2019 WL 5683437, at *3 & n.10 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2019).
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To start, they are hopelessly imprecise and redundant . . . . These inquiries
[into various factors] meander and criss-cross into each other’s paths, to the
extent they differ at all. What’s more, the test does not provide what weight
each enumerated factor should be given, let alone how unenumerated factors
should tip the balance . . . . [O]pinions applying Megless and similar tests
from other circuits frequently read as a rote recitation of factors with a
conclusion tacked on the end. This style is not conducive to the reader scrying
which factors were determinative in the court’s decision. Or, perhaps more
troublingly, the court may in fact have treated all the factors as coequal.47

Rather than try to track a particular list of factors, then, I thought I would
lay out the general structure of the analysis that I have seen in the cases, with
particular attention to how these generalities have been concretely applied (for
example, what counts as a “substantial[]” “bas[i]s,” to quote Megless, for
rejecting disclosure). I turn, at Judge Brann’s suggestion, to “the heart of the
inquiry: Does the Plaintiff risk severe harm by proceeding under his or her real
name? And, if so, is this risk outweighed by a particularly strong public interest
in knowing the Plaintiff’s identity?”48 Because fully naming the parties is the
default, I begin with the presumption against (and justifications for)
pseudonymity.
A. THE FEDERAL RULES AND THE COMMON LAW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) provides that “The title of the
complaint must name all the parties,” and Rule 17(a) provides that “An action
must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” Many courts have
read these statements as generally condemning pseudonymity.49 The same is true
of many state law rules;50 some are even more explicit.51 A strong presumption
against party pseudonymity is generally well settled.52
This presumption might be strengthened to the extent that, “because of the
subject matter of this litigation, the status of the litigant as a public figure, or
otherwise, there is a particularly strong interest in knowing the litigant’s
identities, beyond the public’s interest which is normally obtained.”53 But even
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 322 (11th Cir. 1992). Perhaps Rule 10(a) should instead be read
as “simply seek[ing] to distinguish the more formal caption in the complaint from all others, which for economy
need not list every party,” without “necessarily dictat[ing] the substance of the name designation,” Rice, supra
note 21, at 915; see also Ressler, supra note 5, at 216. But most courts that have considered the matter have
concluded that it does set forth a strong presumption that people must litigate in their own names.
50. See, e.g., Doe v. Empire Ent., LLC, No. A16-1283, 2017 WL 1832414, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. May 8,
2017).
51. See, e.g., DEL. R. SUPER. CT. Rule 10(e); ALASKA R. CT.—R. OF ADMIN. 40.
52. E.g., Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2000).
53. Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 409 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Doe v. Byrd, No. 1:18-cv-00084, at 12–13
(M.D. Tenn. Dec. 17, 2019) (“the fact that this case may have gained media and community attention is reflective
of why the public interest in open judicial proceedings should be respected”). On the other hand, some courts
view public interest in a lawsuit as cutting against naming the parties, because they are concerned that the
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ordinary litigation must generally be carried on in the parties’ names—as
everyday practice indeed reflects—based on “the universal level of public
interest in access to the identities of litigants.”54
B. THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS
Besides the limits on sealing that stem from the common-law tradition of
open access, the First Amendment is also generally seen as limiting the sealing
of court records, including in civil cases.55 Some courts have taken the view that
this limits pseudonymity as well.56
C. VALUE TO THE PUBLIC OF ACCESS TO PARTY NAMES
1. Generally
Public naming of litigants is one aspect of the broader “presumption, long
supported by courts, that the public has a common-law right of access to judicial
records.”57 “Public access to civil trials . . . provides information leading to a
better understanding of the operation of government as well as confidence in and
respect for our judicial system.”58 In particular, the right to public access
“protects the public’s ability to oversee and monitor the workings of the Judicial
Branch,”59 and “promotes the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch.”60
“‘Public confidence [in the judiciary] cannot long be maintained where
important judicial decisions are made behind closed doors and then announced
in conclusive terms to the public, with the record supporting the court’s decision
sealed from public view.’”61

publicity may increase the intrusion on parties’ privacy and damage to their reputation. See, e.g., Doe v. Bd. of
Trustees of Univ. of Ill., No. 2:20-cv-02265, at 5 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2020); Doe v. La. State Univ., No. 20-379,
at 4 (M.D. La. June 30, 2020); Doe v. Colgate Univ., No. 515-cv-1069, 2016 WL 1448829, at *2 (N.D.N.Y.
Apr. 12, 2016); Doe v. American Univ., No. 1:19-cv-03097, at 5–6 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2019).
54. Megless, 654 F.3d at 409.
55. See, e.g., Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 947 F.3d 581, 589 (9th Cir. 2020).
56. See, e.g., DePuy Synthes Prod., Inc. v. Veterinary Orthopedic Implants, Inc., 990 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed.
Cir. 2021); In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 96 (D.C. Cir. 2019); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448,
1464 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981); Ramsbottom v. Ashton, No. 3:21-cv00272, 2021 WL 2651188, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. June 28, 2021); Doe v. Paychex, Inc., No. 3:17-cv-2031, 2020
WL 219377, at *10 (D. Conn. Jan. 15, 2020); Doe v. Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Doe v.
Kidd, 19 Misc. 3d 782, 788 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
57. Eugene S. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 663 F.3d 1124, 1135 (10th Cir. 2011).
58. Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984); see also Sealed Plaintiff v.
Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 188–89 (2d Cir. 2008).
59. Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 263 (4th Cir. 2014).
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835, 851 (3d Cir. 1978), and applying its reasoning
in a civil case).
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This right of access extends to “pretrial court records” as much as to trial
proceedings.62 And the right presumptively forbids redactions as well as outright
sealing, though redactions can be justified on a somewhat lesser showing than
sealing since they are sometimes viewed as the least restrictive means of
protecting important privacy rights.63
In principle, pseudonymity is less of a burden on public access than is
sealing, or even redaction:
The public right to scrutinize governmental functioning is not so completely
impaired by a grant of anonymity to a party as it is by closure of the trial itself.
Party anonymity does not obstruct the public’s view of the issues joined or the
court’s performance in resolving them. The assurance of fairness preserved by
public presence at a trial is not lost when one party’s cause is pursued under a
fictitious name.64

Indeed, pseudonymity is sometimes offered as a less public-access-restrictive
alternative to outright sealing.65
Nonetheless, even courts that take this view acknowledge that “there
remains a clear and strong First Amendment interest” in “[p]ublic access” to the
parties’ names.66 Other courts put it even more strongly:
[L]awsuits are public events and the public has a legitimate interest in
knowing the facts involved in them. Among the facts is the identity of the
parties. We think that as a matter of policy the identity of the parties to a
lawsuit should not be concealed except in the unusual case.67

“[T]he public[]” has a “legitimate interest in knowing all of the facts involved,
including the identities of the parties.”68 “The people have a right to know who
62. Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also, e.g., Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of
Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2006); Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 139 F.R.D.
50, 56 (D.N.J. 1991).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Raffoul, 826 F.2d 218, 227 (3d Cir. 1987); HouseCanary, Inc. v. Title Source,
Inc., 622 S.W.3d 254, 263 (Tex. 2021).
64. Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Doe v. Pittsylvania Cty., 844 F. Supp. 2d
724, 728 (W.D. Va. 2012); Doe v. Tsai, No. 08-1198, 2008 WL 11462908, at *3 (D. Minn. July 23, 2008); Doe
v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 66 Misc. 3d 444, 449 (2019); Doe v. Barrow Cty., 219 F.R.D. 189, 193 (N.D. Ga.
2003); Doe v. Szul Jewelry, Inc., No. 0604277/2007, slip. op. 31382(U), at *13 (N.Y. Sup. May 8, 2008);
Benjamin P. Edwards, When Fear Rules in Law’s Place: Pseudonymous Litigation As a Response to Systematic
Intimidation, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 437, 443 (2013); Ressler, supra note 15, at 823; see also Lior J.
Strahilevitz, Pseudonymous Litigation, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1239, 1246–47 (2010) (arguing that sealing or fuzzing
over the facts makes it harder for litigants to understand what exactly is forbidden or permitted by a precedent,
while pseudonymity doesn’t have that effect).
65. See, e.g., Whistleblower 14106-10W v. Commissioner, 137 T.C. 183, 191 (2011); In re Application of
N.Y. Times Co. for Access to Certain Sealed Ct. Documents, 585 F. Supp. 2d 83, 91 (D.D.C. 2008).
66. Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185; see also Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 273 (4th Cir. 2014).
67. Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 93 F.R.D. 483, 484 (D. Colo. 1982); Doe v. Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652, 653
(D. Mont. 1974); A.B.C. v. XYZ Corp., 282 N.J. Super. 494, 502 (App. Div. 1995). For an early case enunciating
such an “only in the rare case” principle, see Buxton v. Ullman, 147 Conn. 48, 60 (1959), a challenge to
Connecticut’s contraceptive statute, which reached the court under the name of Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497
(1961) (but was dismissed on standing grounds).
68. Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 322 (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448,
1463 (D.C. Cir. 1995); In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d 324, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
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is using their courts.”69 “[A]nonymous litigation runs contrary to the rights of
the public to have open judicial proceedings and to know who is using court
facilities and procedures funded by public taxes.”70 “The Court is a public
institution and the public has a right to look over our shoulders and see who is
seeking relief in public court.”71
Those, at least, are the generalities. Let’s now turn to how pseudonymity
may be concretely harmful, and how open disclosure of party names may be
valuable.
2. Pseudonymity Interfering with Reporting on Cases
To begin with, the names of the parties are often key to investigating the
case further—for instance, by helping reporters and researchers answer
questions such as:
• Is the case part of a broad pattern of litigation by, say, an ideological
advocate, a local businessperson or professional with an economic
interest in the cases,72 or a vexatious litigant?73
• Is there evidence that the litigant is untrustworthy, perhaps in past cases
or in past news reports?74
• Do past cases brought by the same litigant reveal similar allegations
made by the litigant, which past authorities have concluded were not
corroborated?75

69. Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Pilcher, 950 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Blue Cross favorably); Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 408 (3d Cir.
2011) (same); United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1013 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); In re Sealed Case, 971 F.3d
324 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (same).
70. Doe v. Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2016).
71. Gibson v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 3:20-cv-03870, at 2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2020).
72. Even once the defendant learns the plaintiff’s name in this case, the defendant might be unable to easily
find plaintiff’s past pseudonymous filings; and journalists might never learn the pseudonymous plaintiff’s name.
In principle, a court could use “a unique pseudonym” for a serial litigant, to make clear to the public that several
cases are being filed by the same person. See In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2019). But that still
wouldn’t inform researchers of the litigants’ possible outside motivations that might not appear on the face of
the court filings, and it wouldn’t help researchers connect this litigation to other cases filed by the plaintiff in
other courts.
73. See infra Part I.F.8.
74. Thus, for instance, a plaintiff in a recent federal case had apparently been found, in an earlier state case,
to have “perpetrated acts of domestic violence” and to have been “evasive” in her statements. See Motion for
Reconsideration, Doe v. Wang, No. 1:20-cv-02765 (D. Colo. Aug. 27, 2021) (noting, in redacted form but with
enough details to allow the case to be identified, Czodor v. Luo, No. G056955, 2019 WL 4071771, at *1 (Cal.
Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2019)); see also People v. Luo, No. 30-2021-01216615 (Cal. Super. Ct. App. Div. Orange
Cty. Apr. 27, 2022) (discussing what appear to be the same plaintiff’s convictions for vandalism, restraining
order violation, and revenge porn, stemming from a sexual relationship hone bad).
75. For instance, in Luo v. Wang, No. 1:20-cv-02765 (D. Colo. Nov. 7, 2021) (originally filed as Doe v.
Wang), Luo is suing Wang for libel, based on defendant’s allegations that Luo had falsely accused a mutual
acquaintance of rape. It appears that Luo had made similar accusations against other people, which the police
had not acted on—something that would be relevant to a reporter writing about the case, though of course it
wouldn’t be dispositive of the soundness of Luo’s current claims. See Doe v. Newsom, No. 2:20-cv-04525, at
*2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2021) (noting two such similar accusations); Reply to Opposition to Plaintiff’s Request
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•

Does the litigant have a possible ulterior motive—whether personal or
political—that isn’t visible from the court papers?
• Was the incident that led to the lawsuit covered or investigated in some
other context? For instance, if the plaintiff is suing for libel or wrongful
firing or wrongful expulsion based on accusations that plaintiff had
committed a crime, had the plaintiff been arrested for the crime? How
did the police investigation or criminal prosecution turn out?
• Is there online chatter from possibly knowledgeable people about the
underlying incident?
• Is there some reason to think the judge might be biased in favor of or
against the litigant?76
Knowing the parties’ names can help a reporter or an interested local
activist quickly answer those questions, whether by an online search or by asking
around. The parties themselves might be willing to talk; but even if they aren’t,
others who know them might answer questions, or might voluntarily come
forward if the party is identified.77
And litigation of course deploys the coercive power of the state, even as it
also accomplishes private goals. For instance, a libel lawsuit, even between two
private parties, is aimed at penalizing (and sometimes enjoining) supposedly
constitutionally unprotected speech. An employment lawsuit is aimed at
implementing a set of legal rules that constrain employers, protect employees,
and affect the interests of the public in various ways, direct or indirect. In the
words of Justice Holmes, writing about the fair report privilege:
It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under the public eye,
not because the controversies of one citizen with another are of public concern,
but because it is of the highest moment that those who administer justice
should always act under the sense of public responsibility, and that every

to Proceed Under a Pseudonym at 3, Doe v. City of Concord, No. 3:20-cv-02432 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2020)
(Doe plaintiff stating that O.L. v. City of El Monte, Doe v. Newsom, Doe v. Cty. of Orange, and Doe v. Weamer
were all brought by plaintiff); Declaration in Support of Response to Motion for Sanctions, Luo v. Wang, No
1:20-cv-02765-RMR-MEH (D. Colo. Dec. 9, 2021) (Luo stating that Doe v. Weamer was brought by Luo). With
some effort, I was able to see that Luo had brought the past Doe cases; but this stemmed partly from defendant
Wang’s extensive investigation, coupled with incomplete covering of tracks by Luo, who had been pro se in
many of the cases. In other cases, a reporter trying to figure out the plaintiff’s history in Doe v. Wang might have
been stymied by the pseudonymity both of that case and of past cases.
76. Joan Steinman, Public Trial, Pseudonymous Parties: When Should Litigants Be Permitted to Keep
Their Identities Confidential?, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 19 (1985).
77. To quote a media brief opposing pseudonymity in a challenge to a vaccination mandate,
Anonymity greatly hinders, for example, a journalist’s ability to research the litigant’s background,
including business or political interests. Anonymity also prohibits journalists from identifying family
members, friends, employers, coworkers, classmates and other acquaintances who may help the
journalist put a given dispute in context. Knowing a litigant’s identity may help illuminate details
like a plaintiff’s motivation for suing; his or her relationship with the defendants, other trial
participants, or the court; or the litigant’s credibility, among other things.
Motion to Unseal Plaintiffs’ Identities, Does 1–6 v. Mills, No. 1:21-cv-00242-JDL, at *3 (D. Me. Jan. 27, 2022).
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citizen should be able to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in
which a public duty is performed.78

Courts have recognized that this rationale applies also to the openness of
court records,79 including to the presumption against pseudonymity.80 And
evaluating the credibility of the parties, whether as to their in-court statements
or as to their court filings, will often require knowing their identities.
3. Pseudonymity Leading to Sealing or Heavy Redaction
Filed documents will often contain information that make it possible to
identify a pseudonymous party. Sometimes it will be as simple as the name of
another party—for instance, if a named parent is suing on behalf of a
pseudonymous child. This can lead to motions to pseudonymize the parent as
well, which are usually granted.81 But sometimes it also leads to
pseudonymizing the name of the defendant (say, a sexual assault defendant), if
the lawsuit reveals the parties’ relationship so that knowing the defendant’s
name can identify the plaintiff.82
And sometimes maintaining pseudonymity may require redacting or
sealing documents filed in court. This is most clear in libel cases based on
material published online, even in obscure publications. In many states, libel
complaints must set forth the specific libelous words;83 but even if the complaint
can paraphrase or just quote the key words, the full material would need to be
precisely quoted at some point, for instance, in a motion to dismiss or a motion
for summary judgment.
If the material remains available online, then a simple Google search will
often uncover the full statement, which would include the plaintiff’s name. Any
attempt to prevent this would require much broader redaction or sealing of the
alleged libel, which may, in turn, make it much harder to understand the legal
issues in the case.84 And the same can apply in other situations.85

78. Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884); see also Steinman, supra note 76, at 19 (“Intuitively,
one feels less able to judge the fairness of judicial proceedings pursued by unknown parties. Even if the record
reveals enough about the plaintiff or defendant to allow an apparently adequate appraisal of the proceedings, the
record may not quell all suspicions that the secret identity of a party or parties influenced the decision.”).
79. Goesel v. Boley Int’l (H.K.) Ltd., 738 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2013); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen,
733 F.2d 1059, 1069 (3d Cir. 1984); NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV) v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 351 n.14
(1999); Hammock by Hammock v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 662 A.2d 546, 553 (N.J. 1995).
80. Goesel, 738 F.3d at 833; Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 228 F.R.D. 8, 13 (D.D.C. 2005).
81. See infra Part III.D.1.
82. See infra Part III.E.5.
83. See, e.g., Adamo Demolition Co. v. Int’l Union of Operating Engineers Loc. 150, AFL-CIO, 3 F.4th
866, 875 (6th Cir. 2021) (“A plaintiff claiming defamation must plead a defamation claim with specificity by
identifying the exact language that the plaintiff alleges to be defamatory.”); Stead-Bowers v. Langley, 636
N.W.2d 334, 342 (Minn. App. 2001).
84. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe 1, No. 1:16-cv-07359 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2016).
85. Cf. Ressler, supra note 15, at 831 (generally supporting pseudonymity in cases that are likely to draw
public criticism, but acknowledging that “while it might be simple to redact the plaintiff’s name from relevant
documents, redacting identifying information contained therein could be anything but straightforward”).
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Pseudonymization in one case can also lead to sealing in other cases in
which the earlier case is relevant. To give one example, Xingfei Luo sued Paul
Wang for libel and disclosure of public facts arising from Wang’s having
accused Luo of falsely accusing a third party of rape.86 Luo, a frequent litigant
who had been found in a past case to have acted evasively,87 was originally
allowed to proceed pseudonymously; but the judge eventually reversed that
decision.88
But that order reversing the pseudonymity decision, and several related
party filings, were initially sealed because they discussed other pseudonymous
cases that Luo had filed in other courts. The theory for the sealing was that,
“[b]ecause the Court relied, in part, on those other cases, the Court risked
undermining the orders granting pseudonymous status by not restricting its order
or the briefing.”89 The judge ultimately agreed that redacting the other case
names was the better alternative to outright sealing—but only after a third party
moved to intervene and unseal, something that wouldn’t happen in most cases.90
The sealing of court orders is generally viewed as improper,91 and even redaction
is viewed as costly to public understanding of the court’s operations, even if
sometimes necessary;92 yet pseudonymization here led to at least temporary
sealing of an order, which could have easily remained permanent.
Likewise, certain other facts mentioned in a lawsuit can make it easy to
identify a party. Say, for instance, that a lawsuit is a follow-up to an earlier,
nonpseudonymous lawsuit, and mentions the circumstances of that lawsuit; a bit
of court records research or LexisNexis searching through newspaper archives
can uncover the plaintiff’s name. To give one example, consider Doe v. Doe, a
2018 lawsuit in which the plaintiff claimed that an enemy of his was trying to
deliberately promote past newspaper articles that mentioned the plaintiff’s

86. Third Amended Complaint, Doe v. Wang, No. 1:20-cv-02765 (D. Colo. July 28, 2021).
87. See supra note 74.
88. Doe v. Wang, No. 1:20-cv-02765, 2022 WL 89172 (D. Colo. Nov. 8, 2021).
89. Luo v. Wang, No. 1:20-cv-02765, 2021 WL 8445256, at 3–4 (D. Colo. Dec. 22, 2021) (order granting
Plaintiff’s Motion to Restrict Document, understanding that a redacted version of Plaintiff’s objections will be
filed).
90. That third party was me. Motion to Intervene and Unrestrict Document, Wang, No. 1:20-cv-02765 (D.
Colo. Nov. 19, 2021); Motion to Unrestrict Document, id. (Nov. 29, 2021).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Mentzos, 462 F.3d 830, 843 n.4 (8th Cir. 2006) (concluding that defendant’s
“motion to file this opinion under seal” should be denied “because the decisions of the court” are presumptively
“a matter of public record”); Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. Leavell, 220 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t should
go without saying that [a] judge’s opinions and orders belong in the public domain.”); Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond,
46 F.3d 29, 31 (7th Cir. 1995) (Easterbrook, J., one-judge order) (“Opinions are not the litigants’ property. . . . They belong to the public, which underwrites the judicial system that produces them.”); Doe v. Pub.
Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Without access to judicial opinions, public oversight of the courts,
including the processes and the outcomes they produce, would be impossible.”); In re Application of Jason
Leopold, 964 F.3d 1121, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“There is no doubt that the court orders themselves are judicial
records. . . . The issuance of public opinions is core to the transparency of the court’s decision-making
process.”).
92. See, e.g., In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., 927 F.3d 919, 939 (6th Cir. 2019) (stating that both
outright sealing or partial redaction are forbidden unless they are necessary to serve a compelling interest).
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name.93 Those past articles stemmed from an employment discrimination
lawsuit that Doe had filed nonanonymously, which claimed that the named
employer had discriminated against Doe because he was a Muslim.94 Armed
with this information, it was easy for me to find Doe’s name; only much heavier
redaction of the facts would have prevented that.95
This phenomenon, which one might call “penetrable pseudonymity,” may
not be that bad for the pseudonymous party. Often the pseudonymous party’s
goal is simply to keep cases from coming up on casual Google searches (by
prospective employers, prospective romantic partners, friends, neighbors, or
classmates). Even if someone—say, a news reporter—uncovers the party’s real
name, there is a good chance that the name won’t be used in the final story.96
Indeed, penetrable pseudonymity might be seen as a reasonable
compromise (in some measure like the partial pseudonymity, limited to court
opinions, discussed in Part IV): Those who really want to learn the party’s name
can find it, but it takes a bit of work and possibly expense, just as in the past
going to the courthouse to get court records was allowed but involved work and
expense.97
Still, penetrable pseudonymity might not be enough for many litigants,
their lawyers, and even judges who take the view that, once they allow a party
to proceed pseudonymously, they need to do what it takes to make that
pseudonymity effective.98 Indeed, many decisions allowing pseudonymity have
led to sealing decisions,99 including ones that have sealed entire court orders or
93. Complaint at 6–7, Doe v. Doe, No. 2:18-cv-02129 (C.D. Ill. May 09, 2018). 1; Eugene Volokh, Is
Wrongful Search Engine Optimization a Tort?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (REASON) (July 5, 2019, 3:08 PM),
https://reason.com/volokh/2019/07/05/is-wrongful-search-engine-optimization-a-tort/.
94. See, e.g., Matt O’Connor, Muslim Ex-Employee Sues Sears; Workers Derided Him, He Charges, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 18, 2004, at 2C.7.
95. Likewise, for instance, the Complaint in Doe v. Sebrow, 2:21-cv-20706 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2021),
pseudonymizes the plaintiff but not the defendant; searching for the defendant’s name in Bloomberg Law finds
another lawsuit based on the same underlying fact pattern, which appears to disclose the plaintiff’s name. See
also Complaint, Doe v. Underwood, No. 21STCV46709 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. Dec. 22, 2021) (mentioning
details about the case that allows one to identify the plaintiff, for instance by searching trellis.law for the name
“Lipnicki” mentioned in the Complaint); Motion to Reconsider at 4, Doe v. Wang, No. 1:20-cv-02765 (D. Colo.
Aug. 27, 2021) (citing a California Court of Appeal case involving plaintiff, redacting the case number, party
names, and citation, but including the date and a short quote, which sufficed to find the case and thus plaintiff’s
name on Westlaw); Complaint at 4, Doe v. Bd. of Regents, No. 2:21-cv-13032 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 29, 2021)
(giving enough details about the plaintiff’s credentials and prominent positions to allow one to easily identify
the plaintiff).
96. For instance, when I blogged about Doe v. Doe, No. 2:18-cv-02129, Doe v. Sebrow, 2:21-cv-20706,
Doe v. Underwood, No. 21STCV46709, and Doe v. Bd. of Regents, No. 2:21-cv-13032, I didn’t include the
plaintiffs’ names, though I had figured them out.
97. See, e.g., Roe v. Doe, No. 18-cv-666, 2019 WL 1778053, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 2019) (retroactively
pseudonymizing in court files the opinion published at 319 F. Supp. 3d 422 (D.D.C. 2018), though the printed
opinion of course still includes the parties’ names).
98. See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1051 (2003)
(discussing such “enforcement needs slippery slopes”).
99. See, e.g., Unknown Party v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, No. 18-cv-01623, 2021 WL 5002593, at *6 (D. Ariz.
Oct. 27, 2021); Unknown Party v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, No. 18-cv-01623, 2021 WL 1967392, at *3 (D. Ariz.
May 17, 2021) (granting Defendant’s Motion to Redact Small Amounts of Identifying Information).
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significant portions of such orders.100 And some judges have actually concluded
that plaintiffs’ willingness to mention facts that make their pseudonymity
penetrable cuts against allowing pseudonymity, because it suggests that the
plaintiff is not actually committed to staying unidentified.101
4. Pseudonymity Leading to Gag Orders on the Other Party
A pseudonymity order is not itself an injunction banning parties from
revealing a pseudonymous party’s true name.102 In principle, a pseudonymity
order only deals with how the parties are to be referred to in court, not outside
it. But a judge who really believes that a party would be harmed by being named,
and therefore requires pseudonymity in legal filings, may easily feel that the
order would be frustrated if the opposing party is free to publicize the
pseudonymous party’s actual name:103 “If defendants could reveal
plaintiff’s . . . identit[y] to third parties at will, there would be little point in
allowing plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously.”104
As a result, many pseudonymity orders include such speech-restrictive
injunctions as well.105 In one case, a judge ordered a blog that covers the
100. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text (discussing Doe v. Wang); Doe v. Does 1–3, No. 1:16cv-07359 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2016).
101. See, e.g., Doe v. Tr. of Ind. Univ., No. 1:21-cv-02903, 2022 WL 36485, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 3, 2022)
(“First, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not hide the fact that he was elected President of the Pi Lambda Phi fraternity
for the 2020–2021 schoolyear. A quick Google search utilizing this information reveals Plaintiff’s identity,
illustrating how even Plaintiff has not fully attempted to keep his identity confidential when initiating this
lawsuit.”); see also infra Part II.B (citing cases where pseudonymity was denied in part because the party’s
identity had already been disclosed).
102. Indeed, even a sealing order might not itself be a gag order. See United States v. Dougherty, No. 07cr-0361, 2014 WL 3676002, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2014) (concluding that a sealing order was addressed only
to the Clerk of Court, requiring that the Clerk not make the materials available to the public, and “sa[id] nothing
about what [the prosecutor], let alone anybody else, . . . could do with the documents”), aff’d on other grounds,
627 F. App’x. 97, 102 (3d Cir. 2015).
103. Cf., e.g., Doe v. Fitzgerald, No. 20-cv-10713, 2022 WL 425016, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2022)
(justifying an earlier order that defendant not publicly identify the pseudonymous plaintiffs on the grounds that
“[a]ny litigant respectful of the litigation process—any decent person—would have no interest” in so publicizing
the plaintiffs’ identities); Notice of Removal at 1 n.1, Doe v. Gilead Sciences, Inc., No. 2:21-cv-01859 (W.D.
Pa. Dec. 23, 2021) (expressing defendant’s intent to object, “in its responsive pleading,” “to Plaintiff’s use of a
pseudonym,” but stating that “it will not identify Plaintiff by name until the Court has ruled on the issue,” even
though there is no court order so requiring).
104. Doe v. Univ. of Ore., No. 6:17-CV-01103, at 3 (D. Ore. Sept. 27, 2017).
105. See, e.g., Doe v. Maywood Hous. Auth., 71 F.3d 1294, 1296 (7th Cir. 1995); Lawson v. Rubin, No.
1:17-cv-06404-BMC-CLP, at 4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2017); Doe v. PreCheck Inc., No. 21-cv-01129, at *1–2 (D.
Ariz. Sept. 30, 2021); C.M. v. United States, No. 21-cv-00234, 2021 WL 1822305, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 31,
2021); Doe v. Nygard, No. 1:20-cv-06501, at 6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2020); Doe v. Proskauer Rose LLP, No.
1:17-cv-00901, at *1 (D.D.C. May 7, 2017); Doe v. Gwyn, 3:17-cv-00504, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 5, 2018);
Does 151–166 v. Ohio State Univ., No. 2:20-cv-03817, at 1–3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 2020); J.A.A. v. St Hans Bros.
Indus., No. 2:20-cv-00156, at *5 (S.D. Tex. June 17, 2020); Hester Prynne v. Northam, No. 1:19-cv-00329, at
*X (E.D. Va. May 1, 2019); Doe v. Borderland Beat, No. 3:20-cv-06822, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2020); Thomas
v. Rubin, No. 159367/2019, 2021 WL 1040526, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. Mar. 11, 2021); Doe v. Jackson
City School Dist., No. 2:13-cv-00112, at 1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2013); Doe v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, No. 3:14cv-30143, at *X (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2015), granting Motion for Leave to File Complaint as Pseudonymous
Plaintiff (Aug. 11, 2014); Doe v. Topheavy Studios, Inc., No. GN404142, 2004 WL 5353369, at *7 (Tex. Dist.
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Mexican drug war not to disclose the name of a plaintiff who was suing it over
a post on the blog.106 In another, a judge ordered a sexual assault plaintiff not to
disclose the name of the defendant she was accusing.107
When a party learns information through discovery—essentially invoking
the coercive power of the court—a court may impose a protective order limiting
the publication of this information.108 But the cases mentioned above involve
injunctions against parties revealing information that they already knew before
filing the case. Such injunctions are generally unconstitutional prior restraints
on speech and can seriously interfere with plaintiffs’ ability to discuss what they
allege were serious wrongs done to them, with defendants’ ability to rebut the
allegations against them, and with media parties’ ability to cover the news by
interviewing the parties. They therefore, I think, violate the First Amendment.109
To be sure, courts have at times concluded that pretrial restrictions on trial
participants, aimed at preventing prospective jurors from learning too much
about the case, may be upheld even if similar restrictions on third parties are
not.110 But even those restrictions are generally disfavored.111 And the gag orders
I describe are broader still than those restrictions, because they are potentially
perpetual, rather than just lasting until trial.
Ct. Jan. 10, 2004), aff’d, Topheavy Studios, Inc. v. Doe, No. 03-05-00022-CV, 2005 WL 1940159, at *7 (Tex.
App. Aug. 11, 2005) (not reaching the First Amendment challenge, on procedural grounds); Doe v. Swearingen,
No. 18-cv-24145, 2019 WL 95548, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2019); Doe v. Dordt Univ., 5:19-cv-04082-CJWKEM, at 2 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 3, 2020); Doe v. Trustee of Hamilton Coll., No. 6:22-cv-00214 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 8,
2022) (docket entry); see also Ressler, supra note 15, at 829 (advocating for such orders); Doe No. 1 v.
Fitzgerald, No. 20-cv-10713, 2021 WL 6104395, at *6, *8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2021) (imposing such an order,
in response to what the court characterized as the defendant’s attempts at “harassment” of plaintiffs).
106. Doe v. Borderland Beat, No. 3:20-cv-06822, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2020); Eugene Volokh, Media
Outlets Forbidden from Identifying Recently Released Drug Cartel Ex-Boss as Plaintiff in Privacy Lawsuit,
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (REASON) (Oct. 12, 2021), https://perma.cc/SS4V-AJAJ.
107. Doe v. Anonymous #1, No. 520605/2020 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. Sept. 27, 2021) (treating earlier
order, No. 520605/2020 (Feb. 23, 2021), as a gag order); Eugene Volokh, Court Orders #MeToo Plaintiff Not
to Mention Defendant’s Name in Public, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (REASON) (Oct. 11, 2021), https://perma.cc/
8Q86-G5PH.
108. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984); cf. Doe v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., No. 3:21-cv01178, at 3 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2021) (involving a Seattle-Times-like protective order barring defendants from
publicizing the names that plaintiffs were required to disclose to defendants).
109. See, e.g., Kilroy v. L.A. Unif. Sch. Dist., No. 13-cv-6373, 2016 WL 11758009, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Feb.
29, 2016) (concluding that proposed injunction barring plaintiff’s speech was prior restraint, when it wasn’t
limited to information “produced in discovery”); R.W. v. Hampe, 626 A.2d 1218, 1223 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)
(noting, and apparently agreeing with, defendant’s argument “that his free speech rights have been subjected to
a prior restraint by the trial court, as he cannot discuss the case by reference to appellee’s full name”); Mayorga
v. Ronaldo, No. 2:19-cv-00168-JAD-DJA, 2022 WL 741032, *5 (D. Nev. Mar. 11, 2022) (“For the Court to
apply its protective order to documents a third party obtained independently from the discovery process would
almost certainly raise the specter of government censorship.” (cleaned up)), report & recommendation adopted,
No. 2:19-cv-00168-JAD-DJA, 2022 WL 1015814 (D. Nev. Apr. 5, 2022).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 428 (5th Cir. 2000); In re Dow Jones & Co., 842 F.2d
603, 612 (2d Cir. 1988); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 564 (1976) (suggesting that gag orders on
witnesses may be a suitable, less restrictive alternative to gag orders on nonparty newspapers). But see In re
Murphy-Brown, LLC, 907 F.3d 788, 797 (4th Cir. 2018) (rejecting such a gag order).
111. The cases cited supra note 109 acknowledge that such restrictions are prior restraints and are
presumptively unconstitutional.
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5. Pseudonymity in One Case Leading to Pseudonymity in Too Many
Others
The typical case is unlikely to draw much public attention. Allowing
pseudonymity, or even sealing, in just that one case may thus not be seen as
taking much away from the public’s power to supervise the judicial process.
But courts are, of course, aware of their obligation to treat like cases alike.
If they allow pseudonymity for one case, they must be prepared to allow it for
similar cases. And if the case is seen as run-of-the-mill within its category, then
allowing pseudonymity would imply that other cases in the category should be
pseudonymized as well.
Courts often deny pseudonymity relying precisely on this concern.112 For
instance, in a disability discrimination case:
Plaintiff offers no specific information suggesting that disclosure of his
identity would expose him to a risk of physical or mental harm, relying instead
on vague generalizations about risks that all civil rights plaintiffs
bear . . . (explaining that civil rights plaintiffs are “sometimes thought of as
troublemakers” . . .). It cannot be, however, that every plaintiff
alleging . . . discrimination has the right to litigate . . . pseudonymously. A
rule so broad would be inconsistent with both the plain language of Rule 10(a),
and the federal courts’ general policy favoring disclosure.113

Or in a case in which a state judge sued the FBI, claiming that the FBI improperly
disclosed certain information about its criminal investigation of him and where
he sought pseudonymity to avoid the reputational damage that would stem from
further publicizing the investigation:
If [the plaintiff’s interest in reputation justified pseudonymity], then any
defamation plaintiff could successfully move to seal a case and proceed by
pseudonym, in order to avoid ‘spreading’ or ‘republishing’ the defamatory
statement to the public. However, this is not the customary practice.114

Or in a sexual abuse case in which a defendant sought pseudonymity, arguing
that, though he was innocent, the mere allegations would ruin his reputation:
If, as J.C. suggests, these mere accusations are tantamount to an irreparable
injury sufficient to outweigh the public’s interests in open proceedings, then
he is really asking us to effectively grant all defendants accused of sexual
abuse in civil cases the right to defend anonymously, a result which hardly
comports with a philosophy granting anonymity only in rare circumstances.115

I give many more examples in Appendix 6.

112. See, e.g., Doe v. United States, No. 1:20-cv-01052, 2020 WL 7388095, at *3, *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16,
2020) (“This Court regularly sees similar allegations and Plaintiff has failed to show that his case is unusual”;
this was said in a case involving a prisoner suing over an alleged assault by prison workers, where the prisoner
claimed that publicly identifying him would risk retaliation).
113. Smith v. Patel, No. 09-cv-04947, 2009 WL 3046022, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2009).
114. Doe v. FBI, 218 F.R.D. 256, 259 (D. Colo. 2003).
115. T.S.R. v. J.C., 671 A.2d 1068, 1074 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1996).
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Of course, one possible answer is that we should allow pseudonymity to all
these litigants—discrimination plaintiffs, libel and invasion of privacy plaintiffs,
sexual abuse defendants, and the like. But so long as our legal system insists on
generally naming parties, anyone seeking pseudonymity must explain how his
case is different from everyone else’s.
D. REDUCED VALUE TO THE PUBLIC: PURELY LEGAL CHALLENGES
The presumption against pseudonymity may be weakened when, “because
of the purely legal nature of the issues presented or otherwise, there is an
atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigant’s identities.”116 This is
particularly likely in facial challenges to government actions, where the
litigant’s identity is generally not important to analyzing the substantive
questions (though it might bear on ancillary matters, such as the litigant’s
standing to bring the challenge).117
Many famous Supreme Court cases fit this mold, though they don’t
expressly discuss pseudonymity. They also generally involve topics that are seen
as private or as risking improper retaliation against plaintiffs (since even in a
purely legal challenge, pseudonymity is still an exception rather than the rule,
and some positive justification for pseudonymity is required118)—abortion in
Roe v. Wade,119 signing of an initiative petition in Doe v. Reed,120 sex offender
status in Connecticut Dep’t of Public Safety v. Doe,121 a highly controversial
Establishment Clause challenge to football game prayer in Santa Fe Indep.
School Dist. v. Doe,122 and the like.
This position is also consistent with the court decisions dealing with libel
plaintiffs’ subpoenas aimed at identifying anonymous defendants. Courts have
generally required such plaintiffs to show that their claims are at least legally
plausible so that the subpoena is not used to unmask critics who are behaving

116. Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 409 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Edwards, supra note 64, at 448.
117. See, e.g., Publius v. Boyer-Vine, 321 F.R.D. 358, 365 (E.D. Cal. 2017); Doe v. Google LLC, No. 5:20cv-07502, at 1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2021); Doe v. Barrow Cty., 219 F.R.D. 189, 193 (N.D. Ga. 2003). For a similar
case involving a lawsuit against a private entity, see Gomez v. Buckeye Sugars, 60 F.R.D. 106, 107 (N.D. Ohio
1973), which allowed temporary pseudonymity “until the Court determines whether the defendants . . . are joint
employers of the plaintiffs,” a matter as to which “all of the information that would determine this question is in
the possession of the defendants.”
118. See, e.g., NRA, Inc. v. Bondi, No. 4:18-cv-137, 2018 WL 11014101, at *4 (N.D. Fla. May 13, 2018)
(“Here, the NRA has not really identified any information of ‘utmost intimacy’ that would be revealed if Jane
and John Doe were forced use their real names. All we know so far is that they’re nineteen years old, they live
in Florida, they’re members of the NRA, they haven’t been convicted of a felony, they haven’t been adjudicated
mentally defective, they want to buy firearms, and they want to support the NRA with this [Second Amendment]
lawsuit.”).
119. See Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 371 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008) (expressly citing Roe v.
Wade as “giv[ing] the practice [of pseudonymity] implicit recognition”), clarified, 543 F.3d 178, 179 (3d Cir.
2008).
120. 561 U.S. 186, 202 (2010).
121. 538 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2003).
122. 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000).
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perfectly legally.123 While this legal question is being resolved, the defendant’s
identity is unimportant precisely because the underlying issues (for example,
whether plaintiff’s statements are opinion and therefore not actionable) don’t
turn on any facts that the defendants are asserting.
But once a sufficient legal case can be shown, and the matter comes down
to a factual dispute (for instance, about whether the defendant spoke with “actual
malice,” or at least negligently), then the defendant can be identified to the
plaintiff precisely so that the factual investigation can properly proceed.124 And
indeed the defendant’s identity should then presumptively be made available to
the public,125 though that presumption can be rebutted.126
A few cases have likewise allowed pseudonymity until a motion to dismiss
is decided,127 presumably on the theory that such a motion likewise raises only
questions of law and does not require any inquiry into the parties’ credibility.
But I have seen this only rarely, perhaps because some of the concerns about the
unfairness of allowing anonymous plaintiffs to lodge serious factual accusations
against named defendants arise as soon as the Complaint is filed, even if it is
then dismissed in an opinion that doesn’t decide whether the accusations are
true.
E. FAIRNESS TO OPPONENT
1. Generally
Pseudonymity can also create a “risk of unfairness to the opposing
party,”128 even when—as I generally assume in this Article—the defendant
knows the plaintiff’s identity.129 This is often articulated in general terms that
would apply to most pseudonymity requests (except perhaps those in lawsuits
against the government130):
[F]undamental fairness suggests that defendants are prejudiced when required
to defend themselves publicly before a jury while plaintiffs make accusations

123. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 454 (Del. 2005); Dendrite Intern. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756,
760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); In re Does 1–10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 821 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007); Krinsky v.
Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1159 (2008).
124. See, e.g., ZL Techs., Inc. v. Does 1–7, 13 Cal. App. 5th 603, 631 (2017).
125. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC v. Doe, 876 F.3d 831, 837–39 (6th Cir. 2017).
126. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC v. Doe, 323 F. Supp. 3d 954, 957–61 (E.D. Mich. 2018).
127. See, e.g., Doe v. Wright State Univ., No. 3:16-cv-469, 2017 WL 3671240, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 24,
2017); Alma v. Noah’s Ark Processors, LLC, No. 4:20-cv-3141, 2020 WL 7246602, at *2 (D. Neb. Dec. 9,
2020) (allowing anonymity while “this case is at an extremely early stage”—before defendant has even appeared
in the case—but “reserv[ing] the right to readdress this issue should this case proceed to further stages”); Rural
Cmty. Workers All. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1228 n.1 (W.D. Mo. 2020) (likewise).
128. In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
129. Courts almost always insist that a defendant is entitled to know the plaintiff’s identity. See supra note
25. Likewise, if a plaintiff sues defendants that are unknown to it, the plaintiff can usually get discovery of the
defendants’ identity, at least once the plaintiff shows some plausible claim for relief. See supra text
accompanying notes 120–21.
130. See infra Part I.G.
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from behind a cloak of anonymity. C.D. actively has pursued this lawsuit—
including by recruiting his co-plaintiff. He seeks over $40 million in damages.
He makes serious charges and, as a result, has put his credibility in issue.
Fairness requires that he be prepared to stand behind his charges publicly.131

More specifically, in a case where the plaintiff accused the defendant of
having distributed revenge porn of plaintiff:
[Plaintiff] has denied [defendant] Smith the shelter of anonymity—yet it is
Smith, and not the plaintiff, who faces disgrace if the complaint’s allegations
can be substantiated. And if the complaint’s allegations are false, then
anonymity provides a shield behind which defamatory charges may be
launched without shame or liability.132

2. Public Self-Defense
Plaintiffs’ pseudonymity may also make it hard for defendants to defend
themselves in public:
The defendants . . . have a powerful interest in being able to respond publicly
to defend their reputations [against plaintiff’s allegations] . . . in . . . situations
where the claims in the lawsuit may be of interest to those with whom the
defendants have business or other dealings.
Part of that defense will ordinarily include direct challenges to the
plaintiff’s credibility, which may well be affected by the facts plaintiff prefers
to keep secret here: his history of mental health problems and his history of
substance abuse. Those may be sensitive subjects, but they are at the heart of
plaintiff’s credibility in making the serious accusations he has made here. He
cannot use his privacy interests as a shelter from which he can safely hurl these
accusations without subjecting himself to public scrutiny, even if that public
scrutiny includes scorn and criticism.133
131. Rapp v. Fowler, 537 F. Supp. 3d 521, 531–32 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (cleaned up); see also Appendix 5
(citing many cases, sorted by circuit); Balla, supra note 21, at 726 (“In tort cases, it may be difficult to justify
allowing reputational harm to the defendant for being sued, while allowing the plaintiff to avoid reputational
harm through pseudonym use.”). But see Doe v. Tsai, No. 08-cv-1198, 2008 WL 11462908, at *3 (D. Minn. July
23, 2008) (expressly rejecting this argument, in case involving parents suing over allegedly false claims of abuse
of their children); Doe v. Word of Life Fellowship, Inc., No. 11-cv-40077, 2011 WL 2968912, at *2 (D. Mass.
July 18, 2011) (expressly rejecting this argument in case against alleged child molester); Doe v. Diocese Corp.,
43 Conn. Supp. 152, 167–68 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994) (likewise).
132. Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d 1448,
1457 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Anonymity may well confer a kind of immunity which permits a plaintiff to hurl
rhetorical weapons that could cause a unique kind of harm not faced in ordinary litigation.”). Ressler, supra note
5, at 247–48, notes that publicly available court decisions denying plaintiffs pseudonymity might themselves
injure the defendant’s reputation, because they will name the defendants and describe the allegations against
them. From there, the article concludes that, “courts concerned about fairness to defendants should be more
liberal in permitting plaintiffs to bring their actions pseudonymously. Doing so will enable defendants to defend
the charges brought against them and avoid the publication of unsubstantiated allegations.” Id. at 248. But I
don’t think that’s likely to be so—the “publication of unsubstantiated allegations” would still happen if the media
cover the Complaint, if the Complaint is available online, or if future decisions in the case (say, on a motion to
dismiss) lead to publicly available opinions.
133. Doe v. Ind. Black Expo., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 137, 142 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (paragraph break added); Doe v.
Purdue Univ., No. 4:18-cv-72, 2019 WL 1960261, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 30, 2019) ; Doe v. Leonelli, No. 1:22-
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Sometimes, as Part I.C.4 notes, pseudonymity orders are enforced with gag
orders that do indeed prevent defendants from defending themselves against
pseudonymous plaintiffs’ allegations (or plaintiffs from defending themselves
against allegations in pseudonymous defendants’ counterclaims). And even in
the absence of a gag order, I expect that few litigants would feel fully
comfortable publicly identifying an adversary as to whom the judge had issued
a pseudonymity order.134 In entering the pseudonymity order, the judge has
presumably concluded that identifying the plaintiff would be both harmful and
not particularly valuable. It seems likely that the opposing party’s publicly
identifying the victim, even if not forbidden by the letter of the order, would be
seen as defying its spirit. And a litigant whose case will be supervised by that
judge might be reluctant to engage in anything that can be perceived as
defiance.135
3. Effect on Settlement Value of Case
Allowing one side to be pseudonymous can change the settlement value of
the case. Courts recognize this, and sometimes give it as a justification against
pseudonymity: “[S]ome cases suggest that a court should consider whether
allowing a party to proceed under a pseudonym will create an imbalance in
settlement negotiating positions.”136 Likewise,
Defendants contend that anonymity creates an imbalance when it comes to
settlement negotiations: While a publicly accused defendant might be eager to
settle in order to get its name out of the public eye, a pseudonymous plaintiff
might hold out for a larger settlement because they face no such reputational
risk. . . . Allowing Plaintiff to proceed anonymously would put Defendants at
a genuine disadvantage [and cause significant prejudice], particularly when it
comes to settlement leverage.137

cv-03732-CM, 2022 WL 2003635, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2022). Courts sometimes try to minimize this
unfairness by allowing plaintiffs to be pseudonymous but threatening to revoke that if, for instance, plaintiff
“attempts to gain an advantage through the use of the media, including social media,” by “further unnecessary
dissemination of public comment about this case.” Doe 1 v. George Wash. Univ., 369 F. Supp. 3d. 49, 68 n.9
(D.D.C. 2019).
134. See supra Part I.C.4.
135. Cf. Vargas v. LaBella, No. CV065001941S, 2007 WL 155158, at *4 n.6 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2007)
(considering media coverage of a case as a basis to deny pseudonymity, but generally warning litigants in future
cases that “[a]n outcome where parties intentionally seek publication of sensitive details” in order to avoid
pseudonymity “would not serve the public or parties’ interests, particularly in cases involving sexual molestation
charges brought by children”).
136. Doe v. MacFarland, 117 N.Y.S.3d 476, 497 (Sup. Ct. 2019); Doe v. McLellan, No. 20-cv-5997, 2020
WL 7321377, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2020).
137. Doe v. Fedcap Rehab. Servs., Inc., No. 17-cv-8220, 2018 WL 2021588, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2018);
see also Doe v. Zinsou, No. 19-cv-7025, 2019 WL 3564582, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2019); Doe v. Gooding,
No. 20-cv-06569-PAC, 2022 WL 1104750, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2022) (noting this, though ultimately
allowing pseudonymity, at least until trial).
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Of course, one could also say that the non-pseudonymity default itself
causes improper settlement leverage, which pseudonymity might solve.138 Say,
for instance, that David Defendant is in a field where even the accusation
(however unfounded) of some misconduct would mean massive financial cost.
Paul Plaintiff’s threatening to file a Paul v. David lawsuit might yield an unfairly
inflated settlement compared to Paul v. Doe (where David could defend himself
on the merits, and perhaps win without the allegations being disclosed) or even
compared to a fully pseudonymous Poe v. Doe (since pseudonymity wouldn’t
help Paul much).
Conversely, say Polly Plaintiff wants to sue Donna Defendant for
discrimination based on Polly’s mental illness, but is reasonably fearful that
disclosing the mental illness would ruin her future employment prospects. In
pre-filing negotiations, Donna (who might not worry too much about publicity
related to allegations that she discriminated this way) may know that Paula
dreads the publicity and may be able to settle the case for a pittance, even if
Paula has a solid case on the law. Paula’s being able to file a Poe v. Donna
lawsuit or even a Poe v. Doe lawsuit would then yield a likely settlement value
that’s more in line with the expected value of the case at trial.
It’s not clear in general, then, whether non-pseudonymous litigation yields
fairer settlement values than pseudonymous litigation. But it seems clear that
pseudonymity can change settlement values in many cases, for better or for
worse.
4. Mutual Pseudonymity as a Solution?
Of course, the fairness concern could be satisfied by allowing both parties
to be pseudonymous. Some courts have indeed taken that view: “[I]f the plaintiff
is allowed to proceed anonymously, . . . it would serve the interests of justice for
the defendant to be able to do so as well, so that the parties are on equal footing
as they litigate their respective claims and defenses.”139 “If we are to have a
policy of protecting the names of individual litigants from public disclosure,

138. See, e.g., Balla, supra note 21, at 696.
139. Doe v. Doe, No. 20-cv-5329, 2020 WL 6900002, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2020); see also Roe v. Doe,
No. 18-cv-666, 2019 WL 1778053, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 2019); Doe v. Smith, No. 119-cv1121, 2019 WL
6337305, at *2–3, *3 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2019). Conversely, if someone claiming to have been falsely
accused of sexual assault tries to sue pseudonymously, but names either the accuser or the defendants, courts
seem less likely to go along. See, e.g., Doe v. Garland, No. 1:22-cv-00722, at 5–6 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2022); Doe
v. Va. Polytech. Inst., No. 7:21-cv-00306, 2022 WL 67324, at *3 (W.D. Va. Jan. 6, 2022); Ayala v. Butler Univ.,
No. 1:16-cv-1266, at 6 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2018). Compare Doe v. Ind. Univ., No. 1:19-cv-02204 (S.D. Ind. Oct.
2, 2019), where the judge who decided Ayala nonetheless allowed plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously,
distinguishing Ayala in part on the grounds that “the plaintiff’s complaint here respects the privacy interests of
others in ways the complaint in Ayala had not.”
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there is a very substantial interest in doing so on a basis of equality.”140 Others
have cited fairness as a basis for rejecting pseudonymity for either party.141
But of course, such mutual pseudonymity, while providing more protection
to the parties’ privacy and reputations, also undermines public access still more.
Imagine being a reporter who has to write about a Doe v. Roe lawsuit, with no
ability to track down people who can offer the story behind the case (except to
the extent that the lawyers are willing to provide access to those people)—you
could still see the allegations, the parties’ arguments, and the court’s decisions,
but without any ability to independently investigate the facts. And of course, if
that is accepted as the norm in, say, sexual assault lawsuits (or libel lawsuits over
allegations of sexual assault), whole areas of the law could become difficult for
the media and the public to monitor, outside the constrained accounts of the facts
offered up by judges and lawyers. This may be a reason why such mutual
pseudonymity is so rare.142

140. Doe v. City of New York, 201 F.R.D. 100, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also B.R. v. F.C.S.B., No. 1:19cv-00917RDATCB, 2020 WL 12435689, at *24 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2020) (“[T]his Court will do what Plaintiff’s
counsel should have done at the outset of this litigation, and order that, from this point forward, in this litigation,
each party will be referred to by the initials set forth on page one of this Order. The Court recognizes the
seriousness of the alleged offenses and the wide-ranging ramifications that these accusations may hold for each
of the named parties. The Court finds it necessary to not only protect the privacy interests of the accuser, but
also the accused.”), aff’d as to other matters, 17 F.4th 485 (4th Cir. 2021); Doe v. Am. Fed. of Gov’t Emp., No.
1:20-cv-01558, at 6 n.2 (D.D.C. June 19, 2020); Doe v. Anonymous #1, No. 520605/2020E (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings
Cty. Feb. 24, 2021); Affidavit in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint, id. (Dec. 21, 2020);
Doe v. Moravian College, No. 5:20-cv-00377, at 2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2021); Doe v. Smith, 105 F. Supp. 2d 40,
43–44 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); Doe v. Immaculate Conception Church Corp., No. CV09-501-1968, 2009 WL 4845449,
at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 2009); Doe v. Doe, No. CV146015861S, 2014 WL 4056717, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Ansonia-Milford Dist. July 9, 2014); Doe v. Weill Cornell Medical College of Cornell Univ, No.
1:16-cv-03531, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2016) (so providing “as a temporary measure,” but the order was
apparently never modified during the six months while the case was being litigated between filing and
settlement); Doe v. Tenzin Masselli, No. MMXCV145008325, 2014 WL 6462077, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct.
15, 2014) (endorsing such mutual pseudonymity in principle, but rejecting it when the defendant had already
pleaded no contest to a criminal charge arising out of the same facts); Notice of Removal, Doe v. Tyler Clementi
Found., No. 2:20-cv-05202-JWF-PVC, Exh. A (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2020) (containing Complaint, No.
19STCV43398 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. filed Dec. 3, 2019)) (progressing with the individual defendant being
pseudonymous, though without an explicit court decision allowing this); see also Milani, supra note 8, at 1698–
1706 (arguing for such mutual pseudonymity, at least “until judgment is entered” in cases against “defendants
accused of stigmatizing intentional torts”).
141. A.B.C. v. XYZ Corp., 282 N.J. Super. 494, 501 (App. Div. 1995) (noting that the state high court had
concluded that “a sexual harassment plaintiff” would not be pseudonymized, so “there is no reason in logic or
law that a perpetrator [of sexual misconduct, such as exhibitionism,] should be protected, when a victim is not”).
142. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe, 189 A.D.3d 406, 406–07 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020) (allowing pseudonymity for
such a plaintiff but rejecting it for the defendant); Doe v. Diocese Corp., 43 Conn. Supp. 152, 163–64 (1994)
(“In the instance where a plaintiff presents a credible case for anonymity based on neither economic harm nor
on hope of gain but, rather, on concerns for substantial privacy interests, the court should not consider whether
it might give the same relief to the defendant. To do so unfairly treats the privacy claim and allows the
introduction of considerations having no relevance to the merits of the plaintiff’s particular claim, which should
stand or fall on its own.”); Doe v. Purdue Univ., No. 4:18-cv-89, 2019 WL 1757899, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 18,
2019) (likewise).

1384

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:5

F. ACCURACY AND EFFICIENCY OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
Pseudonymity can also cause difficulties in the judicial process, especially
as the case gets closer to trial.
1. Encouraging Party Honesty in Testimony or Affidavits
A named witness, including a party witness, “may feel more inhibited than
a pseudonymous witness from fabricating or embellishing an account.”143
It is one thing to accuse someone of something anonymously; it is quite
another to do so out in the open. Anonymity makes people feel less restrained
in what they say. See, e.g., The Internet. Speaking behind a curtain can create
a false sense of security, tempting whoever-they-are to say things that they
wouldn’t say if everyone knew who was talking. People tend to be a little more
careful about what they say and write when they have to put their name to it.
(Judges are no exception.)144

“‘Public access creates a critical audience and hence encourages truthful
exposition of facts, an essential function of a trial.’”145
And if the party witness is not telling the truth, “there is certainly a
countervailing public interest in knowing the [witness’s] identity.”146 It’s hard
to tell the extent of this tendency, but it probably exists in some measure.
2. Drawing in Witnesses
When the Court recognized a public right of access to criminal trials, in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it noted the possibility that such
publicity can cause otherwise unknown witnesses to come forward.147 Witnesses
might likewise come forward in a civil case: “It is conceivable that witnesses,
upon the disclosure of Doe’s name, will ‘step forward [at trial] with valuable
information about the events or the credibility of witnesses.’”148 And if only one
143. Doe v. Delta Airlines Inc., 310 F.R.D. 222, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, 672 F. App’x 48 (2d Cir. 2016);
Roe v. Does 1–11, No. 20-cv-3788, 2020 WL 6152174, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2020); Lawson v. Rubin, No.
17-cv-6404, 2019 WL 5291205, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2019); Doe v. Zinsou, No. 19-cv-7025, 2019 WL
3564582, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2019); San Bernardino Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs. v. Super. Ct., 232 Cal.
App. 3d 188 (1991); see also Doe v. McLellan, No. 20-cv-5997, 2020 WL 7321377, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10,
2020) (“defendants would not be able to fully and adequately cross-examine the plaintiff” because of plaintiff’s
anonymity); Doe v. Gooding, No. 20-cv-06569-PAC, 2022 WL 1104750, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2022) (stating
that “at trial, [a plaintiff’s] anonymity could affect witness confrontation, evidence presentation, and jury
perception,” citing Doe v. Delta Airlines Inc.). But see Doe v. Smith, 105 F. Supp. 2d 40, 45 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)
(“While the court’s order authorizes the plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym, it does not prevent the defendant
from cross-examining the plaintiff regarding her professional activities either in a deposition or at trial.”).
144. In re Boeing 737 MAX Pilots Litig., No. 1:19-cv-5008, 2020 WL 247404, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16,
2020).
145. Doe v. Byrd, No. 1:18-cv-00084, at 12 n.7 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 17, 2019) (quoting Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983) (a case involving sealing rather than
pseudonymity)).
146. Roe v. Does 1–11, No. 20-cv-3788, 2020 WL 6152174, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2020).
147. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia., 448 U.S. 555, 596–97 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
148. Doe v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 310 F.R.D. 222, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, 672 F. App’x 48 (2d Cir.
2016); see also Ramsbottom v. Ashton, No. 3:21-CV-00272, 2021 WL 2651188, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. June 28,
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side is pseudonymous, “information about only [the other] side may thus come
to light.”149 At the same time, such claims are by their nature hypothetical, and
some judges view them as too speculative.150
3. Avoiding Alienating Prospective Witnesses Through Gag Orders
A party will often need to disclose a pseudonymous adversary’s identity in
conducting discovery. If you want to ask a witness questions about the plaintiff,
you must mention the plaintiff’s name. But if the court really wants to keep the
plaintiff’s identity secret, then the witness would have to be put under some sort
of protective order to remain quiet about that identity as well.151
Many people are likely to resist becoming witnesses if that means agreeing
to a protective order, at least if they have no personal stake in the matter. Legally
enforceable confidentiality obligations are a burden, especially when the
obligation relates to an acquaintance. If you learn that your colleague Mary
Jones has accused your mutual employer of sexual harassment, you may not
want to be legally bound to indefinitely keep that secret fact segregated from
everything else that you know about Jones and that you might say about her to
coworkers or friends.
2021); Rapp v. Fowler, 537 F. Supp. 3d 521, 531 (S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2021); Doe v. Leonelli, No. 1:22-cv-03732CM, 2022 WL 2003635, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2022); Roe v. Does 1–11, No. 20-cv-3788, 2020 WL 6152174,
at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2020); Doe v. Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154, 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); San Bernardino Cty.
Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs. v. Super. Ct., 232 Cal. App. 3d 188, 202 (1991); Steinman, supra note 76, at 19; see
also Doe v. MacFarland, 117 N.Y.S.3d 476, 495 n.18 (Sup. Ct. 2019) (noting that pseudonymity could harm
even the pseudonymous party this way, though allowing pseudonymity nonetheless).
149. Doe v. Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. at 159; Rapp, 537 F. Supp. 3d at 531; Ramsbottom v. Ashton, No. 3:21-cv00272, 2021 WL 2651188, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. June 28, 2021).
150. Doe v. Purdue Univ., No. 4:18-cv-00072, 2019 WL 1960261, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 30, 2019); see also
Ressler, supra note 5, at 223 (“At least in civil litigation, the notion [that open trials help bring out witnesses]
seems rather archaic, even quaint, in this era of wide-ranging discovery. . . . With the net cast so wide [by
disclosure obligations and discovery] from the very start of the litigation, it seems unlikely that any potential
witness would have escaped it, only to appear voluntarily and spontaneously upon reading press accounts of the
case.”).
151. See, e.g., Rapp, 537 F. Supp. 3d at 531 (discussing would-be pseudonymous plaintiff’s suggestion that
defendant be allowed “to use and disclose [plaintiff]’s name for discovery purposes on the condition that anyone
who becomes privy to his identity would be obliged to keep it confidential”); C.S. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc.,
No. 2:20-cv-635, 2021 WL 2792166, at *13 (M.D. Fla. June 11, 2021) (approving of such an order), report &
recommendations rejected, id. (M.D. Fla. Sept. 14, 2021) (rejecting such an order because “requiring the written
agreement of potential witnesses before any disclosures can be made would significantly hamper defendants’
ability to investigate”); J.C. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. 20-cv-00155, 2021 WL 1146406, at *6 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 4, 2021) (approving of such an order); Doe v. Topheavy Studios, Inc., No. GN404142, 2004 WL 5353369
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Jan. 10, 2004) (issuing such an order), aff’d, No. 03-05-00022-CV, 2005 WL 1940159, at *7
(Tex. App. Aug. 11, 2005); Doe v. PreCheck Inc., No. 21-cv-01129, at 1–2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 30, 2021) (issuing
such an order); Does v. Whitmer, No. 2:22-cv-10209-MAG-CI, at 2 (E.D. Mich. May 26, 2022) (issuing such
an order); Doe No. 2 v. Kolko, 242 F.R.D. 193, 199 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (issuing such an order); Ressler, supra
note 15, at 829 (advocating for such orders).
Of course, a court might also conclude that simply pseudonymizing the party in court papers would suffice even
without a gag order on witnesses, on the theory that it’s unlikely that witnesses will widely publicize the party’s
name. See, e.g., Doe v. Topheavy Studios, Inc., 2005 WL 1940159, at *7 (rejecting claim that pseudonymization
order will interfere with interviewing witnesses, and not mentioning any gag order on the witnesses), aff’g, 2004
WL 5353369 (discussing gag order on the party but not mentioning any gag order on witnesses).
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We lawyers must keep such secrets about people as part of our jobs, but
we’re used to it, and we’re handsomely compensated for it—not so for
prospective witnesses, who may already be skittish about the justice system. And
having to incur such an obligation without compensation may be enough to deter
some witnesses from testifying.152
This concern has discouraged some courts from allowing pseudonymity.
In one of the sexual assault lawsuits against Harvey Weinstein, for instance, the
court reasoned:
The Court cannot accept Plaintiff’s “mere speculation” that Weinstein’s
defense would not be prejudiced by the condition that he “not disclose her
name to the public,” with no clear definition of what would constitute
disclosure to “the public.” Plaintiff implicitly concedes that Weinstein might
need to disclose her name to at least some third parties, since she appears to
suggest that he redact her name from witness depositions.153

In another case, the court reasoned,
Having Plaintiff remain anonymous will prejudice Defendants’ ability to test
the credibility of and rebut Plaintiff’s claims of humiliation, shame,
embarrassment, fear, and emotional distress. For example, if Plaintiff remains
anonymous, Defendants are unable to question Plaintiff’s friends, classmates,
family, and others concerning his claims of emotional distress, humiliation,
shame, and fear. Without identifying Plaintiff, Defendant could not possibly
test his credibility or his claims through other people.154

4. Allowing Class Members to Evaluate Class Representative
Some courts have rejected pseudonymity for would-be class
representatives on the grounds that it “may . . . preclude potential class members

152. See, e.g., S.Y. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-00602, 2021 WL 4167677, at *4–5 (M.D. Fla.
Sept. 14, 2021) (rejecting such witness gag orders, apparently based on concerns about “a situation where an
acquaintance or family member of plaintiff would need to sign an agreement prohibiting them from ever
revealing information related to plaintiff’s identity, thus making it impracticable and likely to deter witnesses,”
or “a potential witness [being] asked to agree to be bound by a Court order without knowing what information
he or she was agreeing to maintain confidential or even whether he or she had knowledge of information that
should be maintained as confidential”); Hurvitz v. Hoefflin, 84 Cal. App. 4th 1232, 1245 (2000) (rejecting a
confidentiality order aimed at protecting material covered by the physician-patient privilege, because “Every
third party witness must be shown the order, and agree to be bound thereby, before counsel can interview them
about the case. Thus, unless a witness agrees to voluntarily have his or her right of free speech curtailed on
penalty of contempt of court, he or she may not be interviewed or deposed. This burden on the parties’ ability to
freely communicate with witnesses and potential witnesses is not justified, even by the patients’ right to
privacy.”).
153. Doe v. Weinstein, 484 F. Supp. 3d 90, 97 (citing Michael v. Bloomberg L.P., No. 14-cv-2657, 2015
WL 585592, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2015)). For more generally phrased concerns that plaintiff pseudonymity
may interfere with defendants’ discovery, see Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d 1118, 1125 (10th Cir.
1979); Doe v. McLellan, No. 20-cv-5997, 2020 WL 7321377, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2020); De Angelis v.
Nat’l Ent. Grp. LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00924, 2019 WL 1071575, at *4 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2019); Doe v. Tr. of
Ind. Univ., No. 1:21-cv-02903, 2022 WL 36485, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 3, 2022).
154. Doe v. Byrd, No. 1:18-cv-00084, at 12 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 17, 2019).
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from properly evaluating the qualifications of the class representative.”155
Others have disagreed.156
5. Preventing Jury Prejudice
Letting a party testify pseudonymously might also prejudice the jury, by
“risk[ing] . . . giving [the party’s] claim greater stature or dignity,”157 or by
implicitly “tarnish[ing]” a defendant by conveying to the jury “the unsupported
contention that the [defendant] will seek to retaliate against [the plaintiff].”158
And it could also make “witnesses, who know Plaintiff by her true
name, . . . come across as less credible if they are struggling to remember to use
Plaintiff’s pseudonym.”159 Query whether these risks could be minimized
through suitable jury instructions.160
6. Preventing Confusion and Lack of Witness Credibility
Especially in oral testimony, pseudonyms can confuse witnesses and thus
jurors. To quote one such case,
[In depositions,] “Moira Hathaway” could not recall her pseudonym’s first
name, and “Hillary Lawson” could not recall her close friend and co-plaintiff’s
pseudonym. . . . “[C]onduct[ing] a trial in such an atmosphere, all the while
using pseudonyms, promises trouble and confusion.” In the event a witness
inadvertently testified to a plaintiff’s real name, the Court would have to
immediately excuse the jury in the middle of critical testimony, admonish the
155. See Michael v. Bloomberg L.P., No. 14-cv-2657, 2015 WL 585592, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2015);
In re Ashley Madison Customer Data Security Breach Litig., MDL No. 2669, 2016 WL 1366616, at *4 (E.D.
Mo. Apr. 6, 2016); Doe v. City of Indianapolis, No. 1:06-cv-865, 2006 WL 2289187, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 7,
2006); Sherman v. Trinity Teen Sols., Inc., 339 F.R.D. 203, 206 (D. Wyo. 2021); Doe v. U.S. Healthworks Inc.,
No. 15-cv-05689, 2016 WL 11745513, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2016).
156. See Doe v. City of Apple Valley, No. 20-cv-499, 2020 WL 1061442, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 5, 2020);
Roe v. Operation Rescue, 123 F.R.D. 500, 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Doe v. Mundy, 514 F.2d 1179, 1181–82 (7th
Cir. 1975).
157. Lawson v. Rubin, No. 17-cv-6404-BMC-SMG, 2019 WL 5291205, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2019);
James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 240–41 (4th Cir. 1993); Doe v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 310 F.R.D. 222, 225
(S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“As many jurors and any reader of New York area newspapers surely would be aware, parties
to lawsuits routinely contend, at trial, with disclosure of embarrassing incidents such as public intoxication—
indeed, trials commonly bring to light far more prejudicial, damning, and colorful episodes. Were Doe permitted
to proceed on a no-name basis, one or more jurors might conclude that she, for unknown reasons, merited extrasolicitous treatment. This might skew the jury’s assessment of Doe’s credibility and her claims.”), aff’d, 672 F.
App’x 48 (2d Cir. 2016); Doe v. Rose, No. 15-cv-07503, 2016 WL 9150620, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2016);
Doe v. Cabrera, 307 F.R.D. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2014); EEOC v. Spoa, LLC, No. CCB-13-1615, 2013 WL 5634337,
at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 15, 2013); Doe 1 v. George Wash. Univ., 369 F. Supp. 3d 49, 68 n.8 (D.D.C. 2019); Doe v.
Tr. of Ind. Univ., No. 1:21-cv-02903, 2022 WL 36485, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 3, 2022); Doe v. Ayers, 789 F.3d
944, 946 (9th Cir. 2015) (dictum); Doe v. Gooding, No. 20-cv-06569-PAC, 2022 WL 1104750, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 13, 2022) (stating that “at trial, [a plaintiff’s] anonymity could affect witness confrontation, evidence
presentation, and jury perception,” citing Doe v. Delta Airlines Inc.).
158. Tolton v. Day, No. 19-cv-945, 2019 WL 4305789, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2019); A.B.C. v. XYZ Corp.,
282 N.J. Super. 494, 504 (App. Div. 1995).
159. Doe v. Elson S Floyd Coll. of Med. at Wash. State Univ., No. 2:20-cv-00145, 2021 WL 4197366, at
*3 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 24, 2021).
160. See James, 6 F.3d at 242 (reasoning that they could be).
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witness, and provide a limiting instruction, which may signal to the jury that
either the attorney or the witness acted improperly.161

And “a witness’s credibility in front of the jury may be undermined by
unnatural demeanor” if the witness must deal with a pseudonym (or, worse,
multiple pseudonyms):162
Defendants would have to memorize and recall the pseudonyms of six
plaintiffs, while attempting to remember their past experiences with those
separate plaintiffs whom defendants knew by another name—in a matter of
milliseconds during cross-examination. Although testifying may be stressful
in and of itself, attempting to testify while using pseudonyms may lead to
frequent unnatural pauses, unintentional mistakes, or confusion. Despite a
defendant’s best efforts to be honest, a juror may be inclined to disbelieve a
defendant who appears to be evasive, fabricating testimony, or minimizing
behavior while under oath, when in reality, the witness may simply be trying
to abide by the Court’s order . . . to use pseudonyms. In short, a witness’s
credibility in front of the jury may be undermined by unnatural demeanor.163

Likewise, in a student lawsuit over a medical school’s disciplinary actions, the
court agreed that, “witnesses, who know Plaintiff by her true name, may come
across as less credible if they are struggling to remember to use Plaintiff’s
pseudonym.”164
7. Protecting Parties’ Abilities to Research Each Other’s Past Cases
If you are sued, one of the first things you might want to do is look up any
other lawsuits the plaintiff has filed to see if they may reveal some facts that
might be relevant to this case. Has the plaintiff made similar allegations in other
cases?165 Has the plaintiff made allegations arising out of the same fact pattern,
which might bear on the allegations against you? For instance, might a plaintiff
who claims an injury from your product have already sued someone else over
the same injury, claiming that it was the result of an accident or of medical
malpractice?

161. Lawson v. Rubin, No. 17-cv-6404, 2019 WL 5291205, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2019) (quoting
Guerrilla Girls, Inc. v. Kaz, 224 F.R.D. 571, 572, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), which expressed a similar concern).
Alternatively, depositions could be conducted without pseudonyms, but then the deposition transcripts could be
redacted, but that would cause its own problems. “In a practical sense, anonymous litigation imposes great
burdens on all involved—parties, attorneys, witnesses, and court staff—to ensure that the anonymous party’s
identity is never actually revealed. Exhibits that identify the anonymous party by name must be carefully
redacted . . . deposition transcripts must be extensively sanitized to substitute the pseudonym for the party’s real
name. . . .” Peru v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 10-cv-01506-MSK-BNB, 2010 WL 2724085, at *2 (D. Colo. July
7, 2010).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Doe v. Elson S Floyd Coll. of Med. at Wash. State Univ., No. 2:20-cv-00145, 2021 WL 4197366, at
*3 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 24, 2021).
165. See, e.g., Affidavit of Dawn Ceizler, Luo v. Wang, No. 1:20-cv-02765-RMR-MEH, at ¶ 2 (D. Colo.
May 24, 2022).
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Were there some findings in those lawsuits that might have collateral
estoppel effects? Did the plaintiff make some statements that could be viewed
as judicial admissions,166 or could in any event undermine the plaintiff’s case?
Did the plaintiff say something about his domicile, for instance, that might be
relevant to whether his citizenship is diverse from yours?167 Might either the
written opinions in some of the past cases, or a conversation with the plaintiff’s
opposing counsel in some of those cases,168 offer a helpful perspective on facts
that may bear on the plaintiff’s credibility or other traits?169
Conversely, if you are a plaintiff, you might want to research the defendant:
Have there been past verdicts against the defendant in similar cases? Has the
defendant you are suing for malpractice or sexual harassment, for instance, been
found liable in similar cases before? You might be able to check the records of
the cases to see what relevant facts might have emerged, or consult with other
plaintiffs to see if they are at liberty to tell you anything helpful.
But if the plaintiff’s or defendant’s past cases have been pseudonymous,
that information may be largely unavailable (at least until you ask for
information about the party’s past cases in discovery,170 and the party accurately
answers). And in particular, “without [a party’s] identity in the public record, it
is difficult to apply legal principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel”171—
166. Cf. Ergo Sci., Inc. v. Martin, 73 F.3d 595, 598 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[J]udicial estoppel prevents a party
from asserting a position . . . contrary to a position taken in . . . some earlier proceeding,” when “a court has
relied on the position urged.”).
167. See, e.g., Ceglia v. Zuckerberg, 772 F. Supp. 2d 453, 456 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Having successfully
persuaded a different federal district court that his domicile as of September 2004 was New York, [Facebook
founder Mark] Zuckerberg would be judicially estopped from denying otherwise now.”); Milton H. Greene
Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, 692 F.3d 983, 1000 (9th Cir. 2012) (likewise); Techno-TM, LLC v.
Fireaway, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 2d 694, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (likewise, as to less famous litigants); Sarauw v.
Fawkes, 66 V.I. 253, 268–69 (2017) (citing other such cases); Drake v. U.S. Freedom Cap., LLC, No. 1:20-CV03935, 2021 WL 3566859, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 12, 2021) (noting that, “By assuming a barrage of
pseudonyms . . . Drake has flooded state and federal courts in numerous jurisdictions with a myriad of baseless
complaints,” and noting that plaintiff’s domicile claims in some of his many cases contradicted the claims in
other cases).
168. Thanks to Megan Gray for pointing this out.
169. To quote one lawyer (Jonathan Haderlein) with whom I discussed this, in one case “we were
researching a named plaintiff to see if they had a history of frivolous litigation and found a district court’s opinion
describing them as unreliable.” See also Bormuth v. Cty. of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 524–25 (6th Cir. 2017) (en
banc) (Sutton, J., concurring) (“Other materials, including lower court decisions mentioned in one of the amicus
briefs, . . . show why the council members became frustrated with Mr. Bormuth and confirm that this frustration
had little to do with his religious beliefs and more to do with his methods of advocacy. This was not his first
legal grievance, to put it mildly.”).
170. Cf. Green v. Seattle Art Museum, No. 07-cv-00058, 2008 WL 624961, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 8, 2008)
(“Interrogatory No. 1: Any other names or pseudonyms which have been used by Plaintiff and their times and
places of use. Given Plaintiff’s string of 15 lawsuits in this court (including two against the Museum), Defendant
is entitled to develop a possible defense of vexatious litigation. Defendant is permitted to request this information
for the purposes of investigating whether Plaintiff has filed lawsuits under any other names, and also to develop
information on Plaintiff’s character for truthfulness.”).
171. Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000); Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 592 F.2d
1118, 1125 (10th Cir. 1979); Roe v. Ingraham, 364 F. Supp. 536, 541 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); see also Doe v. Univ.
of Louisville, No. 3:17-cv-00638, 2018 WL 3313019, at *3 (W.D. Ky. July 5, 2018); Doe v. Ky. Cmty. & Tech.
Coll. Sys., No. 20-cv-00006, 2020 WL 495513, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 30, 2020), reconsideration denied, No. 20-
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or to apply judicial estoppel, or to similarly check whether the party’s past
factual assertions and legal positions are consistent with their current ones.
8. Facilitating Tracking of Vexatious Litigants
Courts and litigants often recognize that a litigant in the case before them
is vexatious by searching for past cases filed by the litigant in various courts.172
That becomes impossible or at least much harder if the past cases were
pseudonymous.173 As one court put it, in rejecting a pseudonymity motion,
Plaintiff fails to address the public’s right to know who is filing lawsuits. For
example, Plaintiff’s identity is relevant also for tracking vexatious litigants.174

And another likewise rejected an attempt to retroactively pseudonymize a case—
something the plaintiff had tried to do, with varying degrees of success, as to
many cases—on the grounds that,
Plaintiff’s collection of sealed court orders, that he has filed here under seal
[to support his request to seal and pseudonymize], shows only that plaintiff
has engaged in campaign to conceal his litigation history across the country.
Plaintiff’s behavior may make it more difficult for other courts (and the

cv-00006, 2020 WL 998809 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 2, 2020); Free Mkt. Comp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 98 F.R.D.
311, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); EW v. New York Blood Ctr., 213 F.R.D. 108, 110 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). But see
Osrecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe Int’l, Inc., No. 02-cv-8993, 2003 WL 23313, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2003)
(allowing pseudonymity but seeking to protect the res judicata effects of the litigation by “requiring that plaintiffs
file with the Clerk, under seal, the names and addresses of the individual plaintiffs corresponding to each
numbered Doe plaintiff”; “[i]n the event that any defendant is sued again, that defendant may apply to this Court
for an order that would permit determination whether the plaintiff in a subsequent suit was a plaintiff also in this
case”).
172. Cf. Eugene Volokh, Crafting Statutory Pseudonymity Rules (work in progress) (describing one
particular vexatious litigant’s attempt to seal or pseudonymize many of his past cases); see also Chaker v. San
Diego Sup. Ct., No. D075494, 2021 WL 1523009, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2021) (declining to take that
litigant’s name off the vexatious litigant list, in part based on the court’s own search for Chaker’s past
nonpseudonymous cases, beyond the ones he had disclosed to the court); Emrit v. St. Thomas Univ. Sch. of
Law, No. 22-cv-20835, 2022 WL 874089, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 24, 2022) (“A search on the PACER electronic
database reveals that Plaintiff has filed over 250 lawsuits in federal district courts across the nation”), appeal
pending; Clervrain v. Dimon, No. 1:21-cv-02918-TWP-DLP, 2021 WL 6551107 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 27, 2021)
(likewise), appeal pending; Abalos v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, No. 13-cv-00681-JST, 2013 WL 3243907,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2013) (likewise).
173. See, e.g., O.L. v. Jara, No. 21-55740, 2022 WL 1499656 (9th Cir. May 12, 2022) (noting that “O.L.
makes it difficult to track her cases because she uses initials or pseudonyms,” and warning that “[f]lagrant abuse
of the judicial process” through vexatious litigation “cannot be tolerated” (cleaned up)).
174. Smith v. Corizon Healthcare, No. 1:16-cv-00461, 2016 WL 3538350, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2016),
report & recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 4679712 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2016); see also Doe v. Washington
Post Co., No. 12-cv-5054, 2012 WL 3641294, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2012), dismissed sub nom. Doe v.
Republic of Poland, 531 F. App’x 113, 116 (2d Cir. 2013); Hernandez v. Bishara, No. 15-cv-8556, 2016 WL
4534009, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2016); see also Nguyen v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 2:21-cv-00134,
2021 WL 4173712, at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 13, 2021); Doe v. Law Offices of Andrew Weiss, No. 19-cv-2119, 2020
WL 5983929, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 30, 2020); John v. County of Sacramento, No. 2:16-cv-1640-JAM-DPS, at
2–3 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 2018); Gilbert-Mitchell v. Allred, 583 F. App’x 873, 874 (10th Cir. 2014).
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public) to find his litigation history, which could act to conceal future
vexatious litigation or behavior.175

9. Pseudonymity Only at Early Stages of Litigation
Some courts deal with some of these problems by only offering
pseudonymity at the early stages of litigation, on the theory that “the balance
between a party’s need for anonymity and the interests weighing in favor of open
judicial proceedings may change as the litigation progresses.”176 Many courts
are particularly reluctant to allow pseudonymity to extend to trial, but are willing
to allow it until then:
Allowing Plaintiff to proceed via a pseudonym at trial could impermissibly
prejudice the jury against Defendant. . . . The Court therefore will not allow
Plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym should this case reach trial. But the
Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed under a pseudonym at any other pretrial
hearings. Because the Court, not the jury, is the factfinder at pretrial hearings,
the risk of prejudice is far reduced.177

Likewise, courts might allow pseudonymity while a settlement seems to be
looming, but warn the parties that “[t]his is subject to change if the settlement
craters.”178 To be sure, such pseudonymity is not as valuable to the party as
permanent pseudonymity—though it can still be quite valuable, given that nearly
all cases are terminated before trial.179
175. Nero v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 2:00-cv-01126-GMN-VCF, 2022 WL 1618839, at *3 (D. Nev. May 23,
2022).
176. Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1069 (9th Cir. 2000); Minute Entry
Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed Anonymously, Doe v. Loyola Univ. Chi., No. 1:20-cv-07293 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 30, 2020); Doe v. Haynes, No. 4:18-cv-1930, 2019 WL 2450813, at *4 (E.D. Mo. June 12, 2019); Moe v.
Grinnell College, No. 4:20-cv-00058, 2020 WL 12617299, at *2 (S.D. Iowa Apr. 24, 2020); see also Steinman,
supra note 76, at 36.
177. Doe v. Elson S Floyd Coll. of Med. at Washington State Univ., No. 2:20-cv-00145-SMJ, 2021 WL
4197366, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 24, 2021) (paragraph break omitted); see also, e.g., Doe v. MacFarland, 117
N.Y.S.3d 476, 498 (Sup. Ct. 2019); Doe v. Rose, No. 15-cv-07503-MWF-JCX, 2016 WL 9150620, at *2 (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 22, 2016); Doe 1 v. Ogden City Sch. Dist., 1:20-cv-00048-HCN-DAO, 2021 WL 4923728, at *3 n.2
(D. Utah Oct. 21, 2021); S.Y. v. Uomini & Kudai, LLC, No. 2:20-cv-602-JES-MRM, 2021 WL 3054871, at *6
(M.D. Fla. June 11, 2021); Al Otro Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC, 2017 WL 6541446, at
*8 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017); Doe v. Regis Univ., No. 1:2-cv-00580-DDD-NYW, 2021 WL 5329934, at *3 (D.
Colo. Nov. 16, 2021); Doe v. Gooding, No. 20-cv-06569-PAC, 2022 WL 1104750, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13,
2022); Doe v. Hobart & William Smith Colleges, No. 6:20-cv-6338, 2021 WL 1062707, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar.
19, 2021); Lawson v. Rubin, No. 17-cv-6404, 2019 WL 5291205, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2019). But see Doe
v. Neverson, 820 F. App’x 984, 987–88 (11th Cir. 2020) (suggesting that pseudonymity could be allowed at trial
as well).
178. SEB Inv. Mgmt. AB v. Symantec Corp., No. 18-cv-02902-WHA, 2021 WL 3487124, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 9, 2021).
179. In the 12 months ending September 2019, less than 1% of federal cases reached trial. ADMIN. OFF. OF
THE U.S. CTS., JUD. BUS. OF THE U.S. CTS., 2019 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, Tbl. C-4 (2019),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_c4_0930.2019.pdf. At the state level, the fraction
seems higher—nearly 15% (2019 data), largely because of the high bench trial rates for small claims filings and
unlawful detainer filings—but it’s still small. See Court Statistics Project, CSP STAT Civil / Caseload Detail—
Total Civil (2020), https://www.courtstatistics.org/csp-stat-nav-cards-first-row/csp-stat-civil. Focusing just on
tort filings (and thus excluding small claims and landlord-tenant cases, among others), less than 5% of state
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On the other hand, some courts have refused pseudonymity at the very start
of the case on the grounds that “proceeding anonymously now is no cure, as the
full facts of the case will emerge if the litigation proceeds to trial.”180
G. LITIGATION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
Some cases reason that, when plaintiffs sue the government, the lawsuits
“involve no injury to the Government’s ‘reputation,’” whereas “the mere filing
of a civil action against other private parties may cause damage to their good
names and reputation and may also result in economic harm.”181 This reasoning
counsels in favor of allowing pseudonymity more often in such cases.182
But other cases take the view that lawsuits against a government entity
often include a “claim to relief [that] involves the use of public funds, and the
public certainly has a valid interest in knowing how state revenues are spent,”183
especially when plaintiff makes serious charges of misconduct by government
officials.184 Other courts reason that the interest in openness “is heightened
because Defendants are public officials and government bodies.”185 “The public
has a strong interest in knowing the accusations against its tax-funded entities as
well as the identities of the individuals making those accusations. . . . The
public’s interest . . . weighs heavily against anonymity because the defendants
are public servants who stand accused of a gross abuse of power.”186

filings lead to trials; likewise with employment law filings. (Note that the state data comes from just a minority
of states, but the overall pattern seems likely to be the same throughout the country.).
180. Doe v. MIT, No. 1:21-cv-12060 (D. Mass. Dec. 21, 2021).
181. S. Methodist Univ. Ass’n of Women L. Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 713 (5th Cir. 1979);
Roe v. Doe, No. 18-cv-666-CKK, 2019 WL 2058669, at *4 (D.D.C. May 7, 2019) (internal citations and
quotations omitted); Doe v. Skyline Automobiles Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d 401, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2019); Doe v. Drake
Univ., No. 4:16-cv-00623-RGE-SBJ, 2017 WL 11404865, at *3 (S.D. Iowa June 13, 2017); Doe v. JBF RAK
LLC, No. 2:14-cv-00979–RFB–GWF, 2014 WL 5286512, at *5 (D. Nev. Oct. 15, 2014); Rose v. Beaumont
Indep. Sch. Dist., 240 F.R.D. 264, 266–67 (E.D. Tex. 2007); Doe v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., No. 2:20cv-02265-CSB-EIL, at 4 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2020); S.D. v. Decker, No. 1:22-cv-03063-VSB-BCM, 2022 WL
1239589, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2022). See also EW v. New York Blood Ctr., 213 F.R.D. 108, 112 (E.D.N.Y.
2003) (applying this to a nongovernmental blood bank).
182. See also Ressler, supra note 5, at 245 (arguing that “the importance of ensuring all citizens a voice with
which to challenge governmental actions, and the reluctance of many to do so for fear of reprisal, warrants liberal
permission by the courts to permit plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously when suing governmental agencies”).
183. M.M. v. Zavaras, 139 F.3d 798, 803 (10th Cir. 1998); cf. Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 274 (4th
Cir. 2014) (“[T]he public interest in the underlying litigation is especially compelling given that Company Doe
sued a federal agency.”); Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 411 (3d Cir. 2011).
184. Doe v. Cook Cty., No. 1:20-cv-5832, 2021 WL 2258313, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2021); Doe v. Greiner,
662 F. Supp. 2d 355, 360–61 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
185. Megless, 654 F.3d at 411 (internal quotation marks omitted); Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 274
(4th Cir. 2014); Doe v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 7:18-cv-00016, 2018 WL 1594805, at *3 (W.D.
Va. Apr. 2, 2018); B.L. v. Zong, No. 3:15-cv-1327, 2016 WL 11269933, at *13 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2016); E.A.
v. Brann, No. 18-cv-7603 (CM), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143208, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2018).
186. Cook Cty., No. 1:20-cv-5832, 2021 WL 2258313, at *7; F.B. v. East Stroudsburg Univ., No. 3:09-cv525, 2009 WL 2003363, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 7, 2009); see also E.A. v. Brann, No. 18-cv-7603-CM, 2018 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 143208, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2018).
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Thus, though courts often note “whether the action is against a governmental or private party”187 as a factor in the pseudonymity analysis, it is not clear
which way this factor cuts.188 Perhaps the better inquiry would be not into
whether the defendant is a government entity, but into whether the plaintiff is
challenging government action as a matter of law without regard to the factual
details related to the plaintiff (see Part I.D above); such a purely legal challenge
indeed makes the plaintiff’s identity less important.189
II. REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION OF NON-PSEUDONYMITY: GENERALLY
A. LITIGANT INTERESTS
Yet despite all these costs of pseudonymity—to the public, to opposing
parties, and potentially to the accuracy and efficiency of fact-finding—
pseudonymity is sometimes allowed if there is a “substantial[]”190 basis. The
“substantiality” threshold is high, because it requires some showing of costs to
the would-be pseudonymous litigant beyond that routinely borne by the many
litigants who litigate over matters that might intrude on their privacy or
reputation.191 The cases dealing with such substantial basis claims can be
helpfully divided into several categories, laid out below.192

187. In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2019); James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir.
1993).
188. Cook Cty., No. 1:20-cv-5832, 2021 WL 2258313, at *7; Doe v. Teti, No. 1:15-mc-01380, 2015 WL
6689862, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2015).
189. See also Balla, supra note 21, at 731 (likewise arguing against focus on the presence of government
defendants as such).
190. Megless, 654 F.3d at 409; Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile, 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (viewed there
as an inquiry into “the severity of the threatened harm”).
191. See supra Part I.C.5.
192. In the citations below, I focus on cases that actually discuss whether to allow parties to proceed
pseudonymously (or, on a few occasions, decisions that grant motions for pseudonymity without discussion). I
generally don’t discuss cases in which there was no apparent focus on pseudonymity at all, perhaps because the
opposing party didn’t seek to challenge pseudonymity. “‘Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither
brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to
constitute precedents.’” Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 170 (2004) (quoting
Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925)); Doe v. Empire Ent., LLC, No. A16-1283, 2017 WL 1832414, at *3
(Minn. Ct. App. May 8, 2017) (applying this reasoning in concluding that past pseudonymous cases didn’t set a
binding precedent as to pseudonymity when “none of those cases raised on appeal the question of whether a
party may sue using a pseudonym”); Doe v. Milwaukee Cty., No. 18-cv-503, 2018 WL 3458985, at *1 (E.D.
Wisc. July 18, 2018) (dismissing out-of-circuit precedents on the grounds that “none of those cases discusses
the plaintiff’s right to proceed under a pseudonym”); Doe v. Trustees of Indiana Univ., No. 1:21-cv-02903-JRSMJD, 2022 WL 36485, at *7 n.2 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 3, 2022); Doe v. Settle, 24 F.4th 932, 938–39 n.5 (4th Cir. 2022)
(noting the possible impropriety of the plaintiff’s proceeding pseudonymously, but leaving the matter to the
District Court to decide, presumably because no party had raised the objection); Wescott v. Middlesex Hosp.,
No. MMXCV186020250, 2018 WL 2292916, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 1, 2018) (“Courts have granted
pseudonym status to those with psychiatric issues. See, [e.g.], Doe v. Town of West Hartford, 328 Conn. 172
(2018). However, in the foregoing Doe case, no one objected to pseudonym status and the issue was not
addressed.”).
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B. LITIGANT INTERESTS DIMINISHED WHEN LITIGANT’S IDENTITY HAS
ALREADY BEEN DISCLOSED
Note that all the arguments for pseudonymity discussed above are
weakened or outright eliminated once “the identity of the litigant has” already
been revealed, whether in the litigation itself or otherwise.193 They may also be
weakened when the litigant has sought to publicize the case without his name
attached,194 though court decisions are mixed on this.195
C. SYSTEMIC INTEREST: DIMINISHING UNDERENFORCEMENT OF MERITORIOUS
CLAIMS
In most cases where denying pseudonymity can harm parties (whether
through harming privacy or reputation or otherwise), denying pseudonymity can
also undermine the public policy that the civil causes of action are aimed to
serve. Plaintiffs faced with the prospect of these harms might choose not to
litigate. They might decline to sue or might decline to continue with their

193. Megless, 654 F.3d at 409; Doe v. Drake Univ., No. 4:16-cv-00623-RGE-SBJ, 2017 WL 11404865, at
*4 (S.D. Iowa June 13, 2017); Doe v. Wolf, No. 1:20-cv-03299-DLF (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2020); United States v.
Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1013 (9th Cir. 2008); Vargas v. LaBella, No. CV06-5001941S, 2007 WL 155158, at *4
(Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 2, 2007); Doe v. Wash. Univ., No. 4:21-cv-00205-SRC, 2021 WL 4504387, at *2 (E.D.
Mo. Sept. 30, 2021); A.B. v. Hofstra Univ., No. 2:17-cv-5562-DRH-AYS, 2018 WL 1935986, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 24, 2018); Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1097 (R.I. 2002); Doe v. Cornell Univ., No. 3:19-cv-01189MAD-ML, 2021 WL 6128807, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2021); B.L. v. Zong, No. 3:15-cv-1327, 2017 WL
1036474, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2017); Lopez v. Sedgwick Cty. D.A., 437 P.3d 1033, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App.
2019); Vargas v. Doe, 96 Conn. App. 399, 408–09 (2006); Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1095 (R.I. 2002);
Roe v. Bernabei & Wachtel PLLC, 85 F. Supp. 3d 89, 96–97 (D.D.C. 2015); Doe v. Drake Univ., No. 4:16-cv623, at *4 (S.D. Iowa June 13, 2017); Doe v. Univ. of Louisville, No. 3:17-cv-00638-RGJ, 2018 WL 3313019,
at *3 (W.D. Ky. July 5, 2018); Doe v. Univ. of R.I., No. 93-cv-0560B, 1993 WL 667341, at *3 (D.R.I. Dec. 28,
1993); Doe v. Carleton College, No. 0:19-cv-01878-MJD-LIB, at 4–5 (D. Minn. Oct. 25, 2019); Doe v. Word
of Life Fellowship, Inc., No. 11-cv-40077-TSH, 2011 WL 2968912, at *3 (D. Mass. July 18, 2011); Mateer v.
Ross, Suchoff, Egert, Hankin Maidenbaum & Mazel, P.C., No. 96-cv-1756-LAP, 1997 WL 171011, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1997); Doe v. Berg, No. 15:cv-9787-RJS, 2016 WL 11597923, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10,
2016); Doe v. New England Stair Co., Inc., No. 3:18-cv-756-JBA, 2020 WL 12863508, at *3 (D. Conn. June
12, 2020); S.D. v. Decker, No. 1:22-cv-03063-VSB-BCM, 2022 WL 1239589, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2022).
But see Plaintiff v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 22-cv-00018, 2022 WL 168324, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2022)
(“Plaintiffs regularly litigate suits under their own names where their personal identity is irrelevant to the
substance of the case; even if plaintiff’s identity has no bearing on the legal basis for the Select Committee’s
subpoena, this separation does not justify removing plaintiff’s identifying information from the legal proceeding
entirely.”).
194. Doe v. Kidd, 19 Misc. 3d 782, 789 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008); Doe v. Diocese Corp., 43 Conn. Supp. 152,
162 (Super. Ct. 1994); Doe v. Hopkins Sch., No. CV216110316S, 2021 WL 2303079, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct.
May 14, 2021).
195. See Doe v. Colgate Univ., No. 5:15-cv-1069-LEK-DEP, 2016 WL 1448829, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 12,
2016) (concluding that, though plaintiff’s attempt to publicize the case “weighs against Plaintiff’s argument that
he wishes to avoid publicity in pursuing this action,” “it is not enough to persuade the Court that the public’s
interest in learning Plaintiff’s identity outweighs Plaintiff’s significant interest in remaining anonymous”); Doe
v. Marvel, No. 1:10-cv-1316-JMS-DML, 2010 WL 5099346, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 8, 2010) (“Plaintiff only
engaged in one interview and took reasonable precautions to conceal her identity. Thus, she had not yet crossed
the line. Continued media interviews may, however, cause the Court to reconsider its decision to permit Plaintiff
to proceed anonymously.”).
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lawsuits once pseudonymity is denied.196 Likewise, defendants might settle
before complaints are filed, even if they have sound legal or factual defenses.
The underlying causes of action (or defenses) may end up being underenforced,
and useful precedent may end up being underproduced.
Sometimes courts allow pseudonymity in part to avoid this deterrent
effect.197 But in most cases they do not view avoiding this deterrent effect as a
sufficient basis for pseudonymity: “a plaintiff’s stubborn refusal to litigate
openly by itself cannot outweigh the public’s interest in open trials,” they
reason.198 Indeed, in the great bulk of the cases noted below where pseudonymity
was denied, some such deterrent effect was present—for instance, if plaintiffs
are reluctant to file meritorious libel suits for fear that they will just draw more
publicity to the allegedly libelous accusation,199 libel law will be that much less
enforced.
D. LITIGANT AND INSTITUTIONAL INTEREST: INJURY LITIGATED AGAINST
WOULD BE INCURRED
Courts often note that plaintiffs can proceed pseudonymously if “the injury
litigated against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff’s
identity.”200 This reasoning appears to date back to a 1973 case challenging New
York’s policy of recording information about prescription drugs in a centralized
database, which plaintiffs believed would compromise their privacy (even
196. For examples of cases in which denial of a motion to proceed pseudonymously was apparently followed
by the plaintiff’s dropping the case, see Doe v. Bogan, No. 1:21-mc-00073, 2021 WL 3855686, at *24 (D.D.C.
June 8, 2021); Doe v. Wash. Post Co., No. 1:19-cv-00477-UNA, 2019 WL 2336597, at *4 (D.D.C. Feb. 26,
2019); Doe v. City of Franklin Park, No. 1:20-cv-05583 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 2021) (docket entry); see also Ressler,
supra note 15, at 825–26; Strahilevitz, supra note 64, at 1244.
197. Doe v. Lund’s Fisheries, Inc., No. 20-cv-11306-NLH-JS, 2020 WL 6749972, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 17,
2020) (citing this as a reason for pseudonymity in a sexual assault case); Doe v. Oshrin, 299 F.R.D. 100, 104
(D.N.J. 2014) (likewise in a child pornography case); Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile, 214 F.3d 1058,
1073 (likewise in an employee rights case); Doe v. Innovative Enters, Inc., No. 4:20-cv-00107-RCY-LRL, at 4
(E.D. Va. Aug. 25, 2020) (“There is a special public interest here in allowing litigants to defend their rights
under federal law [which bars consumer reporting agencies from disclosing expunged criminal records] without
suffering the same injury as Plaintiff.”); Doe v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 464, 468 (E.D.
Pa. 1997) (“[D]enying plaintiff the use of a pseudonym[] may deter other people who are suffering from mental
illnesses from suing in order to vindicate their rights, merely because they fear that they will be stigmatized in
their community if they are forced to bring suit under their true identity. Indeed, unscrupulous insurance
companies may be encouraged to deny valid claims with the expectation that these individuals will not pursue
their rights in court.”); Doe v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 237 F.R.D. 545, 550 (D.N.J. 2006); Doe v.
Good Samaritan Hosp., 66 Misc. 3d 444, 450 (2019).
198. Megless, 654 F.3d at 411; see also, e.g., Doe v. Princeton Univ., No. 19-cv-7853-BRM, 2019 WL
5587327, at *5 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2019). “[N]o matter how sincere, a plaintiff’s refusal to litigate openly by itself
cannot outweigh the public’s interest in open trials.” Doe v. Temple Univ., Docket No. 14-cv-04729, 2014 WL
4375613, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2014). “It may be, as plaintiff suggests, that victims of sexual assault will be
deterred from seeking relief through civil suits if they are not permitted to proceed under a pseudonym. That
would be an unfortunate result. For the reasons discussed above, however, plaintiff and others like her must seek
vindication of their rights publicly.” Doe v. Weinstein, 484 F. Supp. 3d 90, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Doe v.
Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. See infra Part III.F.1.e.
200. M.M. v. Zavaras, 139 F.3d 798, 803 (10th Cir. 1998).
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though the information was required to be kept confidential).201 Requiring
plaintiffs to litigate under their names would undermine the very confidentiality
that they sought to protect.202 And it would in turn in effect deny the courts the
ability to effectively adjudicate the claims, which would be rendered either
formally or practically moot.
Read broadly, this concern would authorize pseudonymity in nearly all
defamation or disclosure of private facts claims (at least when the information
had not been already widely spread on the Internet203). After all, requiring such
plaintiffs to identify themselves would only further exacerbate the injury. And a
few cases have taken this view.204 But the dominant view is contrary, which is
why libel and privacy cases (see Part III.F.2) are routinely litigated without
pseudonyms.205

201. Roe v. Ingraham, 364 F. Supp. 536, 541 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
202. Cf. Doe v. City of N.Y., 15 F.3d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1994) (allowing pseudonymity in lawsuit over
unauthorized disclosure of HIV status); Doe v. Civiletti, 635 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1980) (likewise, in lawsuit seeking
reinstatement to federal witness protection program); Doe v. United States, 210 F. Supp. 3d 1169 (W.D. Mo.
2016) (likewise, in Privacy Act lawsuit claiming the government improperly disclosed certain information); E.B.
v. Landry, No. 19-cv-862-JWD-SDJ, 2020 WL 5775148 (M.D. La. Sept. 28, 2020) (likewise, in lawsuit
challenging Louisiana expungement law); U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Utah Dep’t of Com., No. 2:16-cv-00611-DNDBP, 2017 WL 963203, at *2 (D. Utah Mar. 10, 2017) (likewise, in lawsuit challenging Utah’s Controlled
Substance Database procedures); Doe v. Harris, 640 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2011) (likewise, in lawsuit
challenging plaintiff’s inclusion on sex offender registry); Doe I-VIII v. Sturdivant, No. 06-cv-10214, 2006 WL
8432896, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 7, 2006) (likewise, in lawsuit challenging sex offender registry); M.J. v.
Jacksonville Housing Auth., No. 3:11-cv-771-J-37-MCR, 2011 WL 4031099, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2011)
(likewise, in lawsuit claiming unlawful disclosure of a juvenile arrest report); Doe v. Bonta, No. 3:22-cv-00010LAB-DEB (S.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2022) (likewise, in lawsuit claiming unlawful disclosure of firearms purchase and
license records).
203. Cf. Doe v. FBI, 218 F.R.D. 256, 260 (D. Colo. 2003).
204. See Doe v. O’Neill, No. C.A. W.C. 86-354, 1987 WL 859818, at *2 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 6, 1987)
(privacy lawsuit, information about curable STDs); In re Ashley Madison Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.,
MDL No. 2669, 2016 WL 1366616, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 2016) (data breach lawsuit against dating service
for adulterers); Doe v. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll., No. 18-cv-040-LM, 2018 WL 2048385, at *5–6 (D.N.H.
May 2, 2018) (quasi-libel challenge to Title IX finding of sexual assault); Doe v. Regis Univ., No. 1:21-cv00580-NYW, 2021 BL 423775, at *3 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2021) (likewise); Doe v. Univ. of St. Thomas, No. 16cv-1127-ADM-KMM, 2016 WL 9307609, at *2 (D. Minn. May 25, 2016) (likewise); Doe v. Alger, 317 F.R.D.
37, 42 (W.D. Va. 2016) (likewise); Doe v. Grinnell Col., No. 4:17-cv-00079-RGE-SBJ, 2017 BL 555357, at *5
(S.D. Iowa July 10, 2017) (likewise); Doe v. Szul Jewelry, Inc., No. 31382(U) Slip. Op., at *13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2008) (privacy and appropriation of likeness lawsuit, over actions that plaintiff was afraid would damage her
reputation).
205. Raiser v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 182 F. App’x 810, 812 n.2 (10th Cir. 2016)
(“Raiser argues that . . . if we denied his motion to proceed under a pseudonym he would incur the very injury
against which he is litigating. We reject this argument. Preventing disclosure of his identity is not the basis of
Raiser’s lawsuit. Instead, he seeks monetary compensation for a disclosure that has already occurred.”); Doe v.
Liberty Univ., No. 6:19-cv-00007, 2019 WL 2518148, at *3 (W.D. Va. June 18, 2019) (“The ‘injury litigated
against’ is ‘the damage to [Plaintiff’s] reputation.’ This is not the type of retaliatory harm an anonymous lawsuit
is meant to prevent.” (citation omitted)); Free Mkt. Comp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 98 F.R.D. 311, 313
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Doe v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., No. 1:21-cv-02903-JRS-MJD, 2022 WL 36485, at *12 (S.D. Ind.
Jan. 3, 2022). In this respect, Judge Sneed’s dissent in United States v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 930 n.1 (9th Cir.
1981), has largely prevailed: “In [most of the cases cited in support of pseudonymity,] the plaintiffs were required
to reveal information of an intimate and personal nature in order to vindicate constitutional or statutory rights
grounded in the protection of privacy. There is some logic in cooperating to provide anonymity when publicity
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III. REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION OF NON-PSEUDONYMITY:
SPECIFIC JUSTIFICATIONS
A. REASONABLE FEAR OF PHYSICAL HARM OR OTHER EXTRAORDINARY
RETALIATION
Courts generally allow pseudonymity if there is “reasonable[]” “fear[]”206
of “retaliatory physical . . . harm to the requesting party or even more critically,
to innocent non-parties,”207 which may be considered in light of “the anonymous
party’s vulnerability to such retaliation.”208 Express threats of violence would
likely qualify,209 as would specific past incidents of violence or vandalism.210
Lack of such express threats or incidents—or at least lack of highly plausible
predictions of possible future violence211—will usually count against
pseudonymity.212
would inflict the very injury the litigant seeks to avoid by resort to the courts. The practice of providing
pseudonyms should be extended to other situations only rarely.”
206. See, e.g., Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Est., 596 F.3d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 2010);
Endangered v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t Dep’t of Inspections, No. 3:06-cv-250S, 2007 WL 509695,
at *2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2007); Doe v. Benoit, No. 19-cv-1253-DLF, 2020 WL 11885577, at *3 (D.D.C. July
27, 2020); Ramsbottom v. Ashton, No. 3:21-cv-00272, 2021 WL 2651188, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. June 28, 2021);
Whistleblower 14377-16W v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 122 T.C.M. (CCH) 200, at *31 (T.C. 2021); Doe v.
Cook Cty., 542 F. Supp. 3d 779, 784–85 (N.D. Ill. 2021); K.J. v. United States, No. 1:22-cv-00180-JEB, at 6–7
(D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2022); Doe v. Tishman Speyer Properties, L.P., No. 1:22-cv-01682-RJL, at 5–6 (D.D.C. June
7, 2022).
207. In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2019); James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir.
1993); see also Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000); Doe v.
Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981); Does I–V v. Rodriguez, Nos. 06-cv-00805-LTB & 06-mc-0017-LTB,
2007 WL 684114, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2007).
208. Advanced Textile, 214 F.3d at 1068.
209. See Doe v. Neverson, 820 F. App’x 984, 988 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[E]ight threatening or harassing
comments made by [defendant music star’s] fans.”); Doe v. Parx Casino, No. 18-cv-5289, 2019 BL 422669, at
*3 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 2, 2019) (“[T]hreats of physical violence” against lesbian employee who “has a masculine
gender expression.”).
210. Doe v. USD No. 237 Smith Ctr. Sch. Dist., No. 16-cv-2801-JWL-TJJ, 2017 WL 3839416, at *11 (D.
Kan. Sept. 1, 2017); Javier H. v. Garcia-Botello, 211 F.R.D. 194, 196 (W.D.N.Y. 2002); Doe v. United States,
No. 1:19-cv-1673, 2019 WL 6218832, at *4–5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2019); P.S. Zuchowski, No. 2:22-cv-00011cr (D. Vt. Jan. 21, 2022), granting Motion, id. (Jan. 21, 2022).
211. See United States v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 922 n.1 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[R]isk of serious bodily harm if
[prison inmate’s] role on behalf of the Government were disclosed to other inmates.”); Doe No. 1 v. United
States, 143 Fed. Cl. 238, 241 (2019) (“[D]isclosing the names of BATF employees could endanger them.”);
Edwards, supra note 64, at 467 (suggesting that such predictions could be based on a history of retaliatory
violence or vandalism against plaintiffs in past similar cases, and particularly noting Establishment Clause
cases).
212. In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 965 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11th Cir. 2020); United States v. Stoterau, 524
F.3d 988, 1002, 1013–14 (9th Cir. 2008); Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Est., 596 F.3d 1036,
1045 (9th Cir. 2010); Doe v. Gooding, No. 20-cv-06569-PAC, 2022 WL 1104750, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13,
2022); Roe v. Heil, No. 11-cv-01983-WJM-KLM, 2011 WL 3924962, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 7, 2011); Does I-V
v. Rodriguez, No. 06-cv-00805-LTB, 2007 WL 684114, at *2 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2007); Reimann v. Hanley, No.
16 C 50175, 2016 WL 5792679, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2016); Doe v. Raimondo, No. 1:21-mc-00127-UNA
(D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2021); Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Doe v. Ct. of Common Pleas of
Butler Cty. PA, No. 17-cv-1304, 2017 WL 5069333, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2017); Boggs v. United States, 143
Fed. Cl. 508, 513–16 (2019); Doe v. Pleasant Valley School Dist., No. 3:07-cv-854, 2007 WL 2234514, at *3
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2007); Doe v. Garland, No. 1:22-cv-00722, at 5–6 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2022).
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Risk of harm in a foreign country or from a foreign government would also
qualify.213 “[R]easonable[] . . . fears” of other kinds of “extraordinary
retaliation,” such as “deportation, arrest, and imprisonment” in a foreign
country, may also qualify,214 though perhaps mere deportation might not.215 So
might “harassment or other form of retaliation” against a prisoner by guards.216
Courts also generally require that the risk of threatened violence flow from
the revelation of the party’s name in the litigation, not from other factors (such
as the party already being known to the people who might want to attack him).217
And of course, the risk must come from the public revelation: If the risk is that,
for instance, the defendant will retaliate against the plaintiff, that can’t be
avoided by pseudonymity, because the defendant would need to know the
plaintiff’s identity in order to defend the case even if the plaintiff is allowed to

213. See, e.g., Cengiz v. Bin Salman, No. 1:20-cv-03009 (D.D.C. Sept. 16, 2021) (fear of violent retaliation
against nonparty by a Saudi crown prince who had been accused of murdering a prominent critic); Chang v.
Republic of South Sudan, No. 21-cv-1821, 2021 WL 2946160, at *3 (D.D.C. July 9, 2021) (evidence that
plaintiffs have “personally ‘been the victims of deliberate attacks orchestrated by the government of South
Sudan’” and that “South Sudan has carried out ‘cross-border harassment, intimidation, and attacks against critics
of the government of South Sudan’”); Las Americas Immigrant Advoc. Ctr. v. Wolf, No. 19-cv-3640-KBJ, 2020
WL 7319297, at *3–4 (D.D.C. Jul 8, 2020) (risk of attack in Mexico and El Salvador); Kiakombua v.
McAleenan, No. 19-cv-1872-KBJ, 2019 WL 11322784, at *2–3 (D.D.C. July 3, 2019) (risk of attack in El
Salvador and Cuba); Maxwell v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 1:22-cv-00173, at *5 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2022) (risk
of attack in Lebanon); Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 21-cv-1274-RSM, 2021 WL 6138844, at *2
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 2021) (risk of attack against petitioner’s children in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo); Doe v. Dordoni, No. 1:16-cv-00074-JHM, 2016 WL 4522672, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 29, 2016) (risk of
attack in Saudi Arabia based on Saudi citizen’s conversion to Christianity); Doe v. Biden, No. 1:21-cv-03356RBW (D.D.C. Jan. 6, 2022) (risk of retaliation by Iranian government); J.O. v. U.S. Citizenship & Immig. Servs.,
No. 22:cv-1850-AMD (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2022), granting Motion, id. (Apr. 4, 2022)) (risk of attack against gay
asylum applicant in Jamaica); O.M.C.S. v. Zuchowski, No. 5:22-cv-00048 (D. Vt. Feb. 23, 2022), granting
Motion, id. (Feb. 18, 2022) (risk of attack against petitioner’s family by human traffickers in Honduras);
Anonymous v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 127 T.C. 89, 92 (2006) (evidence that “a member of petitioner’s
family was kidnapped several years ago and that kidnapping is rampant in the country where petitioner and most
of petitioner’s family reside,” which led to a reasonable fear that “publicizing petitioner’s identity and financial
circumstances will increase the risk that either petitioner or a member of petitioner’s family will be the target of
another kidnapping”). But see Doe v. U.S. Citizenship & Immig. Servs., No. 1:22-mc-00007-UNA, at *5 (D.D.C.
Jan. 21, 2022) (making clear that pseudonymity isn’t available in asylum cases generally, absent a showing of
some specific “need for secrecy or . . . consequences likely to befall them or others if this case proceeds on the
public docket”); S.D. v. Decker, No. 1:22-cv-03063-VSB-BCM, 2022 WL 1239589, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27,
2022) (likewise).
214. Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Haitian
Bridge Alliance v. Biden, No. 1:21-cv-03317, at 5 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 2021).
215. E.A. v. Brann, No. 18-cv-7603-CM, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143208, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2018)
(“Revealing Petitioner’s identity might subject him to the harm of deportation—and it is a harm—but this Court
has no business interfering with the enforcement of federal law.”); Doe I v. Four Bros. Pizza, No. 13-cv-1505VB, 2013 WL 6083414, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2013).
216. Doe v. Hebbard, No. 21-cv-00039-BAS-AGS, 2021 WL 1195828, at *1–2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2021);
see also Charles H. v. D.C., No. 1:21-cv-00997, 2021 WL 6619327, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Apr. 9, 2021) (relying on
the “risk of retaliation” from “[j]ail staff”).
217. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Chi., 360 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004); A.N. v. Landry, 338 F.R.D. 347, 356
(M.D. La. 2021); Doe v. Freydin, No. 21-cv-8371-NRB, 2021 WL 4991731, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2021).
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sue pseudonymously (unless perhaps the case involves purely legal questions).218
On the other hand, occasionally courts are more open to speculation about
possible violent retaliation; consider this, for instance, from a case where a
student sued his university based on what he said was an unfair investigation of
domestic violence claims levied by a classmate:
The court thinks that Doe’s identification may put him at risk for physical or
mental harm by persons who know that he has been found responsible for
domestic violence against Roe. Moreover, his identification has the potential
to lead persons—especially those who are associated with Doe and Roe or
know of Doe and Roe—to identify Roe as his accuser and identify other
students who were involved in the investigative process. It is also likely that
identification of Roe could result in her facing a risk of harm.219

Likewise, one court has allowed such speculation in allowing a police officer
accused of misconduct to sue pseudonymously for libel, though that was
reversed on appeal, and another appellate court had taken the opposite view.220
As with many such tests that turn on speculation and predictions, much depends
on the instincts of each judge, and the judge’s reactions to the factual allegations.
B. REASONABLE FEAR OF MENTAL, EMOTIONAL, OR PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM
The cases that say pseudonymity can be justified if naming a party risks
physical harm also usually say the same as to “mental harm.”221 And courts

218. See Does v. Shalushi, No. 10-cv-11837, 2010 WL 3037789, at *4 (E.D. Mich. July 30, 2010); Doe v.
Freydin, No. 21-cv-8371-NRB, 2021 WL 4991731, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2021).
219. Doe v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 7:19-cv-00249, 2020 WL 1287960, at *4 (W.D. Va.
Mar. 18, 2020). See also Doe v. Heil, No. 08-cv-02342-WYD-CBS, 2008 WL 4889550, at *3 (D. Colo. Nov.
13, 2008) (allowing pseudonymity even in the absence of specific threat of harm to a prisoner from having his
sex offender status being disclosed, based on the prisoner’s health condition making him especially vulnerable
to harm from attacks); Doe v. School Dist. 214, No. 1:16-cv-07642, at 10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2017) (allowing
pseudonymity to plaintiff who was suing over having been racially harassed in high school, in part because
“plaintiff’s case will require the naming of various classmates, any of whom might feel justified in retaliating
against plaintiff on account of his accusations against them”); Osrecovery, Inc. v. One Groupe Int’l, Inc., No.
02-cv-8993-LAK, 2003 WL 23313, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2003) (finding a threat of physical harm based on
messages containing unpleasant but mostly ambiguous expressions of hostility).
220. M.R. v. Niesen, No. A2002596, 2020 WL 5406791, at *1 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Hamilton Cty. July 24,
2020) (allowing pseudonymity), rev’d sub nom. State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Shanahan, 185 N.E.3d 1089,
1098–1100 (Ohio 2022) (rejecting pseudonymity); Doe v. Mckesson, 935 F.3d 253, 266 n.8 (5th Cir. 2019)
(rejecting pseudonymity); see also Doe v. Town of Lisbon, No. 1:21-cv-00944 (D.N.H. Apr. 21, 2022) (motion
to oppose pseudonymity pending) (police officer’s pseudonymous federal litigation aimed at getting name
removed from list of police officers as to whom credible misconduct allegations had been made and had to be
disclosed to defense counsel). Cf. Bird v. Barr, No. 19-cv-1581, 2019 WL 2870234, at *5 (D.D.C. July 3, 2019)
(allowing pseudonymity on the grounds that plaintiffs could serve as undercover/intelligence workers, and their
ability to do so safely could be hindered by publicly identifying them as FBI agents); Navy Seal 1 v. Austin, No.
1:22-cv-00688-CKK, at 5–6 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2022) (allowing pseudonymity on the grounds that plaintiffs are
Navy Seals, and “public disclosure of their identities ‘may compromise past and future sensitive operations’”);
Doe v. Tishman Speyer Properties, L.P., No. 1:22-cv-01682-RJL, at 5–6 (D.D.C. June 7, 2022) (likewise as to
Green Beret).
221. See, e.g., Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 2008).
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sometimes apply that prong of the test; a psychologist coauthor and I discuss it
in some detail in a separate article.222
C. AVOIDING SELF-INCRIMINATION IN FACIAL CHALLENGES TO GOVERNMENT
ACTION
Courts sometimes allow pseudonymity to prevent a party from having “to
admit [an] intention to engage in illegal conduct, thereby risking criminal
prosecution” in order to challenge potential future government action.223
Modern examples of this are rare, but the ones that do exist appear to generally
involve facial challenges in which the plaintiff’s identity is in any event less
important.224
D. PROTECTING MINORS (AND NEAR-MINORS?)
1. Pseudonymizing Minors and Their Parents
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(a)(3) presumptively requires
pseudonymizing minors as to all matters, whether or not such matters would be
seen as private as to adults,225 though that presumption can be rebutted.226
Likewise, some cases allow parents who are suing on behalf of their minor
children to proceed pseudonymously,227 at least when the case involves highly
personal information about the children, reasoning that, “[s]ince a parent must
proceed on behalf of a minor child, the protection afforded to the minor would

222. Kathryn Baselice & Eugene Volokh, Avoiding Mental Harm as a Basis for Litigant Pseudonymity (in
draft).
223. Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000). This formulation
first appears in Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981), which in turn cites S. Methodist Univ. Ass’n
of Women L. Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 713 (5th Cir. 1979), which in turn cites cases where the
plaintiffs facially challenged abortion laws and limits on welfare payments to illegitimate children.
224. See generally Balla, supra note 21, at 709–10 (generally endorsing pseudonymity in such situations).
For one modern exception, see Doe 1 v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., No. 13-14356, 2014 WL 2207136, at *10 (E.D.
Mich. 2014) (concluding that discovery in the matter could have revealed the “extraordinary means” which
plaintiffs used to protect themselves in prison, thus resulting in potential exposure to punishment from prison
authorities). Cf. Doe v. Cook Cty. Land Bank Auth., No. 1:20-cv-06329, 2020 WL 11627484, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Nov. 23, 2020) (“Plaintiff’s most compelling argument is that he fears retaliation in the form of arrest and
prosecution, as well as associated physical or mental harm. His arguments, though, are only speculative—he
fails to advance any cogent reason for his fear of arrest or prosecution and how this can be a legitimate basis for
anonymity.”); Doe v. Dart, No. CIV. A. 08 C 5120, 2009 WL 1138093, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2009) (pure
speculation of risk of retaliatory arrest for “unsuccessfully attempt[ing] to report her [government] supervisors
about the[ir] alleged improper use of improper funds” inadequate to justify pseudonymity).
225. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a)(3). In this respect, minors’ names are treated like social security numbers or
financial account numbers. Id.; see also M.P. v. Schwartz, 853 F. Supp. 164, 168 (D. Md. 1994) (concluding
that redaction of minors’ names is consistent with the right of access to court records).
226. Lobisch v. United States, No. 1:20-cv-00370-HG-KJM, 2020 WL 12893930, at *2 (D. Haw. Aug. 31,
2020) (rejecting pseudonymity where “both minors’ full names and pictures are readily and publicly available
on various media outlets that reported on Plaintiffs’ filing of this lawsuit”); Doe v. Epic Games, Inc., 435 F.
Supp. 3d 1024, 1053–54 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (rejecting pseudonymity when minor plaintiff filed a class action over
supposed fraud in in-video-game purchases).
227. See Appendix 1a.
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be eviscerated unless the parent was also permitted to proceed using initials.”228
Minor defendants (and their parents) are generally pseudonymized as well.229 A
few courts, however, have declined to pseudonymize parents in such
situations.230
2. Pseudonymizing Young Adults
In cases involving alleged sexual assaults of and by college students:
• Some courts have been willing to allow pseudonymity because of
the students’ youth, even though they were not minors.231
• Others suggest a rigid cutoff at the age of majority.232
• Still others suggest the cutoff should be around age twenty.233
228. P.M. v. Evans-Brant Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 08-cv-168A, 2008 WL 4379490, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 22,
2008).
229. Doe v. Immaculate Conception Church Corp., No. CV09-501-1968, 2009 WL 4845449, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Sept. 22, 2009); Black v. Redacted, No. FA064007232S, 2007 WL 1321729, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Apr. 19, 2007). But see Roe v. Wetmore, No. CV085006610S, 2009 WL 1532501, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. May
6, 2009) (rejecting pseudonymity of defendant, when “[t]he plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the minor
plaintiff, while in the child care services of the defendant, was sexually abused by the minor son of the
defendant,” even though identifying the defendant would enable people to identify her minor son).
230. Doe v. Tsai, No. 08-cv-1198-DWF-AJB, 2008 WL 11462908, at *4 (D. Minn. July 23, 2008) (lawsuit
over allegedly false claims of sexual abuse of minor by parents); Irvin v. Grand Rapids Public School Dist., No.
1:14-cv-1161 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 16, 2015), denying Motion, id. (Nov. 11, 2014); Doe v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist.,
No. 3:15-cv-00385-ST, 2015 WL 5023093, at *5 (D. Or. Aug. 20, 2015); C.H. v. School Bd. of Okaloosa Cty.,
No. 3:18-cv-2128-MCR-CJK, 2018 WL 11267720, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 7, 2018); United Fin. Cas. Co. v.
R.A.E., Inc., No. 20-cv-2467-KHV, 2020 WL 6117895, at *2 (D. Kan. Oct. 16, 2020); Doe v. Hopkins Sch.,
No. CV216110316S, 2021 WL 2303079, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 14, 2021); Bond v. United States, No.
1:22-cv-00136-LEK-KJM, at 6 (D. Haw. Apr. 5, 2022) (rejecting pseudonymity for parent of minors in a
wrongful death case because the minors’ identities “have ben publicly disclosed in an online obituary for the
Decedent”). Even child-only pseudonymity does provide some protection for the children: Many people worry
most not about the rare determined researcher but about a casual name-Googler, whether a prospective employer
or someone else, and shielding the child’s name would likely provide a good deal of protection against that.
231. See Doe v. Colgate Univ., No. 5:15-cv-1069-LEK-DEP, 2016 WL 1448829, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 12,
2016); Doe v. Alger, 317 F.R.D. 37, 40–41 (W.D. Va. 2016); Doe v. New York Univ., 537 F. Supp. 3d 483,
496–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2021); Doe v. Univ. of Chi., No. 16-cv-08298, 2017 WL 4163960, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
20, 2017); Yacovelli v. Moser, No. 1:02-cv-596, 2004 WL 1144183, at *9 (M.D.N.C. May 20, 2014); Doe v.
School Dist. 214, No. 1:16-cv-07642, at 8–9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2017); Charles H. v. D.C., No. 1:21-cv-00997,
2021 WL 6619327, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 9, 2021) (though also noting “plaintiffs’ relative youth [ages 18 and 20]
in conjunction with their disabilities”); M.F. on behalf of R.L. v. Magellan Healthcare Inc., No. 20-cv-3928,
2021 WL 1121042, at *1 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2021) (likewise mentioning young adult plaintiff’s “serious
behavioral issues” as a factor in favor of pseudonymity); Roe v. Doe, 319 F. Supp. 3d 422, 428 (D.D.C. 2018)
(rejecting pseudonymity in part because the defendant was above 18), rev’d, 2019 WL 1778053, at *3 (D.D.C.
Apr. 23, 2019) (allowing pseudonymity, in part because of the defendant’s youth, and in part because “the
pending motion now seeks to protect the identities of both parties, both of whom are young”); see also Doe v.
Doe, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 1120, 2016 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1195, at *4 (2016) (upholding trial court’s sealing
of a college student’s unsuccessful abuse prevention order case against another student, partly because “the
parties were young college students”).
232. E.g., Plaintiff v. Wayne State Univ., No. 2:20-cv-11718-GAD-DRG, 2021 WL 243155, at *6 (E.D.
Mich. Jan. 25, 2021); Doe 1 v. George Wash. Univ., 369 F. Supp. 3d 49, 66 (D.D.C. 2019); see also Doe v. City
Univ. of N.Y., No. 21-cv- 9544-NRB, 2021 WL 5644642, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2021) (non-sexual-assault
case).
233. E.g., Doe v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 7:18-cv-170, 2018 WL 5929647, at *3 (W.D. Va.
Nov. 13, 2018); Doe v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 7:19-cv-00249, 2020 WL 1287960, at *4 (W.D.
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And one unhelpfully opines: “[C]ourts should be careful not to
draw a bright line between a plaintiff one day shy of her eighteenth
birthday and a plaintiff one day past it. . . . The proper inquiry, as
always, is the totality of the circumstances.”234

3. Pseudonymizing Adult Plaintiffs Suing over Injuries That Occurred
When They Were Minors
Some courts allow adults to proceed pseudonymously when they sue over
injuries that occurred when they were minors.235 Others do not.236
4. Pseudonymizing Adults to Shield Their Alleged Minor Victims
Alleged child victims of sexual abuse might not want that information
revealed in any court case—not just their own lawsuits over having been
molested. Thus, then-Judge Sotomayor excluded from an opinion, “for the sake
of the privacy of plaintiff’s child,” the name of a Fourth Amendment plaintiff
who claimed that the government falsely charged him with sexually abusing his
daughter (though the court did not decide whether the name should have been
excluded entirely from the court record).237 One court likewise allowed
pseudonymity in a libel case to “protect[] the minor child of the defendants and
the minor children of the plaintiff from exposure in the community of their
private situation, which involves allegations that a false accusation concerning
Va. Mar. 18, 2020); Doe v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 7:18-cv-320, 2018 WL 5929645, at *3
(W.D. Va. Nov. 13, 2018); Yacovelli v. Moser, No. 1:02-cv-596, 2004 WL 1144183, at *8 (M.D.N.C. May 20,
2014); Magellan Healthcare Inc., 2021 WL 1121042, at *1 n.2. The Virginia Polytechnic cases involved three
different plaintiffs, but the same judge.
234. Doe v. Sheely, 781 F. App’x 972, 973–74 (11th Cir. 2019).
235. E.g., Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 2011) (child pornography); Doe v.
Streeter, No. 4:20-cv-11609-MFL-APP, 2020 WL 6685099, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2020) (child
pornography); Doe v. Fowler, No. 3:17-cv-00730-FDW-DSC, 2018 WL 3428150, at *3 (W.D.N.C. July 16,
2018) (child pornography); Doe v. Wairi, No. 1:22-cv-10091 (D. Mass. Jan. 26, 2022) (surreptitious
photographing of child’s genitals); Doe v. St. John’s Episcopal Parish Day School, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1279,
1290 (M.D. Fla. 2014); Doe v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 2:15-cv-00793-APG-GWF, 2016 WL 4432683, at
*14–15 (D. Nev. Aug. 18, 2016); Doe v. USD No. 237 Smith Ctr. Sch. Dist., No. 16-cv-2801-JWL-TJJ, 2017
WL 3839416, at *11 (D. Kan. Sept. 1, 2017); Doe-2 v. Richland Cty. School Dist. 2, No. 3:20-cv-02274-CMC,
at 2 (D.S.C. Aug. 3, 2020); Doe v. N. Homes, Inc., No. 18-cv-3419-WMW-LIB, 2019 WL 3766380, at *5 (D.
Minn. Aug. 9, 2019), rev’d & remanded as to other matters, 11 F.4th 633 (8th Cir. 2021); PB-7 Doe v. Amherst
Central Sch. Dist., 196 A.D.3d 9 (2021); Doe v. Boulder Valley Sch. Dist. No. RE-2, No. 11-cv-02107-PAB,
2011 WL 3820781, at *3 (D. Colo. Aug. 30, 2011) (though noting that the adult plaintiffs were just a few years
out of minority); Doe v. City of Stamford, No. FSTCV215025468S, 2021 WL 6608252, at *3 (Conn. Ct. Super.
Ct. Dec. 22, 2021).
236. E.g., Doe v. Rackliffe, 173 Conn. App. 389, 400 (2017); C.S. v. EmberHope, Inc., No. 19-2612-KHV,
2019 WL 6727102, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 11, 2019); Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 2005); Doe 1 v.
Unified Sch. Dist. 331, No. CIV.A. 11-1351-KHV, 2013 WL 1624823, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 15, 2013); Doe v.
Holland Christian Ed. Soc’y, No. 1:18-cv-400, at 3 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 11, 2018); Brooks v. Benton Harbor Area
Schools, No. 1:17-cv-93 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 2, 2017); Doe v. Bedford City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., No. 1:22-cv00059 (N.D. Ohio June 17, 2022); Doe v. St. John, No. CV055000443S, 2006 WL 1149224, at *2 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Apr. 13, 2006); GCVAWCG-Doe v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y., 69 Misc. 3d 648, 653 (2020);
Sherman v. Trinity Teen Sols., Inc., 339 F.R.D. 203, 205 (D. Wyo. 2021) (non-sexual abuse).
237. Smith v. Edwards, 175 F.3d 99, 100 n.1 (2d Cir. 1999).
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the plaintiff’s conduct toward his niece had the effect of alienating him from his
own children.”238
5. Pseudonymizing Adults in Other Cases Related to Nonparty Minors
And children might be upset not just by discussions of their alleged sexual
abuse, but also by discussions of the child’s having been physically abused by
parents or others, or even taunted by classmates.239 Likewise, in one case,
parents sued a doctor who had artificially inseminated the mother with the
doctor’s own sperm instead of her husband’s; the appellate court suggested that,
in deciding whether the parents could proceed pseudonymously, the trial judge
should weigh “the risk of harm to the children from revelation of the full
circumstances of their birth.”240
In another case, a child’s mother sued the child’s father, whose identity was
secret from the child, alleging that the father failed to supply promised child
support and other benefits. The court concluded that both parties should be
pseudonymous because “public disclosure of the parties’ identities would nullify
any privacy protection given to the minor child and would lead to the uncovering
of the minor child’s identity.”241
6. Pseudonymizing Adults in Cases Unrelated to Their Children, to
Avoid Embarrassment to Children
Indeed, a child could be highly embarrassed (or taunted by classmates)
even by revelations about their parents that have nothing to do with the child.
Consider, for instance, Doe v. MacFarland, in which a woman sued alleging that
she was sexually abused by her high school guidance counselor starting thirtyfive years earlier;242 the court let her proceed pseudonymously chiefly because

238. Boe v. Coe, No. CV05-4005684, 2005 WL 941418, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. New Haven Dist. Mar. 18,
2005); see also M. v. O., No. 1:22-cv-03707 (D.N.J. June 13, 2022), granting Motion, id. at 4–7 (June 10, 2022)
(allowing pseudonymity for both plaintiff and defendant when plaintiff claimed he was abused, when he was a
minor, by his mother and uncle). But see A.K. v. Ill. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 2017 IL App (1st) 163255U, ¶¶ 27–30 (noting the issue but not considering it, for procedural reasons; it appears that on remand the trial
court held against pseudonymity, because the case proceeded with the parties named, Kozik v. Ill. Dep’t of
Child. & Fam. Servs., 2019 IL App (1st) 182022-U); Doe v. Quiring, 686 N.W.2d 918, 923 (S.D. 2004) (3–2
vote) (rejecting statutory argument that incest offenders should be excluded from state sex offender registry
because identifying them would identify their victims, and the statute made “confidential” “the name or any
identifying information” of a victim).
239. See Doe v. Mechanicsburg Sch. Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1027 (S.D. Ohio 2021) (allowing
pseudonymity in such a case, in part on the theory that “[p]ublic revelation of Plaintiffs’ identities may invite
further bullying and harassment and disrupt John Doe’s education”).
240. James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 241 (4th Cir. 1993) (remanding for the trial judge to do the weighing);
see also id. at 243 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that “the risk of substantial
harm to these innocent third parties who are minor children so significantly outweighs the minimal risk of
prejudice to the defendant . . . that as a matter of law the plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed to trial under
the James pseudonyms”).
241. Doe v. Roe, No. 17-cv-23333, at 2 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2018), granting Motion, id. (Nov. 16, 2017).
242. Doe v. MacFarland, 117 N.Y.S.3d 476, 481 (Sup. Ct. 2019).
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of the “potential impact to her children, both of whom attend school in the
School District”:
The Court is particularly mindful of the impact of social media and the extent
to which children can be readily exposed to taunting and harassing behaviors
through such medium. In this Court’s view, placing plaintiff into a Hobson’s
choice of proceeding under a pseudonym or discontinuing her action would
negate the intent of the Child Victims Act. Here, issues which are sensitive
and intimate have been raised and there is arguably a significant risk of harm
to innocent third parties and little chance of prejudice to the only defendant
who has opposed the application.243

Or consider Doe v. Doe, which allowed pseudonymity for a defendant who was
accused of sexual assault and of paying for sex, partly because “[t]he defendant’s
former spouse and minor child are innocent third parties who would be
vulnerable to mental harm if his name is disclosed.”244
Indeed, any publicity related to a parent’s alleged misconduct (or even
proven misconduct) might deeply embarrass the parent’s children245 and lead
them to be taunted at school.246 It can even sometimes lead to the risk that
children will be attacked because of their association with the parent.247 Yet
allowing pseudonymity in such cases seems likely to sharply undermine the
general rule of public access, which may be why other courts have rejected such
arguments.248
243. Id. at 498. See also GCVAWCG-Doe v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y., 69 Misc. 3d 648, 653
(2020) (noting that, in such a case, “a highly compelling factor might be that the plaintiff has a child or grandchild
currently in the school system or church parish in which the [past] abuse [of plaintiff] arose”); Doe v.
Yellowbrick Real Est., No. FSTCV205023127S, 2020 WL 6712461, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 2020)
(allowing sexual assault plaintiff to sue under a pseudonym in part because “[p]laintiff has submitted affidavits
in which she stated that failure to shield her name subject her, and her minor children, to harassment, injury,
revictimization, ridicule, stigmatization, ostracization in their immediate community and church, which hold
conservative and anachronistic attitudes toward sexual assault”); Discopolus, LLC v. City of Reno, No. 317-cv0574-MMD-VPC, 2017 WL 10900550, at *2 (D. Nev. Nov. 16, 2017) (allowing erotic dancer to proceed
pseudonymously in part because “plaintiff JT is the mother of two young children and disclosure of her identity
may stigmatize them as well”); see also Doe v. Roman Cath. Archdiocese of N.Y., 64 Misc. 3d 1220(A), at *2
(2019) (discussing this argument raised by the plaintiff, but rejecting pseudonymity on other grounds); Doe v.
Marvel, No. 1:10-cv-1316-JMS-DML, 2010 WL 5099346, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 8, 2010) (mentioning this
argument raised by the plaintiff, but allowing pseudonymity without further discussing this particular point).
244. Doe v. Doe, No. 20-cv-5329-KAM-CLP, 2020 WL 6900002, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2020).
245. Amy B. Cyphert, Prisoners of Fate: The Challenges of Creating Change for Children of Incarcerated
Parents, 77 MD. L. REV. 385, 385 (2018); HHS and DOJ Host Listening Session with Youth Who Have an
Incarcerated Parent, YOUTH.GOV (2016), http://youth.gov/feature-article/coip-listening-session-2016.
246. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants, Doe v. Thompson, No. 13-110318-S, 2014 WL 903846, at *57 (Kan.
Jan. 22, 2014).
247. Doe v. Butte Cty. Prob. Dep’t, No. 2:20-cv-02248-TLN-DMC, 2020 WL 7239583, at *6–7 (E.D. Cal.
Dec. 9, 2020); Doe v. Butte Cty. Prob. Dep’t, No. 2:20-cv-02248-TLN-DMC, 2021 WL 50471, at *3 (E.D. Cal.
Jan. 6, 2021); cf. Chang v. Republic of South Sudan, No. 21-cv-1821, 2021 WL 2946160, at *3 (D.D.C. July 9,
2021) (citing risk that “disclosure of plaintiff Nygundeng’s personal information might put her three minor
children at risk” from the government of South Sudan, though focusing on the personal information and not the
plaintiff’s name, which was public).
248. See, e.g., Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. M.O., No. 21-cv-2164-DDC-ADM, 2021 WL 4476783, at *9 (D. Kan.
Sept. 30, 2021) (“M.O.’s argument essentially asserts in conclusory fashion that her children should be protected
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E. PRIVACY AS TO “SENSITIVE AND HIGHLY PERSONAL” “STIGMATIZED”
MATTERS
Courts also sometimes allow pseudonymity to prevent disclosure of
people’s “sensitive and highly personal” private information249 that creates a risk
of “social stigma.”250 But I stress the “sometimes”: The cases are sharply split
about what matters can indeed justify pseudonymity.
1. Consensual Sex and Related Matters
a. Abortion
Cases where a party is disclosing having had an abortion are often
mentioned as examples of where pseudonymity is proper.251 But while some
such cases allow pseudonymity,252 others don’t.253

from psychological harm because her sex life [and, in particular, her having gotten HPV as a result of having
sex in a car] is embarrassing. But the mere fact that a parent’s sex life might be embarrassing to the minor
children does not present an exceptional case that warrants granting leave to proceed anonymously, particularly
when that individual is seeking insurance coverage as a result of his or her sex life.”); F.L. v. Doe, 70 Misc. 3d
962, 963 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020) (refusing to allow pseudonymity in legal malpractice claim stemming from
divorce case, when the alleged malpractice had to do with division of marital property, though “plaintiff
attest[ed] that she seeks to proceed anonymously to protect her minor child from unnecessary bullying and
embarrassment”); Doe v. Benoit, No. 19-cv-1253-DLF, 2020 WL 11885577, at *4 (D.D.C. July 27, 2020);
Lawson v. Rubin, No. 17-cv-6404-BMC-SMG, 2019 WL 5291205, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 18, 2019); Al Otro
Lado, Inc. v. Nielsen, No. 17-cv-02366-BAS-KSC, 2017 WL 6541446, at *5 n.5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2017);
Luckett v. Beaudet, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1030 (D. Minn. 1998).
249. In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2019); James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir.
1993); Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000).
250. See Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 794 F. Supp. 72, 74 (D.R.I. 1992); Doe v. Rostker, 89
F.R.D. 158, 161 (N.D. Cal. 1981). In some cases, partial redaction of certain information—say, medical details—
can adequately prevent the disclosure of private information this even without pseudonymity, see, e.g., Doe, Inc.
v. Roe, No. 21-mc-43-BAH, 2021 WL 3622166, at *3 (D.D.C. June 3, 2021), but when the core of the lawsuit
is about some such matter, redaction may make it impossible to understand the facts and the legal arguments,
see, e.g., Doe v. Neverson, 820 F. App’x 984, 987–88 (11th Cir. 2020); Oldaker v. Giles, No. 7:20-cv-00224WLS, 2021 WL 3412551, at *3 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 4, 2021), reconsideration denied, No. 7:20-cv-00224-WLS,
2021 WL 3779837 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 25, 2021).
251. E.g., Southern Methodist Univ. Ass’n of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 712–
13 (5th Cir. 1979).
252. Roe v. Operation Rescue, 123 F.R.D. 500, 505 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc.,
527 F.3d 358, 371 n.2 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Roe v. Aware Woman Center for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 685
(11th Cir. 2001) (pseudonymity allowed to plaintiff alleging defendants had prevented her from getting an
abortion).
253. M.M. v. Zavaras, 139 F.3d 798, 804 (10th Cir. 1998) (concluding that denying pseudonymity in claim
against prison for denial of “funds for transportation and medical expenses for abortion services” wasn’t an
abuse of discretion); Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198, 1210 (6th Cir. 1981)
(concluding that denying pseudonymity in challenge to abortion ban wasn’t an abuse of discretion), rev’d in part
on other grounds, City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. For Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983); see also Aware
Woman Center for Choice, 253 F.3d at 689–90 (Hill, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
against pseudonymity in such a case).
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b. Stigmatized Sexual Minorities
Courts have allowed pseudonymity to avoid outing a party as
homosexual254 or transgender,255 at least when the party has kept that
information confidential.256 But some recent cases have disagreed.257
c. Sexual Behavior
Three courts have concluded that pseudonymity was justified to avoid
identifying plaintiff as an erotic dancer,258 but two other courts disagreed.259
Courts have likewise split with regard to allegations of extramarital affairs,260
and one allowed pseudonymity in a case involving adultery together with paying
for sex (and allegedly transmitting STDs).261 Another case allowed it for
254. Doe v. Commonwealth’s Att’y, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200 n.1 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff’d, 425 U.S. 901
(1976); Doe v. Hood, No. 3:16-cv-00789-CWR-FKB, 2017 WL 2408196, at *2 (S.D. Miss. June 2, 2017); Doe
v. Univ. of Scranton, No. 3:19-cv-1486, 2020 WL 1244368, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2020); Doe v. Catholic
Relief Servs., No. 1:20-cv-01815-CCB, 2020 WL 4582711, at *2 (D. Md. Aug. 10, 2020); Doe v. Wilson, No.
3:21-cv-04108-MGL, at 2 (D.S.C. Apr. 18, 2022).
255. Delaware Valley Aesthetics, PLLC v. Doe 1, No. CV 20-0456, 2021 WL 2681286, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June
30, 2021); Doe v. Woodward Properties, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-05090-JMY (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2020), granting
Motion for Order to Proceed Anonymously, id. (Oct. 14, 2020); Doe v. Gray, No. 3:20-cv-00129-DRL-MGG,
at 3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 23, 2020); Doe v. Gardens for Memory Care at Easton, No. 18-cv-4027, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 21, 2018); Doe v. Triangle Doughnuts, LLC, No. 19-cv-5275, 2020 WL 3425150, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 23,
2020); Doe v. Dallas, 16-cv-787-JCJ, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2016); Doe v. Romberger, 16-cv-2337-JP, at
*1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2016); Doe v. Dee Packaging Solutions, Inc., No. 20-cv-2467, at 1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. July
23, 2020); Roe v. Tabu Lounge & Sports Bar, No. 20-cv-3688, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2020), granting Motion,
id. (July 29, 2020); Doe v. Colonial Intermediate Unit 20, No. 20-cv-1215 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2020); Doe v. Pa.
Dep’t of Corrections, No. 19-cv-1584, 2019 WL 5683437, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2019); Doe v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of R.I., 794 F. Supp. 72, 73 (D.R.I. 1992); Meriwether v. Trs. of Shawnee State Univ., No. 1:18-cv753, 2019 WL 2392958, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2019); cf. In the Matter of the Application of T.I.C.-C to
Assume the Name of A.B.C.-C., 271 A.3d 350, 359 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.) (allowing sealing of identifying
records in a transgender person’s name change application).
256. See Doe v. Guess, Inc., No. 5:20-cv-04545-JFL, 2020 WL 5905440, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 6, 2020)
(denying pseudonymity when plaintiff’s sexual orientation was broadly known).
257. Doe v. Franklin Cty., No. 2:13-cv-00503, 2013 WL 5311466, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 20, 2013)
(homosexuality); Doe v. BrownGreer PLC, No. 14-cv-1980, 2014 WL 4404033, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 5, 2014)
(homosexuality); Doe v. Reyes 1, Inc., No. 5:19-cv-320-TES, 2019 WL 12493582, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 19,
2019) (transgender status).
258. Jane Roes 1–2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 77 F. Supp. 3d 990, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Doe #1 v. Deja Vu
Consulting Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00040, 2017 WL 3837730, at *4–5 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 1, 2017); Discopolus, LLC
v. City of Reno, No. 3:17-cv-0574-MMD-VPC, 2017 WL 10900550, at *2 (D. Nev. Nov. 16, 2017); cf. Manasco
v. Best in Town, Inc., No. 2:21-cv-00381-JHE, 2022 WL 816469, at *2–3 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 17, 2022) (allowing
pseudonymity for erotic dancer declarants, though expressing doubt about whether it would have been allowed
for parties). Two of these courts have also noted the risk that erotic dancers, if identified, may be exposed to the
risk of stalking and violence from fans. Jane Roes 1–2, 77 F. Supp. 3d at 995; Doe #1, 2017 WL 3837730, at
*4.
259. 4 Exotic Dancers v. Spearmint Rhino, No.-cv-08-4038-ABC-SSx, 2009 WL 250054, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 29, 2009); De Angelis v. Nat’l Ent. Grp. LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00924, 2019 WL 1071575, at *5 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 7, 2019).
260. Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 339, 343 n.1 (1975) (no pseudonymity); Alexander v. Falk, No. No. 2:16-cv02268-MMD-GWF, 2017 WL 3749573, at *6 (D. Nev. Aug. 30, 2017) (pseudonymity); In re Ashley Madison
Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., MDL No. 2669, 2016 WL 1366616, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 2016)
(pseudonymity).
261. Doe v. Doe, No. 20-cv-5329-KAM-CLP, 2020 WL 6900002, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2020).
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intervenors who were mentioning their contraceptive use (or at least use of
contraceptives that some view as abortifacients) and premarital sexual
activity,262 though that might have been tied to the parties being students at a
Catholic university, where contraceptive use might be unusually controversial.263
One court refused to allow pseudonymity in a case involving BDSM,
reasoning that, though “a voluntary BDSM relationship may reasonably be
characterized as ‘highly personal,’ it is distinguishable from other highly
personal matters, e.g., hereditary health issues, in that a voluntary BDSM sexual
relationship is a choice.”264 Another refused pseudonymity as to
exhibitionism.265 And courts generally do not allow pseudonymity to prevent
disclosure of other, more conventional sexual or romantic relationships.266
Some courts have allowed pseudonymity (though others have rejected it267)
in cases involving allegedly copyright-infringing downloading of adult
pornography, “because of the ‘highly embarrassing and potentially sensitive and
personal nature of such accusations,’ the risk of misidentification where a
defendant is only identified by an IP address, and the fact that ‘the public’s
interest is not necessarily furthered by knowledge of the defendant’s specific
identity.’”268 Likewise, one case allowed pseudonymity for an actress who

262. Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, No. 13-3853 (7th Cir. Jan. 14, 2014), granting Motion, id. (Dec. 19,
2013).
263. Motion, supra note 259, at 16–18.
264. Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 179 F. Supp. 3d 583, 593 (E.D. Va. 2016).
265. A.B.C. v. XYZ Corp., 282 N.J. Super. 494, 505–06 (App. Div. 1995).
266. Doe v. Berg, No. 15-cv-9787, 2016 WL 11597923, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2016); Doe v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. of N.M., No. 20-cv-1207-JB-JHR, 2021 WL 4034136, at *2 (D.N.M. Sept. 4, 2021) (pseudonymity not justified by the lawsuit’s exposing information about a graduate student’s “romantic and sexual
relationship” with her doctoral advisor, and about the student’s divorce, which was apparently initiated before
the relationship, see Complaint, id. at 5 (Nov. 18, 2020)). But see Del. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Birch, No. CIV.A.
02C-05-026RFS, 2004 WL 1731139, at *1 n.1 (Del. Super. Ct. July 30, 2004) (pseudonymity allowed as to
lawsuit over wrongful disclosure of pregnancy test results).
267. Boy Racer, Inc. v. John Does 1–34, No. 11-cv-23035, 2012 WL 1535703, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 1,
2012); AF Holdings, LLC v. Does 1–162, No. 11-cv-23036, 2012 WL 488217, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2012);
Liberty Media Holdings, LLC v. Swarm Sharing Hash File, 821 F. Supp. 2d 444, 453 (D. Mass. 2011); Patrick
Collins, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, No. 1:12-cv-00844-TWP-MJD, 2013 WL 12291722, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 29, 2013);
Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3, No. 1:12-cv-00844-TWP, 2013 WL 364637, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 29,
2013); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. John Does 1–54, No. 11-cv1-1602-PHX-GMS, 2012 WL 911432, at *4 (D. Ariz.
Mar. 19, 2012).
268. Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 15-cv-2624-ER, 2015 WL 6116620, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2015);
Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, No. 3:19-cv-508-J-34JRK, 2019 WL 5722173, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 5, 2019);
Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 15-cv-1862-RJS, 2015 WL 4271825, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2015); Malibu
Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 14-cv-20394, 2014 WL 12605559, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2014); Malibu Media, LLC
v. Doe, No. 14-cv-20397, 2014 WL 12605560, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 14, 2014); Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No.
14-cv-60689, 2014 WL 12605554, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 2014); Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 14-cv60680, 2014 WL 12605553, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2014); Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 13-cv-21579, 2013
WL 2950593, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2013); Patrick Collins, Inc. v. Does, No. 3:12-cv-339-MCR-CJK, 2012
WL 12870254, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 16, 2012); Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–5, No. 12-cv-2950-JPO,
2012 WL 2001968, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012); see also Next Phase Distrib., Inc. v. Does 1–138, No. 11-cv9706-KBF, 2012 WL 691830, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2012).
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claimed she had been misled into participating in an online ad for a jewelry store,
and had not realized that one of the scenes that she filmed would be “heavily
edited to create a . . . video depicting [her] . . . simulating an orgasm.”269
What about lawsuits involving rape allegations, where the defendant agrees
that the parties had sex but asserts it was consensual? These could be sexual
battery lawsuits, libel lawsuits over rape allegations, or wrongful termination or
expulsion claims brought by employees or students who had been accused of
rape. There, too, the case would expose sexual behavior on the part of the
accused—perfectly legal behavior, according to the accused. And there, too, the
allegation risks great embarrassment (and worse) to the accused. Some courts
have allowed the accused to be anonymous, generally in lawsuits against a
university, precisely on those grounds; for instance:
This case centers on allegations that the Plaintiff engaged in sexual
misconduct. The Plaintiff will therefore be required to disclose information of
the utmost intimacy about himself and the victim of the alleged misconduct.
For this reason, the second factor weighs in favor of proceeding
anonymously.270

But others have not, perhaps on the theory that “[t]he party seeking anonymity
did not allege that he was a victim of sexual assault, which is a crucial distinction
is assessing the intimacy of the information.”271

269. Doe v. Szul Jewelry, Inc., 2008 N.Y. Slip. Op. 31382(U), at 13 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
270. Doe v. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ., No. 6:20-cv-01220-WWB-LRH (M.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2020);
see also Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., Inc., 179 F. Supp. 3d 583, 593 (E.D. Va. 2016)
(“There can be no doubt that the litigation here focuses on a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature.
Plaintiff has been accused of sexual misconduct, the mere accusation of which, if disclosed, can invite
harassment and ridicule.” (citation omitted)); Doe v. Univ. of Ark.-Fayetteville, No. 5:18-cv-05182-PKH, at 2
(W.D. Ark. Dec. 17, 2018); Doe v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., No. 2:20-cv-02265-CSB-EIL, at 4 (C.D. Ill. Nov.
9, 2020); Doe v. La. State Univ., No. 20-cv-379-BAJ-SDJ, 2020 WL 6493768, at *3 (M.D. La. June 30, 2020);
Doe v. Univ. of Miss., No. 18-cv-138, 2018 WL 1703013, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 6, 2018); Doe v. Rollins Coll.,
No. 6:18-cv-1069-Orl-37LRH, 2018 WL 11275374, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2018); Doe v. Univ. of S. Ala., No.
17-cv-0394-CG-C, 2017 WL 3974997, at *2 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 8, 2017); Doe v. Thompson, No. 20STCV31772
(Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. Oct. 28, 2021); Doe v. Univ. of South, No. 4:09-cv-62, 2011 WL 13187184, at *19
(E.D. Tenn. July 8, 2011); Doe v. Grinnell College, No. 4:17-cv-00079-RGE-SBJ, 2017 WL 11646145, at *4
(S.D. Iowa July 10, 2017); Doe v. Univ. of Ore., No. 6:17-cv-01103-AA, at 3 (D. Ore. Sept. 27, 2017);
Memorandum, Doe v. Dordt Univ., 5:19-cv-04082-CJW-KEM, at 15 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 3, 2020), granting
Motion, id. (Dec. 5, 2019); Doe v. Univ. of Miss. Bd. of Trs., No. 3:21-cv-201-DPJ-FKB, 2021 WL 6752261,
at *2 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 14, 2021). Cf. Doe v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 7:19-cv-00249, 2020 WL
1287960, at *3 (W.D. Va. Mar. 18, 2020) (applying the same reasoning to allegations of “domestic and dating
violence”; “[l]ike sexual misconduct, allegations of domestic violence or abusive dating relationships involve
sensitive and highly personal facts that can invite harassment and ridicule”).
271. See Doe v. Purdue Univ., No. 4:18-cv-72-JVB-JEM, 2019 WL 1960261, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 30,
2019); see also Ayala v. Butler Univ., No. 1:16-cv-1266-TWP-DML, at 5–6 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 2018) (expressly
rejecting the argument discussed in the text); Appendix 4b (cases rejecting pseudonymity in such Title IX cases,
though generally without discussing the argument that accusation of sexual misconduct is a matter of utmost
intimacy for the accused).
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2. Victimization
a. Sexual Assault Victimization
Many cases allow people who allege they were sexually assaulted to be
pseudonymous,272 including when they are defendants being sued for libel and
related torts.273 But again, many other decisions hold otherwise, some in highly
prominent cases (for instance, against Kevin Spacey, Harvey Weinstein, and
Tupac Shakur) and others in much less prominent ones.274 A few cases conclude
that the plaintiff’s being part of a conservative religious community, in which
being sexually assaulted is seen as shameful, might cut in favor of allowing
pseudonymity; whether that’s proper is discussed in a separate article.275
b. Sexual Assault Victimization: Pseudonymizing Alleged
Victimizer to Protect Alleged Victim
Some cases allow pseudonymity for the alleged attacker as well as the
alleged victim, if the two are relatives or ex-spouses or ex-lovers, because
identifying one would also identify the other, at least to people who had known
them.276

272. See infra Appendix 2a.
273. See, e.g., Adgers v. Doe, No. CV05-4014657, 2005 WL 3693816, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 23,
2005); A.B. v. C.D., No. 2:17-cv-5840-DRH-AYS, 2018 WL 1935999, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2018); Painter
v. Doe, No. 3:15-cv-369-MOC-DCK, 2016 WL 3766466, at *2 (W.D.N.C. July 13, 2016); Heineke v. Santa
Clara Univ., No. 17-cv-05285-LHK, 2017 WL 6026248, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2017); Bird v. Barr, No. 19CV-1581, 2019 WL 2870234, at *4 (D.D.C. July 3, 2019); Doe 1 v. George Wash. Univ., 369 F. Supp. 3d 49,
63–64 (D.D.C. 2019); see also NMIC Ins. Co. v. Smith, No. 2:18-cv-533, 2018 WL 7859755, at *2 (S.D. Ohio
Oct. 24, 2018) (lawsuit by insurance company claiming that it had no duty to defend a sexual assault lawsuit
brought against the company’s insured by defendant).
274. See infra Appendix 2b; Jayne S. Ressler, Anonymous Plaintiffs and Sexual Misconduct, 50 SETON
HALL L. REV. 955, 964 (2020) (noting that the caselaw is inconsistent on this).
275. See Eugene Volokh, Protecting People from Their Own Religious Communities: Jane Doe in Church
and State (in draft).
276. Doe v. Kenyon Coll., No. 2:20-cv-4972, 2020 WL 11885928, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 24, 2020); Doe v.
Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., No. 18-cv-040-LM, 2018 WL 2048385, at *6 (D.N.H. May 2, 2018); Doe v. Vassar
College, No. 19-cv-09601-NSR, at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2019); Doe v. Williams Coll., No. 3:20-cv-30024-KAR
(D. Mass. Feb. 19, 2020), granting Assented to Motion to Proceed Under a Pseudonym, id. at 6–7 (D. Mass.
Feb. 18, 2020); Doe v. Smith, 105 F. Supp. 2d 40, 44 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting approvingly “plaintiff’s offer to
forego opposition to defendant also proceeding under a pseudonym”); cf. Doe v. Billington, No. 21STCV22207
(Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 2, 2021).
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c. Sexual Harassment Victimization
Allegations of sexual harassment falling short of sexual assault are often
not seen as sufficient to justify pseudonymity,277 though even there the cases are
split.278
d. Non-Sexual Victimization
Parties’ allegations of nonsexual victimization don’t generally lead to
pseudonymity,279 though I have found four cases in which they have: two
involving alleged nonsexual forced labor280 and two involving alleged nonsexual
mistreatment of high school students who were adults when the case was filed.281
Nonparty witnesses who are crime victims are often pseudonymized,282 but this
article focuses on pseudonymity of parties.
3. Illness
a. Communicable Disease
Courts are divided on whether to allow pseudonymity where disclosing the
party’s name might reveal that the party has been infected with HIV,283
277. See, e.g., Doe v. Cook Cty., No. 1:20-cv-5832, 2021 WL 2258313, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2021); L.A.
v. Gary Crossley Ford, Inc., No. 4:20-cv-00620-RK, at 2–3 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2020); Doe v. Am. Fed. of Gov’t
Emps., No. 1:20-cv-01558-JDB, 2021 WL 3550996, at *6 n.2 (D.D.C. June 19, 2020); Roe v. Bernabei &
Wachtel PLLC, 85 F. Supp. 3d 89, 96–97 (D.D.C. 2015); Doe v. Moreland, No. 18-cv-800-TJK, 2019 WL
2336435, at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 21, 2019) (claim of allegedly libelous accusations of sexual harassment); Doe v.
Freydin, No. 21-cv-8371-NRB, 2021 WL 4991731, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2021); Doe 1 v. George Wash.
Univ., 369 F. Supp. 3d 49, 63–64 (D.D.C. 2019); Bird v. Barr, No. 19-cv-1581, 2019 WL 2870234, at *4 (D.D.C.
July 3, 2019); Doe I v. Yesner, No. 3:19-cv-0136-HRH, 2019 WL 4196054, at *13 (D. Alaska Sept. 4, 2019).
278. See, e.g., Heineke v. Santa Clara Univ., No. 17-cv-05285-LHK, 2017 WL 6026248, at *22–23 (N.D.
Cal. Dec. 5, 2017) (allowing pseudonymity to defendant in libel lawsuit brought over sexual harassment claim);
Doe v. Georgetown Synagogue-Kesher Israel Congregation, No. 1:16-cv-01845-ABJ (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2016)
(allowing pseudonymity in case involving hidden photographing of plaintiffs when they were naked).
279. E.g., Sherman v. Trinity Teen Solutions, Inc., 339 F.R.D. 203, 205 (D. Wyo. 2021) (child abuse); Doe
v. Zinsou, No. 19-cv-7025-ER, 2019 WL 3564582, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2019) (nonsexual trafficking and
forced labor).
280. Doe v. Phillips, No. 2:20-cv-00019-TSK (N.D. W. Va. Mar. 31, 2021), granting Request, id. (July 10,
2020; see Complaint, id. (July 9, 2020); Doe v. Baldeo, No. 1:22-cv-00917 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2022) (referring
to Complaint, id. (Feb. 2022)).
281. Doe v. School Dist. 214, No. 1:16-cv-07642, at 10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2017) (racial harassment in high
school); Doe v. Bd. of Ed. of City of Chicago, No. 1:22-cv-00583 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2022), granting Motion, id.
(Feb. 1, 2022) (retaliatory harassment for reporting sexual misconduct by teammates in high school).
282. See, e.g., Denbow v. State, No. 09-19-00318-CR, 2021 WL 4173725, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App. Sept. 15,
2021).
283. Pseudonymity allowed: Roe v. City of Milwaukee, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1129 (E.D. Wis. 1999);
W.G.A. v. Priority Pharmacy, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 616, 617 (E.D. Mo. 1999); Doe v. Landry’s, Inc., 1:18-cv-11501LAP (S.D.N.Y. 2019); Doe v. Brennan, No. 19-cv-5885, 2020 WL 1983873, at *3–4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2020);
Doe v. Russ, No. 1:20-cv-07769-AT (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2020), granting Motion to Proceed Under Pseudonym,
id. (Oct. 14, 2020); S.G. v. Mears Transp. Grp., Inc., No. 6:14-cv-917-ORL-37, 2014 WL 4637139, at *1 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 12, 2014); Doe v. Tris Comprehensive Mental Health, Inc., 298 N.J. Super. 677, 682–83 (Law Div.
1996); Doe v. Griffon Mgmt. LLC, No. 14-cv-2626, 2014 WL 7040390, at *2 (E.D. La. Dec. 11, 2014); Doe v.
Casey’s General Stores, Inc., No. 4:03-cv-03397 (D. Neb. Nov. 13, 2003), granting Motion, id. (Nov. 13, 2003);
Anonymous v. Duane Reade Inc., 10 Misc. 3d 1056(A), 2005 WL 3309737, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Oct. 7, 2005).
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herpes,284 or other communicable (and generally sexually transmitted) illnesses.285
b. Mental Illness or Disorder
Courts are divided on this as well.286
c. Nonmental, Noncommunicable Illness or Disability
And courts are divided on this, too.287

Pseudonymity not allowed: Mateer v. Ross, Suchoff, Egert, Hankin, Maidenbaum & Mazel, P.C., No. 96-cv1756-LAP, 1997 WL 171011, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1997); Doe v. Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs., Inc., 162 F.R.D.
418, 420 (D. Mass. 1995); Pierre v. Cty. of Broome, No. 3:05-cv-332, 2006 WL 8453057, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar.
13, 2006); Doe v. Merritt Hosp., LLC, 353 F. Supp. 3d 472, 474–75, 482 (E.D. La. 2018); Doe v. BrownGreer
PLC, No. 14-cv-1980, 2014 WL 4404033, at *2 (E.D. La. Sept. 5, 2014); Doe v. New England Stair Co., No.
AAN-CV18-6025867-S, 2018 WL 3062243, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 30, 2018); see also Doe v. Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am., 744 F. Supp. 40, 41–42 (D.R.I. 1990) (not allowing pseudonymity for plaintiffs whose lawsuit
was related to their son’s having died of AIDS).
284. Pseudonymity allowed: Doe v. Cochran, No. FSTCV155014849S (Super. Ct. Conn. Sept. 28, 2015);
Doe v. Weinzweig, 40 N.E.3d 351, 363 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) (noting that the circuit had allowed pseudonymity
but concluding that the question was not properly before the court on appeal).
Pseudonymity not allowed: Unwitting Victim v. C.S., 47 P.3d 392, 401 (Kan. 2002); Anonymous v.
Lerner, 124 A.D.3d 487, 488 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); Anonymous v. Simon, No. 13-cv-2927-RWS, 2014 WL
819122, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2014).
285. Pseudonymity allowed: EW v. N.Y. Blood Ctr., 213 F.R.D. 108, 112 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (hepatitis B);
Doe v. O’Neill, , No. C.A. W.C. 86-354, 1987 WL 859818, at *1 (R.I. Super. Jan. 6, 1987) (chlamydia and
gonorrhea). Pseudonymity not allowed: Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. M.O., No. 21-2164-DDC-ADM, 2021 WL
4476783, at *8 (D. Kan. Sept. 30, 2021) (HPV).
286. See infra Appendix 3a & 3b.
287. Pseudonymity allowed: Heather K. by Anita K. v. City of Mallard, Iowa, 887 F. Supp. 1249, 1256
(N.D. Iowa 1995) (“severe respiratory and cardiac conditions”); Doe v. Nw. Mem’l Hosp., 19 N.E.3d 178, 193
(Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (plaintiffs’ having provided semen or testicular tissue for assisted reproduction, which
defendants’ negligence allegedly destroyed, thus “shatter[ing]” “any hope plaintiffs had of having a biological
child”); C.R.M. v. United States, No. 1:20-cv-00404-AJT-IDD, 2020 WL 4904243, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Va. Apr. 13,
2020) (deaths of plaintiff’s three newborn children, and miscarriage of two fetuses at nineteen weeks of
pregnancy, stemming from defendants’ alleged malpractice in implanting embryos for assisted reproduction);
Roe v. Cath. Health Initiatives Colo., No. 11-cv-02179-WYD-KMT, 2012 WL 12840, at *5 (D. Colo. Jan. 4,
2012) (plaintiff’s use of prescribed opiates for back pain, see Complaint at 3, id. (Aug. 9, 2011)).
Pseudonymity not allowed: Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 112 F.3d 869, 872
(7th Cir. 1997) (medical conditions generally); Anonymous v. Medco Health Sols., Inc., 588 F. App’x 34, 35
(2d Cir. 2014) (Parkinson’s Disease); Endangered v. Louisville/Jefferson Cty. Metro Gov’t Dept. of Inspections,
3:06-cv-250, 2007 WL 509695, at *1–2 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2007) (mobility-impairing disabilities); Parlante v.
Am. River Coll., No. 2:20-cv-02268-KJM-JDP (PS), 2021 WL 4123807, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2021) (“[M]ore
than 50% blind[ness],” Motion, id. at 1 (Nov. 13, 2020)); Rankin v. N.Y. Pub. Libr., No. 98-cv-4821-RPP, 1999
WL 1084224, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1999) (fibromyalgia, spondylarthritis, chronic fatigue immune deficiency
syndrome, and hypothyroidism”); Doe v. Univ. of the Incarnate Word, No. SA-19-cv-957-XR, 2019 WL
6727875, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2019) (hand injury); Doe v. CareMount Med. P.C., No. 21-cv-7453-LTS,
2021 WL 4940995, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2021) (family history of cancer).
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4. Beliefs
a. Religious Beliefs
An oft-quoted 1981 Fifth Circuit decision, Doe v. Stegall, allowed
plaintiffs to pseudonymously challenge public school prayers, partly on the
grounds that “the Does complain of public manifestations of religious belief;
religion is perhaps the quintessentially private matter. . . . [T]he Does have, by
filing suit, made revelations about their personal beliefs and practices that are
shown to have invited an opprobrium analogous to the infamy associated with
criminal behavior.”288 Some other cases have likewise allowed Establishment
Clause challenges to religiously controversial policies to proceed
pseudonymously, especially where there was a risk of public hostility to child
plaintiffs,289 though others have disagreed.290 Stegall relied on the threat of
“violent reprisals,”291 not just social opprobrium,292 but other courts haven’t
cited such threats of physical harm.
Yet courts have nearly uniformly refused to let plaintiffs be pseudonymous
simply to avoid revealing their membership in minority religions, such as
Judaism and Islam,293 with only one clear exception that I have seen.294 Indeed,
288. Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Doe v. Barrow Cty., 219 F.R.D. 189, 193
(N.D. Ga. 2003).
289. Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 2004); Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 806, 809
n.1 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that trial judge had allowed pseudonymity), aff’d as to other matters, 530 U.S. 290
(2000); Doe v. Heritage Academy, No. 2:16-cv-03001-SPL, 2017 WL 6001481, at *18 (D. Ariz. June 9, 2017);
Yacovelli v. Moeser, No. 1:02-cv-596, 2004 WL 1144183, at *6–7 (M.D.N.C. May 20, 2004).
290. Doe v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 172 F.R.D. 215, 217 (E.D. Tex. 1997); Freedom from Religion
Found., Inc. v. Emanuel Cty. School Sys., 109 F. Supp. 3d 1353, 1357 (S.D. Ga. 2015).
291. See supra Part III.A.
292. Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186.
293. Doe v. Coll. of N.J., No. 19-cv-20674-FLW-ZNQ, 2020 WL 360719, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 22, 2020)
(rejecting argument that identifying Doe would “reveal her status ‘as a practicing and traditional Jew,’ risking
her and her children’s safety ‘in light of the recent rise of Anti-Semitic violence,’” reasoning that “[t]his Court
regularly hears claims by and against Jewish litigants, and Doe had failed to show any evidence that Jewish
litigants are put at a greater risk of anti-Semitic discrimination or violence by virtue of using their names in
federal court”), aff’d, No. 19-cv-20674-FLW, 2020 WL 3604094 (D.N.J. July 2, 2020), aff’d, 997 F.3d 489 (3d
Cir. 2021); Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. Emanuel Cty. School Sys., 109 F. Supp. 3d 1353, 1357 (S.D.
Ga. 2015) (“The fact that religion is an intensely private concern does not inevitably require that an
Establishment Clause plaintiff be given Doe status . . . no court from this or any other circuit has considered a
plaintiff[’]s religious beliefs to be a matter of such sensitivity as to automatically entitle the plaintiff to Doe
status.”); Doe v. Cloninger, No. 3:15-cv-00036, 2015 WL 4389525, at *2 (W.D.N.C. July 17, 2015) (rejecting
claim of pseudonymity aimed at avoiding disclosure that plaintiff is a practicing Muslim); Roe v. San Jose Unif.
School Dist. Bd., No. 20-cv-02798-LHK, 2021 WL 292035, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2021) (rejecting claim of
pseudonymity aimed at avoiding disclosure that plaintiff is a conservative Christian opposed to homosexuality);
Doe v. Felician Univ., No. 2:18-cv-13539-ES-SCM, 2019 WL 2135959, at *4 (D.N.J. May 15, 2019) (rejecting
claim of pseudonymity for Muslim student, even though the lawsuit had been noted on an anti-Islam website).
The same has of course been true as to majority religions. See, e.g., Doe v. City Univ. of N.Y., No. 21-cv-9544NRB, 2021 WL 5644642, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2021); U.S. Army ROTC ECP Cadet Doe v. Biden, No. 1:22mc-00034-UNA, at 5–6 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2022).
294. The exception allowed pseudonymity for plaintiffs challenging military vaccine mandates on religious
grounds. Navy Seal 1 v. Austin, No. 8:21-cv-2429-SDM-TGW (M.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2022) (pseudonymity
justified because “[p]rosecution of this action compels the plaintiffs to disclose sincere religious beliefs,” though
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were it otherwise, religious discrimination lawsuits brought by religious
minorities could nearly always be litigated pseudonymously. It thus appears that
mere disclosure of religious beliefs is not sufficient to justify pseudonymity—
there must be a combination of both the plaintiff’s religious beliefs and expected
public hostility to the specific remedy that the plaintiff is seeking.
b. Political Beliefs
Likewise, a recent case rejected pseudonymity where plaintiff argued that
his challenge to Twitter policies might draw attacks on his children from
“unbalanced people in the world” who “hate President Trump supporters.”295 On
the other hand, some other cases allowed challenges to vaccine mandates to
proceed pseudonymously, because of concern about public hostility to such
challenges.296 And another case allowed pseudonymity based on the speaker’s
perceived political views: a case where university students sued over having
been disciplined for engaging in actions that were supposedly “racist, antiSemitic, homophobic, sexist, and hostile to people with disabilities”;297 query
whether this may have stemmed from the more general trend of allowing
challenges to university discipline to be pseudonymous, as a means of protecting
the accused students’ reputations.298
Some other cases that have allowed pseudonymity in politically
controversial contexts have focused on the claims being legal rather than factual

also noting that plaintiffs would have “to disclose the deeply personal experiences that form the foundation of
those beliefs,” such as having had an abortion in the past). One other case mentioned the religious nature of
plaintiffs’ objections in allowing pseudonymity, but seemed to focus not on disclosure of religious beliefs as
such but rather on the risk of public hostility to people objecting to vaccine mandates, for religious reasons or
otherwise. Does v. NorthShore Univ. Healthsystem, No. 1:21-cv-05683, at 23 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2021).
295. Verogna v. Twitter, Inc., No. 20-cv-536-SM, 2020 WL 5077094, at *2 (D.N.H. Aug. 27, 2020); see
also Does 1–6 v. Mills, No. 1:21-cv-00242, 2022 WL 1747848, at *6 (D. Me. Sept. 2, 2021) (“The Plaintiffs
have not demonstrated that the public controversy associated with mandatory COVID-19 vaccinations will result
in the Plaintiffs being socially stigmatized to a substantial degree if the Plaintiffs’ identities are publicly
revealed.”), rev’g, 2021 WL 4005985, at *2 (D. Me. Sept. 2, 2021) (an earlier decision by the same judge that
allowed pseudonymity).
296. See Does v. NorthShore Univ. Healthsystem, No. 1:21-cv-05683, at 23 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2021).
297. Doe #1 v. Syracuse Univ., No. 5:18-cv-0496-FJS-DEP, 2018 WL 7079489, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 10,
2018), report & recommendation adopted, No. 5:18-cv-00496-BKS-ML, 2020 WL 2028285 (N.D.N.Y. Apr.
28, 2020). But see Doe v. Rhodes College, No. 2:21-cv-02811 (W.D. Tenn. Feb. 15, 2022) (alleged facts laid
out in Complaint, id. (Dec. 29, 2021)) (denying pseudonymity for a university student suing over having been
disciplined for racist statement).
298. See infra Part III.G.
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challenges,299 so that naming the parties was seen as less likely to be valuable.300
And even in such controversial contexts, pseudonymity is not always allowed.301
5. Crime and Addiction
a. Drug or Alcohol Abuse or Addiction
Courts appear to generally disallow pseudonymity aimed at preventing
revelation of a party’s history of drug abuse or addiction302 or alcohol abuse or
addiction.303 In the words of one case:
[W]e do not discount Doe’s very real concerns about reputational harm, both
personally or professionally, or her fears of relapse in the event of such
backlash. But those types of fears are similar to those of other plaintiffs who
have alleged that they were discriminated against because of their histories of
substance abuse, and it is clear that several similarly-situated plaintiffs have
publicly identified themselves in their own litigations.304

At least three cases, though, have allowed pseudonymity in such a situation.305
b. Criminal Record or Behavior
Stegall, which allowed pseudonymity for people challenging public school
prayers under the Establishment Clause, noted:
Although they do not confess either illegal acts or purposes, the Does have,
by filing suit, made revelations about their personal beliefs and practices that

299. See, e.g., Publius v. Boyer-Vine, 321 F.R.D. 358 (E.D. Cal. 2017) (allowing a pseudonymous blogger
who was harshly critical of government officials to challenge a speech restriction pseudonymously); Menders v.
Loudoun Cty. School Bd., No. 1:21-cv-00669, 2022 WL 179597, at *4 n.2 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2021) (allowing a
pseudonymous challenge to a school board’s policies on teaching views associated with Critical Race Theory);
Doe v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., No. 1:21-cv-02637-RM-KMT, at 9–10 (D. Colo. Jan. 5, 2022) (allowing a
pseudonymous challenge to a vaccine mandate, and stressing that there was little factual dispute, as opposed to
legal dispute, in the case); Does v. Hochul, No. 1:21-cv-05067-AMD-TAM, at 12, 16 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2022)
(likewise); Doe 1 v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 963 N.W.2d 823, 826 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2021) (allowing a
pseudonymous challenge to a school district’s policy “allowing students to ‘change gender identity’ and select
new names and pronouns for themselves ‘regardless of parent/guardian permission’”).
300. See supra Part I.D.
301. See, e.g., Doe 1 v. Northshore Univ. Healthsystem, No. 21-3242 (7th Cir. Dec. 13, 2021); U.S. Army
ROTC ECP Cadet Doe v. Biden, No. 1:22-mc-00034-UNA, at 6 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2022); Doe v. Washington
Nationals Baseball Club, LLC, No. 1:22-cv-01299-TJK, at 6–7 (D.D.C. May 11, 2022).
302. D.E. v. John Doe I, 834 F.3d 723, 728–29 (6th Cir. 2016); Doe v. Indiana Black Expo, Inc., 923 F.
Supp. 137, 142 (S.D. Ind. 1996); Doe v. Heitler, 26 P.3d 539, 542 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001); K.W. v. Holtzapple,
299 F.R.D. 438, 439–40, 442 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
303. Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992).
304. Doe v. Main Line Hosps., Inc., No. 2:20-cv-02637-KSM, 2020 WL 5210994, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 1,
2020).
305. Smith v. United States Off. of Pers. Mgmt., No. 2:13-cv-5235, 2014 WL 12768838, at *2 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 21, 2014) (drug and alcohol addiction); Beach v. United Behav. Health, No. 3:21-cv-08612-RS (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 15, 2021), granting Motion to Proceed Anonymously, id. at 3 (Nov. 9, 2021) (likewise); M.C. v. Jefferson
Cty., No. 6:22-cv-00190-DNH-ML (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2022), granting Motion for Leave to File Under Seal,
id. (Apr. 6, 2022) (opioid use disorder).
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are shown to have invited an opprobrium analogous to the infamy associated
with criminal behavior.306

This language might make it seem like litigants could generally be
pseudonymous if their alleged actions would tend to “invite[] an opprobrium
analogous to the infamy associated with criminal behavior,” for instance, if they
were accused of rape or fraud.
And indeed, several cases have allowed people challenging the publication
of their criminal convictions to proceed anonymously. This has happened most
prominently in some challenges to sex offender notification schemes; most of
those have involved fundamentally legal challenges,307 for which pseudonymity
is generally more available.308 But one case allowed pseudonymity even as to a
factual dispute, in a lawsuit over expunged convictions.309
Yet even for some such legal challenges, pseudonymity was denied.310 And
when it came to cases that turned primarily on the facts rather than on broad
legal challenges, many cases have concluded that discussing a plaintiff’s adult
criminal history does not justify pseudonymity311 (though the result may be

306. Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981).
307. See Doe v. Alaska, 122 F.3d 1070, 1070 (9th Cir. 1997); Doe v. Harris, 640 F.3d 972, 973 n.1 (9th Cir.
2011); Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1115 n.1 (10th Cir. 2012); Does v. Whitmer, No. 2:22-cv10209-MAG-CI (E.D. Mich. May 17, 2022); Doe v. Wilson, No. 3:21-cv-04108-MGL, at 2 (D.S.C. Apr. 18,
2022); Doe v. Strange, No. 2:15-cv-606-WKW, 2016 WL 1168487 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 24, 2016); Doe v.
Swearingen, No. 18-cv-24145, 2019 WL 95548 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2019); Doe v. City of Apple Valley, No. 20cv-499-PJS-DTS, 2020 WL 1061442, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 5, 2020); Doe v. Jindal, 851 F. Supp. 2d 995 (E.D.
La. 2012); Doe v. Hood, No. 3:16-cv-00789-CWR-FKB, 2017 WL 2408196, at *3 (S.D. Miss. June 2, 2017);
Doe v. Wasden, No. 1:20-cv-00452-BLW, at 1 (D. Idaho Dec. 23, 2020), granting Motion, id. (Sept. 23, 2020);
Does 1–4 v. Snyder, No. 2:12-cv-11194-RHC-DRG, 2012 WL 1344412, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 18, 2012); Does
v. City of Indianapolis, Ind., No. 1:06-cv-865-RLY-WTL, 2006 WL 2289187, at *3 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 7, 2006);
Doe v. Shurtleff, No. 1:08-cv-00064-TC, at 1, 16 (D. Utah Sept. 25, 2008); Doe v. Town of Plainfield, 860
N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Doe v. Thompson, 373 P.3d 750, 759 (Kan. 2016); Doe AA v. King
Cty., 15 Wash. App. 2d 710, 717 (2020); see also E.B. v. Landry, No. 19-cv-862, 2020 WL 5775148, at *3
(M.D. La. Sept. 28, 2020) (legal challenge to Louisiana’s enforcement of its scheme for expungement of criminal
convictions).
308. See supra Part I.D; cf. Doe v. Settle, 24 F.4th 932, 939 n.5 (4th Cir. 2022); United States v. Stoterau,
524 F.3d 988, 1013 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that “a litigant’s identity may not be as important in purely legal or
facial challenges”).
309. Doe v. Ronan, No. 1:09-cv-243, 2009 WL 10679478, at *1 (S.D. Ohio June 4, 2009) (“A criminal
record . . . carries a very negative connotation in society which can be embarrassing and humiliating if that
information becomes public.”); cf. Doe v. Univ. of Miss. Bd. of Trs., No. 3:21-cv-201-DPJ-FKB, 2021 WL
6752261, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 14, 2021) (allowing plaintiff to sue pseudonymously in case challenging a Title
IX finding of sexual assault, on the grounds that “Roe’s sexual misconduct claims against him, if believed, may
be construed by some to constitute criminal conduct or to warrant ‘an opprobrium analogous to the infamy
associated with criminal behavior’” (citing Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186)).
310. Mueller v. Raemisch, 740 F.3d 1128, 1135–36 (7th Cir. 2014); A.N. v. Landry, 338 F.R.D. 347, 355–
56 (M.D. La. 2021) (concluding that sex offender history “weighs somewhat in favor of anonymity,” but “cannot
stand alone to modify ‘the almost universal practice of disclosure’”); Pelland v. State, 919 A.2d 373, 377–78
(R.I. 2007) (holding that denial of pseudonymity wasn’t an abuse of discretion).
311. Plaintiff v. Wayne State Univ., No. 2:20-cv-11718-GAD-DRG (E.D. Mich. Jan. 25, 2021) (actual
allegations of criminal behavior not enough to justify pseudonymity); cf. A.B.C. v. XYZ Corp., 282 N.J. Super.
494, 503 (App. Div. 1995) (“Plaintiff’s arguments that he would risk self-incrimination, that he and his family
might be isolated from society and that his employment would be in jeopardy are not only somewhat speculative,
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different for juvenile criminal history312). This has included cases involving
disclosure of sex offender history.313 And, of course, criminal prosecutions and
habeas cases routinely discuss the named parties’ criminal behavior.
F. REPUTATIONAL HARM / RISK OF ECONOMIC RETALIATION
So far, we have talked mostly about potential harm to privacy, through
disclosure of matters that courts might plausibly label “sensitive and highly
personal” information. Let us now move on to matters that would rarely be seen
as highly “private,” but that can nonetheless cause harm to reputation, and the
economic and professional harm that can stem from reputational harm.314 Here,
the dominant rule is no pseudonymity, except (rightly or wrongly) in one
important class of cases: lawsuits brought under Title IX alleging that students
were wrongly found guilty of sexual assault or harassment. I will begin by laying
out a few categories of situations where the risk of reputational harm is
especially serious, and then summarize the state of court decisions on the
subject.
1. Risks of Reputational Harm
a. Defendants Accused (Perhaps Wrongly) of Serious Misconduct
Many defendants could be ruined simply by being publicly accused of
certain offenses—such as rape, sexual harassment, embezzlement, fraud,
malpractice,315 and the like—or could be materially harmed even by being sued
for more minor matters, such as in landlords’ unlawful detainer actions against
tenants.316 Even if they are innocent, they might agree to settle as a means of
avoiding the lawsuit even being filed, thus being pressured to give in to a form

but any such ramifications are due to his actions and his election to institute litigation over a perceived wrong.”);
Doe v. Georgia-Pac., LLC, No. 12-cv-5607-PSG-JCFx, 2012 WL 13223668, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2012)
(reference to criminal record not enough); Doe v. U.S. Healthworks Inc., No. 2:15-cv-05689, 2016 WL
11745513, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2016) (likewise, as to recently expunged criminal record); Day v. Sebelius,
227 F.R.D. 668, 679 (D. Kan. 2005) (likewise, as to acknowledgement of “illegal immigration status”); Doe v.
Trs. of Ind. Univ., No. 1:21-cv-02903-JRS-MJD, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 3, 2022) (likewise, as to alleged violation
of COVID shutdown orders); Doe I v. Merten, 219 F.R.D. 387, 392 (E.D. Va. 2004) (likewise, as to “unlawful
or problematic immigration status”); Doe v. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., No. 18-cv-690-JD, 2018 WL 5801532, at
*5 (D.N.H. Nov. 2, 2018) (likewise, as to allegations of criminal conduct raised in a harassment restraining order
proceeding).
312. T.S.H. v. Nw. Mo. State Univ., No. 19-cv-06059-SJ-ODS, 2019 WL 5057586, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Oct.
8, 2019).
313. Doe v. Settle, 24 F.4th at 939 n.5; United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1013 (9th Cir. 2008); Doe
G v. Dep’t of Corr., 410 P.3d 1156, 1164 (Wash. 2018); Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir.
2000); United States v. Pilcher, 950 F.3d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 2020); Doe v. Lee, No. 3:22-cv-00181, at 6 (M.D. Tenn.
Apr. 22, 2022).
314. Naturally, there is overlap here: for instance, disclosure of drug or alcohol abuse or addiction or of
criminal history may be seen by some as an invasion of privacy, but can also harm reputation.
315. Doe v. Milwaukee Cty., No. 18-cv-503, 2018 WL 3458985, at *1 (E.D. Wisc. July 18, 2018).
316. See Hundtofte v. Encarnación, 330 P.3d 168, 171 (Wash. 2014).
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of legally permissible blackmail: in effect, “pay me money or I’ll file a lawsuit
accusing you of misconduct.”
b. Employees and Others Fearful of Getting Reputations for
Litigiousness
Plaintiffs suing ex-employers may worry that suing will make them look
litigious and thus prevent job offers from prospective future employers.317
Antidiscrimination laws generally forbid employers from retaliating against
people who had brought discrimination claims or engaged in whistleblowing,
and “a subsequent employer may be held liable for retaliation against a current
employee for engaging in protected activity at a past employer.”318 But, first,
such retaliation is only illegal when done because of certain kinds of claims, and
not many other employment claims (such as breach of contract). And, second,
such retaliation tends to be very hard to prove, since an employer has so many
possible reasons to reject a prospective employee.319 As a result, many
317. See, e.g., Doe v. Fedcap Rehab. Servs., Inc., No. 17-cv-8220 -JPO, 2018 WL 2021588, at *8 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 27, 2018) (“Plaintiff wants what most employment-discrimination plaintiffs would like: to sue their former
employer without future employers knowing about it.”); Ressler, supra note 5, at 242. But see Strahilevitz, supra
note 64, at 1244 (suggesting, though not specifically within the employment context, that “litigiousness signaling
effects are not a strong basis for granting pseudonymity to parties. Though a party might prefer that his
litigiousness be kept secret, that party’s potential transaction partners will have good reasons for wanting to
evaluate the litigiousness of a party before entering into a relationship with him”). Courts’ practice of providing
“[i]ncentive awards” “in class action cases,” including employment cases, reflects in part the “reputational risk”
that comes from putting your name to a lawsuit. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. West Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 958
(9th Cir. 2009); Schneider v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., 336 F.R.D. 588, 602 (N.D. Cal. 2020); Palmer v. Pier
1 Imports, No. 8:16-cv-01120-JLS-DFMx, 2018 WL 8367495, at *6 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2018).
318. Fredriksen v. Consol Energy, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00379-MJH, 2019 WL 2108099, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May
14, 2019); see also United States v. Air Indus. Corp., No. 8:12-cv-02188-JVS-RNB, 2016 WL 11515131, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2016) (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) as the proper protection against retaliation for False Claims
Act whistleblowers, and rejecting pseudonymity on those grounds); 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (banning retaliation
for having filed Fair Labor Standards Act claim).
319. Vega v. HSBC Securities (USA) Inc., No. 16-cv-9424, 2019 WL 2357581, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 4,
2019), asserted that, “No basis exists to presume that prospective employers would violate the law and, even if
they do, the law provides remedies to the plaintiff for such violations,” but that strikes me as unsound. There
seems to be little reason to just assume compliance with the law, or enforcement of the law, when a good deal
of noncompliance and underenforcement should be reasonably expected.
Thus, for instance, one court allowed Fair Labor Standards Act plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously—
at least while the court was determining a purely legal question as to which the plaintiffs’ identity was
irrelevant—notwithstanding the defendants’ arguments that the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision “provides
adequate protection to the plaintiffs.” Gomez v. Buckeye Sugars, 60 F.R.D. 106, 107 (N.D. Ohio 1973). “The
method proposed by the plaintiffs [i.e., pseudonymity] affords them a higher degree of security than does the
statutory provision without being subject to the vagaries that promises.” Id. Likewise, when it comes to reporting
of labor claims to government enforcers, courts have recognized that “the most effective protection from
retaliation is the anonymity of the informer. The pressures which an employer may bring to bear on an employee
are difficult to detect and even harder to correct. The economic relationship of employer-employee makes
possible a wide range of discriminatory actions from the most flagrant to those so subtle that they may be scarcely
noticed. . . . Here the shield of anonymity is preferable to the sword of punishment.” Wirtz v. Cont’l Fin. & Loan
Co. of W. End, 326 F.2d 561, 564 (5th Cir. 1964). It may well be that the public shouldn’t be denied access to
information about court filings despite the risk of such illegal employer decisions not to hire litigious employees
who had sued for discrimination (or of legal employer decisions, for instance if the past litigation was only over
alleged breaches of contract). But I don’t think we should just assume there is no such risk.
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employers likely think that they won’t be sued if they refuse to hire litigious
employees and that, if they hire and later dismiss a litigious employee, the risk
of a future lawsuit by the employee is greater than the risk of a lawsuit for
retaliatory refusal to hire.
The same, of course, is possible in other situations. Tenants, for instance,
may worry that suing a landlord will lead other landlords to decline to rent to
them.320
c. Plaintiffs Fearful of Public Hostility Stemming from the Nature
of Their Claim
Some plaintiffs might think their claims will appear legally or morally
unjustified to the public—even if the claims are legally valid—and could result
in public ridicule or shaming.321
d. Parties Fearful of Revealing Conditions that Might Lead to
Future Discrimination
Plaintiffs filing lawsuits that reveal their disabilities, mental illnesses, and
the like might worry that publicizing this information would lead to
discrimination by future employers, clients, patients, and the like. In this respect,
requests for pseudonymity in such cases might be a matter not just of protecting
privacy322 but also of protecting reputation and preventing retaliation.
e. Libel Plaintiffs Fearful of Amplifying the Allegedly False
Statements
Plaintiffs suing for libel may understandably worry that suing will just
further amplify the libels.323 People Googling for the plaintiff’s name would see
the lawsuit, and may easily find the complaint and other filings, which will
necessarily repeat the libel in the course of alleging that it is indeed a libel.
Likewise, newspaper articles or blog posts may be written about the lawsuit,
especially if the plaintiff or defendant is famous.
Perhaps the libel lawsuits will ultimately vindicate such plaintiffs and give
them judgments that they can point to as evidence that the allegations over which

320. See, e.g., Hundtofte, 330 P.3d at 174; Yonathan A. Arbel & Roy Shapira, Theory of the Nudnik: The
Future of Consumer Activism and What We Can Do to Stop It, 73 VAND. L. REV. 929, 968 (2020); Esme
Caramello & Nora Mahlberg, Combating Tenant Blacklisting Based on Housing Court Records: A Survey of
Approaches, 2017 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1, (2017).
321. See Ressler, supra note 15.
322. See supra Parts III.E.8–III.E.11.
323. This is the famous “Streisand effect.” See Roe v. Does 1–11, No. 20-cv-3788-MKB-SJB, 2020 WL
6152174 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2020); Plaintiff’s Motion to Seal True Name of Defendant, Doe v. Billington, No.
21STCV22207 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2021); Doe v. Doe 1, No. 1:16-cv-07359 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 24, 2016);
Doe v. Bogan, No. 1:21-mc-00073, 2021 WL 3855686, at *21 (D.D.C. June 8, 2021); Doe v. Wash. Post Co.,
No. 1:19-cv-00477-UNA, 2019 WL 2336597, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2019); Patton v. Entercom Kansas City,
LLC, No. 13-cv-2186-KHV, 2013 WL 3524157, at *3 (D. Kan. July 11, 2013).
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they sued were false.324 But even when libel plaintiffs have strong cases, this
might not happen. The lawsuit may be dismissed without a decision about the
truth of the allegations (for instance, if a court concludes that the statements were
privileged, or were said without “actual malice,” without reaching whether they
were true). Litigation costs might pressure plaintiffs into accepting a settlement.
The defendant might not appear, which will give plaintiffs a default judgment
that third parties might not credit as an authoritative decision on the facts. And
in any event, there likely would not be a final verdict for years.325 Many plaintiffs
would therefore reasonably much prefer to litigate pseudonymously, at least
until they get a favorable final judgment (or until the other side stipulates to a
retraction).
f. Other Plaintiffs Fearful of Amplifying Allegedly False
Allegations
The same concern would apply for other lawsuits that are not framed as
libel claims but are still based on claims of false allegations or the consequences
of false allegations: lawsuits over wrongful expulsion from universities,
wrongful firings, wrongful employer discipline of a doctor326 or lawyer327 or
professor,328 and the like. “[A] plaintiff alleging he was discriminated against by
his employer when his employment was terminated typically will have to
disclose the employer’s reason for terminating the plaintiff’s employment—a
reason that the plaintiff disputes is the real reason and which is often
embarrassing or even damaging to his or her reputation.”329

324. See, e.g., Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 410 (3d Cir. 2011) (reasoning that “to the extent that the
[allegedly libelous flyers over which plaintiff was suing] publicly accused him of being a pedophile, litigating
publicly will afford Doe the opportunity to clear his name in the community”); Doe v. Valencia Coll., No. 6:15cv-1800-ORL-40DAB, 2015 WL 13739325, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2015); Doe v. Cornell Univ., No. 5:15-cv0322-TJM-DEP, at 6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2015).
325. To be sure, when the original libel had already been broadly spread, the plaintiffs might feel they have
nothing to lose by suing. But often the libels (or especially oral slanders) have reached only a limited audience,
especially if they aren’t in Google-searchable media, or at least don’t appear high up in Google search results.
A plaintiff’s lawsuit may cause the alleged defamation to be seen by a much broader audience.
326. Doe v. Dep’t of Army, No. 1:21-mc-00114-UNA, at 3 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2021) (denying pseudonymity); Doe v. Lieberman, No. 1:20-cv-02148, 2020 WL 13260569, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2020) (denying pseudonymity); Plaintiff Dr. v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. #3, No. 18-cv-7945, 2019 WL 351492, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2019)
(denying pseudonymity; for factual details, see Morice v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. #3, 430 F. Supp. 3d 182, 191 (E.D.
La. 2019)).
327. Doe v. Garland, No. 21-mc-00044, 2021 WL 3622425, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 2021) (denying pseudonymity).
328. Doe v. Ky. Cmty. & Tech. Coll. Sys., No. 20-cv-00006, 2020 WL 495513, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 30,
2020) (denying pseudonymity), reconsideration denied, No. 20-cv-00006, 2020 WL 998809 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 2,
2020).
329. Doe v. Milwaukee Cty., No. 18-cv-503, 2018 WL 3458985, at *1 (E.D. Wisc. July 18, 2018) (denying
pseudonymity).
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2. Courts Generally Do Not Allow Pseudonymity Simply to Protect
Reputation and Professional Prospects
Despite these serious risks, courts mostly refuse to allow pseudonymity
aimed at avoiding “the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation,”
including “inability to secure future employment,” “scrutiny from current or
prospective employers,” “economic harm,” “economic or professional
concerns,” “reputational harm,” “blacklisting,” or “embarrassment and
humiliation.”330 And this is true both for plaintiffs and defendants,331 and in a
wide range of cases, such as defamation cases.332
As I suggested above, this judicial skepticism of reputation-based arguments for pseudonymity may stem from the ubiquity of reputational risk in civil
cases (and even more so in criminal cases). Courts often say that they “allow
parties to use pseudonyms in the ‘unusual case’ when nondisclosure of the
party’s identity ‘is necessary . . . to protect a person from harassment, injury,
ridicule or personal embarrassment.’”333 But there is nothing “unusual” about
embarrassment or risk of harassment, reputational injury, or ridicule stemming
from people believing the allegations in a case, or being wary about a person
because of those allegations.334 If risk of reputational damage sufficed to justify
pseudonymity, our civil system would become, for better or worse, one in which
pseudonymity is the norm.335
Some courts reject reputational damage claims on the grounds that they are
too speculative, thus in theory leaving open the door that proof of reputational

330. See infra Appendix 6.
331. T.S.R. v. J.C., 671 A.2d 1068, 1074 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1996); Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d 1160, 1167
(Ill. Ct. App. 1996).
332. See, e.g., P.D. & Assocs. v. Richardson, 64 Misc. 3d 763, 767 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019); Doe v. Bogan,
No. 1:21-mc-00073, 2021 WL 3855686, at *21 (D.D.C. June 8, 2021); Doe v. Wash. Post Co., No. 1:19-cv00477-UNA, 2019 WL 2336597, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 2019); Doe v. Underwood, No. 21STCV46709 (Cal.
Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. May 9, 2022).
333. Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067–68 (9th Cir. 2000).
334. Does I thru XXIII itself allowed pseudonymity only because, “[w]hile threats of termination and
blacklisting are perhaps typical methods by which employers retaliate against employees who assert their legal
rights, the consequences of this ordinary retaliation to plaintiffs are extraordinary,” id. at 1071; loss of
employment could have led to deportation back to China, and “debts arising from their contracts with the
recruiting agencies” that could lead to “arrest and incarceration” in China. Id.
335. Ressler, supra note 15, at 828, arguing that plaintiffs should be allowed to sue anonymously whenever
they face “the likelihood of susceptibility to public shaming” based on the subject matter of the lawsuit (as
predicted by the judge at the outset of the case); but this would markedly change the caselaw, and would require
difficult predictions about just which sort of cases are likely to draw such public attention. That article’s key
example, for instance, is a lawsuit by a woman suing her nephew over an accidental injury (with the expected
recovery presumably coming from the nephew’s parents’ homeowner’s insurance company), id. at 780–82;
while that case drew national attention, because some people disapproved of people suing their young relatives
over such accidents—and presumably didn’t focus on the likelihood that the judgment will be paid by the
homeowner’s insurance policy, and not by family members—it seems hard to predict at the start of a case
whether the plaintiff’s legal theory is likely to yield such public attention. Cf. id. at 831 (acknowledging this
difficulty, though concluding that it’s not insuperable).
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damage might suffice to justify pseudonymity.336 But of course, concrete
evidence on such matters is unlikely to be available. If Paula has been accused
by Don of some serious misconduct (such as sexual assault, embezzlement, or
malpractice), there is every reason to speculate that the lawsuit, if publicized or
even if simply noted in Google-searchable court dockets, will further air Don’s
allegations and thus damage Paula’s professional prospects; and that will be
especially so if the lawsuit leads to a written court decision.
Of course, it’s possible that the lawsuit will draw no publicity, that it will
not lead to a written decision, and that no-one will search for Paula’s name and
find the court records that reveal the allegations—but there is no way of
predicting this up front. Indeed, even if Paula does lose professional
opportunities because of the accusations, this will often be impossible to know
for sure. For instance, most employers who decline to hire an applicant do not
specifically explain why they said no.337 And courts can’t just proceed nonpseudonymously until there is evidence that the case has indeed caused harm:
by then, Paula’s name would be available in many filed documents and in many
copies of those documents on various online services; that cat could not be put
back in the bag.338
Yet here too, courts are in some measure divided, though lopsidedly against
pseudonymity. In one recent sexual assault lawsuit, for instance, the judge let
the defendant proceed pseudonymously, reasoning, “[T]he court finds that the
chance that [plaintiff] would suffer reputational harm is significant. The
defendant is a partner of a well-known law firm in New York and an adjunct law
336. See, e.g., Am. Online, Inc. v. Anon. Pub. Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377, 385 (Va. 2001); Abdel-Razeq
v. Alvarez & Marsal, Inc., No. 14-cv-5601-HBP, 2015 WL 7017431, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2015).
337. This is related to the reason that presumed damages are available in libel cases: “‘[P]roof of actual
damage will be impossible in a great many cases where, from the character of the defamatory words and the
circumstances of publication, it is all but certain that serious harm has resulted in fact.’” Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985) (quoting WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 112, at
765 (4th ed. 1971)).
338. Occasionally, courts allow such retroactive pseudonymization. See, e.g., Doe No. 1 v. United States,
143 Fed. Cl. 238, 241 (2019); Roe v. Doe, No. 18-cv-666-CKK, 2019 WL 1778053, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 23,
2019); Doe v. Bryson, No. 1:12-cv-10240 (D. Mass. Sept. 10, 2021); Doe v. Collectco, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-00244JCM-DJA, 2021 WL 3199210, at *2 (D. Nev. July 27, 2021); Doe v. Winn & Sims, No. 06-cv-00599-H-AJB,
2021 WL 2662311, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 28, 2021); Doe v. Bank One Corp., No. 1:06-cv-02932, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 31, 2022); Doe v. San Diego Superior Ct., No. 3:99-cv-02260-BTM-AJB, at 2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2021);
Doe v. Mun. Ct., No. 3:98-cv-00272-JM-POR (S.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2021) (notice of document discrepancy noting
plaintiff’s real name); id. (S.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 1998) (earlier order that now lists plaintiff as Doe, presumably
because of some sealed order granting the motion for pseudonymity). (The last set of cases, starting with Doe v.
Collectco, apparently involved one frequent litigant and frequent pseudonymizer.) But many don’t allow such
retroactive pseudonymization, precisely because it appears futile. See, e.g., Kansky v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
of New England, 492 F.3d 54, 56 n.1 (1st Cir. 2007); Doe v. Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154, 162 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
Doe v. F.B.I., 218 F.R.D. 256, 260 (D. Colo. 2003); Doe v. Bell Atl. Bus. Sys. Servs., 162 F.R.D. 418, 422 (D.
Mass. 1995); Doe v. Univ. of R.I., 28 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 366 (D.R.I. 1993); cf. Gambale v. Deutsche Bank AG,
377 F.3d 133, 144 & n.11 (2d Cir. 2004) (concluding—as to retroactive sealing more broadly, rather than just
about retroactive pseudonymity—that, once “the genie is out of the bottle” and “the cat is out of the bag,” “the
ball game is over” (cleaned up)). And even if courts allow retroactive pseudonymization, it’s unlikely to be fully
successful, because many records will remain available on third-party websites.

1422

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:5

school instructor.”339 It is, of course, indeed likely that an allegation of sexual
assault would be ruinous to a partner at a well-known law firm who also teaches
at a law school. And it would be damaging right away, even before any verdict
in the case, and even if eventually the defendant is vindicated. But wouldn’t it
be devastating to a janitor as well?340
Likewise, in a lawsuit over an allegedly false credit report—basically, a
narrow statutory quasi-libel claim—the court allowed plaintiff to proceed
pseudonymously, because “[p]ublicly identifying Plaintiff risks impeding her
future employment prospects by making the improperly disclosed information
public knowledge.”341 One court did the same in a libel lawsuit.342 Some cases
that discuss a party’s disability have likewise led to pseudonymization on the
theory that identifying the plaintiffs could lead to “severe” “economic and career
consequences.”343 Some courts have also allowed pseudonymity for
whistleblowers, out of a concern that being known as a whistleblower might
create “a reasonably credible threat of some professional harm.”344 One court
339. Doe v. Doe, No. 20-cv-5329-KAM-CLP, 2020 WL 6900002, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2020). But see
Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 349 (1975) (rejecting pseudonymity in a divorce case, where the husband was found
guilty of adultery: “we do not approve . . . [of] throw[ing] the protective cloak of anonymity over a successful
and well-known member of the bar, as would appear to have been the case here”); Doe v. FBI, 218 F.R.D. 256,
259 (D. Colo. 2003) (“if the Court were to give greater weight to the reputational interests of a judge [who is the
plaintiff in this case] than those of an ‘ordinary’ plaintiff, such a decision would create the appearance of
favoritism within the judiciary”).
340. A few other trial court cases indeed allow alleged sexual abusers to proceed pseudonymously. See, e.g.,
Roe v. Borup, 500 F. Supp. 127, 130 (E.D. Wis. 1980). But see Doe v. Brown, No. FBT-CV-095024074-S, 2009
WL 5322462, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 11, 2009) (rejecting pseudonymity for a sexual assault defendant);
Balerna v. Bosco, No. HHD-CV-176082264S, 2017 WL 6884041, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 2017) (rejecting pseudonymity when the parties merely “wish to protect themselves from embarrassment and/or economic
harm in their respective professional and social communities as a result of having to proceed using their true
names”).
341. Doe v. Innovative Enters., Inc., No. 4:20-cv-00107-RCY-LRL, at 4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 25, 2020). But see
Doe v. Law Offs. of Robert A. Schuerger Co., No. 17-cv-13105-BRM-DEA, 2018 WL 4258155, at *2 (D.N.J.
Sept. 6, 2018) (refusing to allow pseudonymity in a similar case); Doe v. Evident ID Inc., No. 2:22-cv-00214,
at 3–4 (S.D. W. Va. May 19, 2022) (likewise).
342. Alexander v. Falk, No. 2:16-cv-02268-MMD-GWF, 2017 WL 3749573, at *5 (D. Nev. Aug. 30, 2017)
(“Assuming that there may be some validity to Plaintiffs’ allegations that they have been defamed, requiring
them to sue in their true names would potentially spread the damaging effects of the defamation to the arena of
their private lives where it has not yet reached.”); see also Doe v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal, No. D073328,
2018 WL 6252013, at *1 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2018) (mentioning, apparently favorably, that “Doe filed
suit under a pseudonym to protect his privacy and reputational interests”; Doe was a professor who had been
accused of “severe harassment based on sex and sexual orientation,” and who was suing claiming that the
university’s investigation violated his rights).
343. Doe v. Elson S Floyd Coll. of Med. at Wash. State Univ., No. 2:20-cv-00145-SMJ, 2021 WL 4197366,
at *2 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 24, 2021); see also Doe v. Bryson, No. 1:12-cv-10240 (D. Mass. Sept. 10, 2021)
(retroactively pseudonymizing case), granting Letter/Request, id. (D. Mass. July 14, 2021) (sealed), which
seems likely to have echoed Letter/Request, id. (D. Mass. June 4, 2021) (seeking pseudonymization “so that
[plaintiff’s] privacy and reputation online around the medical disability” that formed the basis of the lawsuit “is
not readily searchable,” and “to prevent the Plaintiff from further employment discrimination which has gravely
impacting her securing employment”).
344. SEB Inv. Mgmt. AB v. Symantec Corp., No. 18-cv-02902-WHA, 2021 WL 3487124, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 9, 2021); In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 97–98 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Whistleblower 14106-10W v. Comm’r,
137 T.C. 183, 204 (2011); Doe v. United States, No. 19-720T, 2019 WL 3406800, at *3 (Ct. Fed. Cl. July 29,
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has allowed pseudonymity to a doctor challenging her employer’s reporting
“charge[s] of professional misconduct” to “the National Practitioner Data
Bank.”345 And one court has allowed a defendant who is being accused of trade
secret infringement to litigate pseudonymously.346
3. The Special Case of University Student Lawsuits
And there is one large array of cases where pseudonymity requests have
usually been granted (though not always): lawsuits against universities by
students who claim they had been wrongly punished based on false accusations
and botched investigations, usually related to alleged sexual assault.347 There,
the students’ concerns are chiefly reputational: “being accused of sexual assault
is a serious allegation with which one would naturally not want to be identified
publicly.”348
Yet these university student cases don’t generally explain why they are
departing from the norm applicable in other reputational risk cases (except
insofar as some of the university cases suggest that young adults should get
special protection beyond what older adults get349). Some people are getting this
invaluable protection, and others are not, with little justification for the different
treatment but just because they drew a judge who is more open to pseudonymity
or because the judge found their plight to be especially sympathetic.350
IV. PSEUDONYMITY LIMITED TO COURT OPINIONS
(AND PERHAPS DOCKET SHEETS)
So far, we have been talking about true pseudonymity of court records. But
courts writing opinions can simply choose not to mention the names of the
parties. This has become the practice in some courts in social security benefits
cases,351 and is done ad hoc in other cases where courts want to shield parties in
some measure.352

2019). But see Whistleblower 14377-16W v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 122 T.C.M. (CCH) 200, at *28 (T.C.
2021) (concluding that the allowance of pseudonymity in Whistleblower 14106-10W stemmed from that decision
having “rested on a legal issue whose resolution we viewed as not dependent to any appreciable extent on [the
whistleblower’s] identity’” (citing 137 T.C. 183, 205 (2011)).
345. Doe v. Lieberman, No. 1:20-cv-02148, 2020 WL 13260569, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2020).
346. Ipsos MMA, Inc. v. Doe, No. 1:21-cv-08929-PAE (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2021), reaffirmed after case was
settled, id., 2022 WL 451510, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2022).
347. See Appendices 4a & 4b.
348. Doe v. Univ. of South, No. 4:09-cv-62, 2011 WL 13187184, at *19 (E.D. Tenn. July 8, 2011).
349. See supra Part III.D.2.
350. To be sure, internal university Title IX investigations are themselves confidential. But lawsuits are
usually litigated in public even when they stem from disputes arising out of internal investigations—for instance,
employer investigations of alleged misconduct by employees are routinely confidential, yet if the employee sues,
claiming that the investigation was pretext to cover discrimination, that lawsuit would be litigated without
pseudonymity.
351. See infra note 356.
352. See, e.g., J.S.B. v. S.R.V., 630 S.W.3d 693, 695 n.1 (Ky. 2021); S.U. v. Central Atl. Legal Grp., PLLC,
No. 20-1006, 2022 WL 293551, at *1 n.1 (W. Va. Feb. 1, 2022); United States v. Indian Boy X, 565 F.2d 585,
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The names remain available elsewhere in the record. Many appellate
opinions in which the parties’ names are pseudonymized indicate the trial court
case number, for instance, and looking up the trial court records will reveal the
parties’ names.353 Indeed, sometimes the full name appears even in the appellate
docket—just not in the opinion.354 Likewise, here is how one district court put
it, in rejecting a request to retroactively pseudonymize a case:
The fact that the parties now believe that they have suffered economic harm
[or embarrassment] as a result of the allegations at issue in this case is not a
basis to assign a pseudonym retroactively to every publicly available
document in this case. . . . The plaintiff chose to file this complaint, and the
defendants chose to file counterclaims without requesting anonymity. “Lawsuits are public events” and “[t]he risk that a [party] may suffer some
embarrassment is not enough” to justify anonymity.
Nevertheless, because this is a joint request and this case has been settled
without any finding of fault on either side, there is no especially pressing
public interest in being able to access the litigants’ identities through a search
of the caption. A limited sealing order is therefore justified. An order that
masks the names in the caption will reduce the publicity afforded to the parties
while still allowing access to the unredacted documents in the court file.355

This naturally provides much less privacy to the litigants, especially now
that many court dockets, and not just opinions, are available online. At the same
time, it likely provides some such protection against the casual Googler. And
because the full name remains in the record, where it can be found with just a
slight effort, the public retains its right of access (plus the other party can still
use the name if necessary). Courts therefore treat this sort of within-the-opinion
pseudonymity as within their discretion, available regardless of whether full
pseudonymity might be. For example:
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying D.E.’s motion for a
protective order, because he did not articulate concerns that outweigh the
presumption of openness in judicial proceedings. . . . As for potential negative
scrutiny from future employers, D.E., as the district court explained, “forfeited
his ability to keep secret his actions at the international border . . . when he
sued United States Customs and Border Patrol agents” [for their allegedly
unconstitutional search that revealed “marijuana and drug parapherna-

595 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Doe, 655 F.2d 920, 922 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Edwards, 175 F.3d
99, 99 n.1 (2d Cir. 1999).
353. See, e.g., J.A.B. v. J.E.D.B., 250 A.3d 254, 258 (Ct. Spec. App. Md. 2021); State v. Roy D.L., 262
A.3d 712, 712 n.* (Conn. 2021), aff’g No. HHD-CR15-0253526-T (Conn. Super. Ct. June 27, 2018); B.J. v.
S.B., No. B299525, 2021 WL 164503 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2021), as modified (Feb. 9, 2021), aff’g, No.
19STRO01033 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. July 22, 2019).
354. See, e.g., D.E. v. John Doe I, 834 F.3d 723 (6th Cir. 2016).
355. Stankiewicz v. Universal Com. Corp., No. 16-cv-2050-JGK, 2017 WL 3671040, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
9, 2017) (citation omitted).
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lia”] . . . . However, in the exercise of our discretion, in this published opinion
we refer to D.E. by his initials.356

To be sure, it is possible that technological changes will eliminate even this
mildly protective effect. Say, for instance, that some site that hosts court
opinions and other documents (such as CourtListener, PacerMonitor, or Google
Scholar) takes steps to find the places where the party’s full name is present and
to link the pseudonymized opinion with the full name. But for now, many a
litigant would find pseudonymization in the opinion valuable, even if the name
is available in some file (including some online file accessible by the public).
Nonetheless, even with such intermediate measures, one may wonder:
Should there be some clearer guidelines than just the judges’ discretion to decide
who gets this often-valuable privacy protection and who does not?
V. STATUTORY RULES
The analysis above suggests that some of these matters should be resolved
through clear rules defined by statute (or by courts acting in their rulemaking
capacity), which reflect specific judgment calls about when pseudonymity is
proper.357 And indeed the legal system often operates this way, for example,
with:
• Rules providing that appeals from juvenile cases involve pseudonyms
(the underlying cases themselves are sealed outright).358
• Rule 5.2(a)(3), which requires all minors (parties or otherwise) to be
identified by their initials.359
• Rules in some states mandating pseudonymity for sex crime victims360
or revenge porn victims.361
• Laws in some states mandating pseudonymity for family law cases.362
• Some federal courts’ practice of routinely pseudonymizing social
security benefits appeals.363

356. D.E., 834 F.3d at 728–29.
357. See Balla, supra note 21, at 709–35 (suggesting that courts create such express rules).
358. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. Rule 21.25; WASH. R. APP. P. 3.4.
359. See also, e.g., KAN. S. CT. R. 7.043(b)(1)–(2) (requiring that any minor or “a person whose identity
could reveal the name of a minor” be pseudonymized in appellate filings and decisions); N.C. R. APP. P. 3.1
(requiring pseudonymization of minors in many cases).
360. See, e.g., KAN. S. CT. R. 7.043(b)(3).
361. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.85; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3427.3 (2017) (allowing pseudonymity
for clients of health care facilities, such as abortion clinics, that have been targeted for interference with access).
362. See, e.g., DEL. R. S. CT. Rule 7(d).
363. Hon. Wm. Terrell Hodges, Chair, Comm. on Court Admin. & Case Mgmt. of the Jud. Conf. of the
U.S., Privacy Concern Regarding Social Security and Immigration Opinions, May 1, 2018, https://perma.cc/
P6US-AEFE; see, e.g., James P.B. v. Edwards, No. 21-cv-4810-JMV, 2021 WL 2981044, at *4 (D.N.J. July 15,
2021) (one of 15 D.N.J. cases adopting this view); N.D. ILL. INTERNAL OP. PROC. 22, https://perma.cc/6FSWDFB5; Coaty v. Comm’r, No. 1:13-cv-01348 (D. Or. Jan. 5, 2021) (noting District of Oregon practice).
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•

Many administrative agencies’ practice of pseudonymizing their
decisions.364
I am inclined to think that there ought to be more such rules, which add
clarity, predictability, and consistency to the process—though of course any
such rules should be carefully crafted in light of the concerns about the costs of
pseudonymity laid out in Part I. But that is a story for another day.365
CONCLUSION
I hope that the framework that I have laid out above, and the citations that
support it, are helpful to lawyers. Whether your client can sue (or be sued)
pseudonymously is often critically important to both the case and the client’s
future career. Conversely, whether your client can defeat the other side’s
pseudonymity motion is often important to how the rest of the case will be
litigated, and to the likely settlement value.
I also hope that the framework will be helpful to judges, who must consider
such matters without the benefit of any Supreme Court precedents, clearly
defined Federal Rules, or in many situations even any dispositive circuit
precedents. Though there is a general presumption against pseudonymity, and
multi-factor balancing tests in many circuits that discuss when the presumption
can be rebutted, the factors are often so vague or ambiguous that, by themselves,
they provide relatively little guidance.
But while I hope the analysis will also be helpful to scholars studying civil
procedure, privacy, or free speech, I very much doubt that it will be particularly
satisfying, precisely because the cases are so badly split, and the most
fundamental questions are therefore not consistently answered. Litigants and the
public, I think, deserve better than the uncertainty and inconsistency we now
see. I hope that, armed with some of the framework that I describe, courts,
rulemaking committees, and legislatures eventually chart a clearer path.

364. EEOC, Commission Federal Sector Appellate Decisions to Use Randomly Generated Names, Oct. 5,
2015, https://perma.cc/ZJL7-MAW9. See also U.S. TAX CT. R. 227, 345 (providing for pseudonymization of
intervenor names in actions aimed at restricting disclosure related to tax litigation, and in whistleblower filings).
365. See Eugene Volokh, Crafting Statutory Pseudonymity Rules (work in progress).
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APPENDICES
These appendices—generally focused on issues where there are more
sources than can conveniently fit in a footnote—are included chiefly for the
benefit of lawyers, judges, and pro se litigants who may need citations related to
specific topics in specific courts. These are not comprehensive lists, but I have
tried to make them more detailed than is common in a typical academic article.
In most of the Appendices, I sort the cases by circuit and, within that, by
state or district. I also note in parentheses the full names of the defendants, if
they are famous, in case the prominence of one of the parties may have
influenced the judges’ perception of the likely public interest in the case.
I focus solely on cases that have adjudicated motions for pseudonymity,
rather than just ones in which papers were filed pseudonymously with no
discussion of whether there was a legal basis for such pseudonymity:
“‘Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of
the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as
to constitute precedents.’”366 When the court granted or denied a motion for
pseudonymity but didn’t explain in detail the court’s rationale, I also cite to the
party filings that the court appears to have endorsed.
I also focus on adult claimants, given that children are generally
pseudonymized in any event.367
In some of these cases, the cited order does not explain the circumstances
of the case, but simply states that it grants or denies a motion; when that is so, I
also cite to the motion being considered.
Nearly all the district court decisions listed below that don’t include a
Westlaw citation are available for free on CourtListener.com, as well as for pay
on PACER and Bloomberg Law.
APPENDIX 1: PSEUDONYMITY ALLOWED FOR PARENTS TO SHIELD
CHILDREN
For the very few cases that do not allow pseudonymity in such situations,
see note 230.
1ST CIRCUIT
Doe v. Cavanaugh, No. 1:19-cv-11384-WGY (D. Mass. July 10, 2019).
2D CIRCUIT
Homesite Ins. Co. v. Cruz, No. 3:20-cv-00905-VLB (D. Conn. July 8,
2020), granting Motion, id. (July 1, 2020) (lawsuit related to sexual assault of
minor).

366. See supra note 192.
367. See supra Part III.D.1.
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Doe v. Brown, No. FBTCV095024074S, 2009 WL 5322462, at *1 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Dec. 11, 2009) (also citing other such cases from Connecticut trial
courts).
Doe v. Fairfield, No. CV065004042S, 2006 WL 3200433, at *3 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Oct. 24, 2006).
C.K. v. Bassett, No. 2:22-cv-01791 (E.D.N.Y. Mar 31, 2022), granting
Motion, id. (Mar. 31, 2022) (lawsuit related to minors’ mental illness).
P.M. v. Evans-Brant Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 08-cv-00168A, 2008 WL
4379490, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2008).
C.B. v. Pittsford Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 08-cv-6462 CJS, 2009 WL 2991564,
at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2009).
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 158 A.D.2d 296 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
3D CIRCUIT
Doe v. Banos, 713 F. Supp. 2d 404, 407 n.1 (D.N.J.), aff’d as to other
matters, 416 F. App’x 185 (3d Cir. 2010).
D.M. v. Cty. of Berks, 929 F. Supp. 2d 390 (E.D. Pa. 2013).
4TH CIRCUIT
A.R. v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Ed., No. 5:22-cv-45-D (E.D.N.C. Feb. 9, 2022).
Danvers v. Loudoun Cty. School Bd., No. 1:21-cv-01028-RDA-JFA, at 4
(E.D. Va. Sept. 13, 2021), granting Motion, id. (Sept. 8, 2021) (lawsuit related
to sexual assault of minor).
5TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Eason, No. CIV.A. 3:98-cv-2454, 1999 WL 33942103 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 4, 1999) (parent suing on her own behalf, but for claims that flowed from
her child having been sexually assaulted).
C.M. v. United States, No. SA-21-cv-00234-JKP, 2021 WL 1822305, at *2
(W.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2021).
6TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Mechanicsburg Sch. Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 3d 1024, 1027 (S.D.
Ohio 2021).
Bd. of Educ. of Highland Loc. Sch. Dist. v. United States Dep’t of Educ.,
No. 2:16-cv-524, 2016 WL 4269080, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 2016).
7TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710, 722 (7th Cir. 2011).
Marquez v. BHC Streamwood Hospital, Inc., 1:20-cv-04267 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 21, 2020).
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Doe A v. Plainfield Comm. Cons. Sch. Dist. 202, No. 1:21-cv-04460 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 25, 2021), granting Motion, id. (Aug. 23, 2021).
R.N. by & through R.T. v. Franklin Cmty. Sch. Corp., No. 1:19-cv-01922MJD-TWP, 2019 WL 4305748, at *4 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 11, 2019).
8TH CIRCUIT
M.T. v. Olathe Pub. Sch. USD 233, No. 17-cv-2710-JAR-GEB, 2018 WL
806210, at *3 (D. Kan. Feb. 9, 2018).
L.M. as Next Friend of A.M. v. City of Gardner, No. 19-cv-2425-DDC,
2019 WL 4168805 (D. Kan. Sept. 3, 2019).
S.E.S. v. Galena Unified Sch. Dist. No. 499, No. 18-cv-2042-DDC-GEB,
2018 WL 3389878 (D. Kan. July 12, 2018).
Doe B.A. v. USD 102, No. 18-2476-CM, 2019 WL 201741, at *2 (D. Kan.
Jan. 15, 2019).
9TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 215-cv-00793-APG-GWF, 2016 WL
4432683, at *15 (D. Nev. Aug. 18, 2016).
10TH CIRCUIT
Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. RE-1 v. Douglas Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Health, No.
21-cv-02818-JLK, 2021 WL 5106284, at *1 (D. Colo. Oct. 21, 2021).
11TH CIRCUIT
D.L. ex rel. Phan L. v. Bateman, No. 3:12-cv-208-J-32JBT, 2012 WL
1565419, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2012).
J.W. v. School Bd. of Suwanee Cty., No. 3:21-cv-01259-BJD-JBT, at 2
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 22, 2021) (lawsuit related to minor’s disability).
Doe v. School Bd. of Orange Cty., No. 6:22-cv-00411-PGB-LHP, at 2–3
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2022).
D.C. CIRCUIT
J.W. v. District of Columbia, 318 F.R.D. 196 (D.D.C. 2016) (lawsuit
related to minor’s disability).
M.J. v. District of Columbia, No. 1:18-cv-01901, at 6 (D.D.C. Aug. 14,
2018) (lawsuit related to minor’s mental health disability).
Doe v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 1:22-mc-00032-UNA, at 1, 5 (D.D.C. Mar. 7,
2022) (lawsuit related to “physical and verbal assault” on minor).

1430

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 73:5

APPENDIX 2A: ALLEGED SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS: PSEUDONYMITY
ALLOWED
All cases involve adults (since minors are generally treated under a separate
rule); they also involve sexual assault and not other forms of sexual misconduct,
unless otherwise specified.
1ST CIRCUIT
Doe v. Cerqueira, No. 1:21-cv-00370-NT, at 3–4 (D. Me. Mar. 3, 2022).
Globe Newspaper Co., Inc. v. Clerk of Suffolk Cty. Super. Ct., 14 Mass.
L. Rptr. 315 (2002).
2D CIRCUIT
Doe v. Diocese Corp., No. CV930704552S, 1994 WL 174693 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Apr. 21, 1994).
Doe v. Cent. Conn. State Univ., No 3:19-cv-00418 (D. Conn. May 10,
2019).
Khan v. Yale Univ., No. 3:19-cv-01966 (D. Conn. Jan. 10, 2020)
(defendant in defamation case stemming from sexual assault complaint).
Doe v. Doe, No. CV146015861S, 2014 WL 4056717 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Ansonia-Milford Dist. July 9, 2014) (plaintiff was a minor at the time of the
alleged assault, but not when the lawsuit was filed).
Adgers v. Doe, No. CV05-4014657, 2005 WL 3693816 (Conn. Super. Ct.
Hartford Dist. Dec. 22, 2005) (defendant in defamation case stemming from
sexual assault complaint).
Doe v. Smith, 105 F. Supp. 2d 40, 44 (E.D.N.Y. 1999).
Doe v. Hofstra Univ., No. 2:17-cv-00179 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2017), granting Motion, id. (Jan. 13, 2017) (allegations of retaliation for refusing unwanted
sexual advances, rather than sexual assault).
Lawson v. Rubin, No. 17-cv-6404-BMC-SMG, 2019 WL 5291205
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2019) (defendant in defamation case stemming from sexual
assault complaint).
A.B. v. C.D., No. 17-cv-5840-DRH-AYS, 2018 WL 1935999 (E.D.N.Y.
Apr. 24, 2018).
Doe v. Columbia Univ., No. 1:14-cv-03573-JMF (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2014),
granting Motion, id. (June 9, 2014)).
Doe v. Sarah Lawrence College, No. 7:19-cv-10028-PMH (S.D.N.Y. Oct.
31, 2019).
Doe v. Vassar College, No. 19-cv-09601-NSR, 2019 WL 5963482, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2019).
Doe v. Smith, No. 19-cv-1121-GLS-DJS, 2019 WL 6337305, at *3
(N.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2019).
Doe v. Gooding, No. 20-cv-06569 (PAC), 2021 WL 5991819, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2021) (Cuba Gooding, Jr.).
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Doe v. McAdam Fin. Group LLC, No. 22-cv-00113 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13,
2022), granting Motion, id. (Jan. 7, 2022).
3D CIRCUIT
Doe v. Rutgers Univ., No. 2:21-cv-20763-ES-MAH, at 2–3 (D.N.J. Jan.
25, 2022).
Doe v. Rutgers Univ., No. 2:18-cv-12952-KM-CLW, 2019 WL 1967021,
at *3 (D.N.J. Apr. 30, 2019).
Doe v. Trishul Consultancy, LLC, No. 18-cv-16468-FLW-ZNQ, 2019 WL
4750078, at *4 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2019).
Doe v. Lund’s Fisheries, Inc., No. 20-cv-11306-NLH-JS, 2020 WL
6749972, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 2020).
Doe v. Horizon House, No. BER-L-008445-21 (N.J. Super. Ct. Jan. 10,
2022).
Doe v. Evans, 202 F.R.D. 173, 176 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
Doe v. Moravian College, No. 5:20-cv-00377-JMG, at 1–2 n.1 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 11, 2021).
Doe v. Westminster College, No. 2:22-cv-00075-CCW, at 1–2 (W.D. Pa.
Feb. 14, 2022).
A. McD. v. Rosen, 423 Pa. Super. 304, 306 n.1 (1993) (sexual misconduct
by psychiatrist towards patient).
4TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Morgan State Univ., No. 1:19-cv-03125-GLR (D. Md. Jan. 21,
2020), granting Motion, id. (Oct. 29, 2019).
Painter v. Doe, No. 3:15-cv-369-MOC-DCK, 2016 WL 3766466
(W.D.N.C. July 13, 2016) (defendant in defamation case stemming from sexual
assault complaint).
Doe v. Fowler, No. 3:17-cv-00730-FDW-DSC, 2018 WL 3428150
(W.D.N.C. July 16, 2018) (child pornography).
Doe v. Old Dominion Univ., No. 2:17-cv-00015-HCM-DEM, at 1 (E.D.
Va. Feb. 14, 2017).
Doe v. Sidar, No. 1:22-cv-00545-CMH-TCB, at 1 (E.D. Va. May 13,
2022), granting Motion, id. (May 12, 2022).
Doe v. Yates, No. 3:22-cv-00002-NKM (W.D. Va. Jan. 14, 2022).
5TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Meister, No. 4:21-cv-04226 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2022), granting
Motion, id. (Dec. 30, 2021) (sex trafficking).
Doe v. El Paso Cty. Hosp. Dist., No. 13-cv-00406-DCG, 2015 WL
1507840, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 1, 2015) (“coerced nudity and the repeated
probing of Plaintiff’s genitals,” though not sexual assault).
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6TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Dabbagh, No. 15-cv-10724, 2015 WL 13806540, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
May 28, 2015).
Doe v. Streeter, No. 4:20-cv-11609-MFL-APP (E.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 2020)
(child pornography).
NMIC Ins. Co. v. Smith, No. 2:18-cv-533, 2018 WL 7859755, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Oct. 24, 2018).
Doe v. Kenyon College, No. 20-cv-4972-MHW-CMV, at 3 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 24, 2020).
Doe v. Mitchell, No. 2:20-cv-00459, 2020 WL 6882601, at *7 (S.D. Ohio
Nov. 24, 2020), report & recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 2313436 (S.D.
Ohio June 7, 2021).
Doe v. Streck, 522 F. Supp. 3d 332, 334 (S.D. Ohio 2021).
Doe v. Athens County, No. 2:22-cv-00855-EAS-CMV, at 2 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 15, 2022).
Doe v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 3:21-cv-00395, 2021 WL
5041286, at *3, *9 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 29, 2021) (accepting pseudonymity for
plaintiff who alleged rape but rejecting it for plaintiff who alleged sexual
groping).
7TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisc., 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th
Cir. 1997) (dictum).
Doe v. Sproul, No. 3:20-cv-00610-MAB, 2022 WL 579488, at *2 (S.D. Ill.
Feb. 24, 2022).
Doe v. Tinsley, 2021 IL App (1st) 210228-U, at *5 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 21,
2021).
Doe v. Purdue Univ., No. 4:18-cv-72-JVB-JEM, 2019 WL 1960261, at *4
(N.D. Ind. Apr. 30, 2019).
Doe v. Purdue Univ., No. 4:19-cv-56-TLS-JPK, 2019 WL 3887165, at *4
(N.D. Ind. Aug. 19, 2019).
Doe v. Marvel, No. 1:10-cv-1316-JMS-DML, 2010 WL 5099346, at *3
(S.D. Ind. Dec. 8, 2010).
Doe No. 62 v. Indiana Univ. Bloomington, No. 1:16-cv-1480-JMS-DKL,
2016 WL 11553229, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 26, 2016).
8TH CIRCUIT
Nationwide Affinity Ins. Co. of Am. v. Brown, No. 2:20-cv-02355-EFMTJJ, at 2 (D. Kan. Aug. 28, 2020).
Doe v. Innovate Fin., Inc, No. 11-cv-1754-JRT-TNL, 2022 WL 673582, at
*3 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2022).
Roe v. St. Louis Univ., No. 4:08-cv-1474-JCH, 2009 WL 910738, at *5
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 2, 2009).

July 2022

THE LAW OF PSEUDONYMOUS LITIGATION

1433

D.B. v. King, No. 4:09-cv-1869-CEJ, 2009 WL 4020073, at *1 (E.D. Mo.
Nov. 18, 2009).
D.P. for Doe v. Montgomery Cty., No. 2:19-cv-00038-DDN, 2019 WL
2437024, at *1 (E.D. Mo. June 11, 2019).
Doe v. Haynes, No. 4:18-cv-1930-HEA, 2019 WL 2450813, at *3 (E.D.
Mo. June 12, 2019).
Doe v. Eckerson, 5:20-cv-06135-GAF (W.D. Mo. Oct. 8, 2020).
9TH CIRCUIT
Doe I v. Yesner, No. 3:19-cv-0136-HRH, 2019 WL 4196054, at *12 (D.
Alaska Sept. 4, 2019) (sexual assault only, not sexual harassment).
Doe v. Krogh, No. 21-cv-08086-PCT-DWL, 2021 WL 1967165, at *1 (D.
Ariz. May 17, 2021).
Doe K.G. v. Pasadena Hospital Ass’n, Ltd., No. 2:18-cv-08710-ODWMAAx, 2019 WL 1612828, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 15, 2019).
Fleites v. MindGeek S.A.R.L., No. 21-cv-04920-CJCA-DSX, 2021 WL
2766886, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 28, 2021) (alleged victims of “federal sex
trafficking, child pornography, and sexual exploitation”; the victims were
minors at the time of the incidents but adults at the time of the lawsuit).
Doe v. Penzato, No. 10-cv-5154-MEJ, 2011 WL 1833007, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
May 13, 2011) (sex trafficking).
Heineke v. Santa Clara Univ., No. 17-cv-05285-LHK, 2017 WL 6026248,
at *23 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2017) (defendant in defamation case stemming from
sexual assault complaint).
B.M. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., No. 20-cv-00656-BLF, 2020
WL 4368214, at *10 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2020) (sex trafficking).
Doe v. NCAA, No. 3:22-cv-01559-LB (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2022) (sexual
harassment), granting Motion, id. (Mar. 17, 2022).
Doe v. Unitedhealthcare Ins. Co., No. 3:20-cv-06574-EMC (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 24, 2020), granting Motion, id. (Sept. 18, 2020) (case involving “confidential psychiatric treatment notes, which include accounts of childhood sexual
abuse”).
Doe v. Steele, No. 3:20-cv-01818-MMA-MSB, at 5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 16,
2020) (sex trafficking).
10TH CIRCUIT
Ramsay v. Frontier, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-03544-RMR-NRN, at 2–3 (D. Colo.
Feb. 20, 2020).
S.M. v. Bloomfield School District, No. 16-cv-823-SCY-WPL, at 8–9
(D.N.M. Dec. 1, 2016).
Doe v. Sisters of Saint Francis of Colorado Springs, No. 20-cv-0907-WJLF, at 6 (D.N.M. Feb. 19, 2021).
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Doe v. Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP, No. 1:20-cv-01365-KWRLF, 2021 WL 1026702, at *2 (D.N.M. Mar. 17, 2021).
Roe v. Okla. ex rel. Univ. of Central Okla., No. 5:22-cv-00237-SLP, at 2–
3 (W.D. Okla. May 2, 2022).
11TH CIRCUIT
S.B. v. Fla. Agric. & Mech. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, No. 4:16-cv-613-MWCAS, 2018 WL 11239720, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2018) (at least when
“Defendant ‘is not accused of culpability for committing a sex crime itself’”),
appeal dismissed on procedural grounds, 823 F. App’x 862 (11th Cir. 2020).
Doe v. Truong, No. 1:22-cv-00825-SEG, at 1 (N.D. Ga. May 3, 2022)
(child pornography).
D.C. CIRCUIT
Doe v. De Amigos, LLC, No. 11-cv-1755, 2012 WL 13047579, at *2–3
(D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2012).
Doe v. Cabrera, 307 F.R.D. 1, 3–4, 6 (D.D.C. 2014) (Miguel Cabrera).
E.V. v. Robinson, No. 1:16-cv-01419, 2016 WL 11584907, at *2 (D.D.C.
July 8, 2016).
Doe v. Georgetown Synagogue-Kesher Israel Congregation, No. 1:16-cv01845-ABJ (D.D.C. Sept. 15, 2016), granting Motion, id. (Sept. 15, 2016)
(hidden photographing of plaintiffs when they were naked).
Doe v. Howard Univ., No. 1:17-cv-00870-TSC, at 1 (D.D.C. May 12,
2017).
Doe 1 v. George Wash. Univ., 369 F. Supp. 3d 49, 64 (D.D.C. 2019).
Doe v. Howard Univ., No. 1:20-cv-01769-CJN, at 5–7 (D.D.C. July 16,
2020).
Doe v. OPO Hotel Mgmt., No. 2020 CA 003630 B (D.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 7,
2020).

APPENDIX 2B: ALLEGED SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS: PSEUDONYMITY NOT
ALLOWED
1ST CIRCUIT
Doe v. Bell Atlantic Business Systems, Inc., 162 F.R.D. 418, 421 (D. Mass.
1995).
MacInnis v. Cigna Grp. Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F. Supp.2d 89 (D. Mass.
2005).
Doe v. Univ. of R.I., No. 93-cv-0560B, 1993 WL 667341 (D.R.I. Dec. 28,
1993).
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2D CIRCUIT
K.D. v. City of Norwalk, No. 3:06-cv-00406-WWE, 2006 WL 1662905, at
*2 (D. Conn. June 14, 2006).
Doe v. Rackliffe, 173 Conn. App. 389, 400 (2017).
Doe v. St. John, No. CV055000443S, 2006 WL 1149224, at *2 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 2006).
Balerna v. Bosco, No. HHDCV176082264S, 2017 WL 6884041, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 2017) (rejecting pseudonymity in non-Title-IX case
arising out of alleged sexual assault at college).
Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Tupac Shakur).
Roe v. Does 1–11, No. 20-cv-3788-MKB-SJB, 2020 WL 6152174, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2020) (asserting that there is a “general trend to disfavor
anonymity in sexual assault-related civil cases”).
Doe v. Gong Xi Fa Cai, Inc., No. 19-cv-2678, 2019 WL 3034793, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2019).
Doe v. Skyline Automobiles Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d 401, 405 (S.D.N.Y.
2019).
Doe v. Gong Xi Fa Cai, Inc., No. 19-cv-2678-RA, 2019 WL 3034793, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2019) (sexual harassment).
Doe v. Townes, No. 19-cv-8034, 2020 WL 2395159, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May
12, 2020).
Doe v. Freydin, No. 21-cv-8371-NRB, 2021 WL 4991731, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 27, 2021).
Doe v. Weinstein, 484 F. Supp. 3d 90, 94 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (Harvey
Weinstein).
Rapp v. Fowler, No. 20-cv-9586-LAK, 2021 WL 1738349 (S.D.N.Y. May
3, 2021) (Kevin Spacey).
GCVAWCG-Doe v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y., 69 Misc. 3d
648, 654–55 (2020).
Doe v. Leonelli, No. 1:22-cv-03732-CM, 2022 WL 2003635, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2022).
3D CIRCUIT
Doe v. County of Lehigh, No. 5:20-cv-03089, 2020 WL 7319544 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 11, 2020).
Doe v. Ct. of Common Pleas of Butler Cty., No. 17-cv-1304, 2017 WL
5069333, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2017) (sexual harassment, though language
also covers sexual assault).
F.B. v. East Stroudsburg Univ., No. 3:09-cv-525, 2009 WL 2003363, at *3
(M.D. Pa. July 7, 2009).
B.L. v. Zong, No. 3:15-cv-1327, 2017 WL 1036474, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar.
17, 2017) (though also relying in part on plaintiff’s having earlier publicly
identified himself).
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Brownlee v. Monroe Cty. Corr. Facility, No. 1:18-cv-1318, 2019 WL
2160402, at *3 (M.D. Pa. May 17, 2019).
4TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. N. Carolina Cent. Univ., No. 1:98-cv-01095, 1999 WL 1939248, at
*3 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 15, 1999).
Doe v. Briscoe, 61 Va. Cir. 96, 2003 WL 22748373, at *3 (2003).
5TH CIRCUIT
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Harris, No. 14-cv-00802, 2014 WL 4207599, at *2
(W.D. La. Aug. 25, 2014).
Rose v. Beaumont Independent School Dist., 240 F.R.D. 264 (E.D. Tex.
2007).
6TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Webster Cty., No. 4:21-CV-00093-JHM, 2022 WL 124678, at *4
(W.D. Ky. Jan. 12, 2022).
Doe v. Wolowitz, No. 01-cv-73907, 2002 WL 1310614, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
May 28, 2002).
Doe v. Bedford City School Dist. Bd. of Ed., No. 1:22-cv-00059 (N.D.
Ohio June 17, 2022).
Doe v. Bruner, No. CA2011-07-013, 2012 WL 626202, at *3 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 27, 2012) (applying federal law by analogy).
Ramsbottom v. Ashton, No. 3:21-cv-00272, 2021 WL 2651188, at *4
(M.D. Tenn. June 28, 2021).
Doe v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 3:21-cv-00395, 2021 WL
5041286, at *3, *9 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 29, 2021) (rejecting pseudonymity for
plaintiff who alleged sexual groping but accepting it for plaintiff who alleged
rape).
7TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Cook County, No. 1:20-cv-05832, 2021 WL 2258313, at *4 (N.D.
Ill. June 3, 2021).
Doe v. Hamilton County Coal, LLC, No. 3:20-cv-73-NJR, 2020 WL
2042899, at *1–2 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 28, 2020) (“unwanted and non-consensual
touching, kissing, receipt of pornographic text messages, and exposure to other
employees’ genitals and anuses”).
8TH CIRCUIT
Luckett v. Beaudet, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D. Minn. 1998).
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9TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. JBF RAK LLC, No. 2:14-cv-00979–RFB–GWF, 2014 WL
5286512, at *5 (D. Nev. Oct. 15, 2014).
Doe v. Rose, No. 15-cv-07503-MWF-JCX, 2016 WL 9150620 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 22, 2016) (pseudonymity allowed before trial, but rejected “for purposes
of the trial itself”).
10TH CIRCUIT
Doe 1 v. Unified Sch. Dist. 331, No. 11-cv-1351-KHV, 2013 WL 1624823,
at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 15, 2013) (“suggestive sexual comments and sexual
touching”).
Doe H. v. Haskell Indian Nations University, 266 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1289
(D. Kan. 2017).
C.S. v. EmberHope, Inc., No. 19-cv-2612-KHV, 2019 WL 6727102 (D.
Kan. Dec. 11, 2019).
H.A. v. Blue Valley Unified Sch. Dist. 229, No. 20-cv-2559-JAR, 2020
WL 6559425, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 9, 2020).
Doe v. Weber State Univ., No. 1:20-cv-00054-TC-DAO, 2021 WL
5042849, at *4 (D. Utah Oct. 29, 2021).
11TH CIRCUIT
Plaintiff B v. Francis, 631 F.3d 1310, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011) (“courts have
often denied the protection of anonymity in cases where plaintiffs allege sexual
assault, even when revealing the plaintiff’s identity may cause her to ‘suffer
some personal embarrassment’”).
Doe v. Sheely, 781 F. App’x 972, 973–74 (11th Cir. 2019).
Doe v. Ocean Reef Cmty. Ass’n, No. 19-cv-10138-FAM, 2019 WL
5102450, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2019).

APPENDIX 3A: MENTAL ILLNESS OR CONDITION: PSEUDONYMITY
ALLOWED
1ST CIRCUIT
Doe v. Standard Ins. Co., No. 1:15-cv-00105-GZS, 2015 WL 5778566, at
*2 (D. Me. Oct. 2, 2015) (“serious mental health condition”).
Anonymous v. Legal Servs. Corp. of Puerto Rico, 932 F. Supp. 49, 50
(D.P.R. 1996) (“treatable mental disorder”).
2D CIRCUIT
T.W. v. N.Y. State Bd. of L. Examiners, No. 16-cv-3029-RJD-RLM, 2017
WL 4296731, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2017) (“depression, anxiety, panic
attacks, and cognitive impairments”) (though stressing that the lawsuit was
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against the government, which in the court’s view justified more latitude for
pseudonymity).
3D CIRCUIT
Doe v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co., 237 F.R.D. 545, 550
(D.N.J. 2006) (“severe bipolar disorder”).
Doe v. Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co., 176 F.R.D. 464, 468–69
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (“general anxiety disorder, dysthymic disorder, adult attention
deficit disorder, personality disorder, immature, inadequate, passive
aggressiveness, and occupational stress with previous job situation”).
R.W. v. Hampe, 426 Pa. Super. 305, 314–15 (1993) (unspecified “personal
details of [plaintiff’s] life and [psychiatric] therapy,” including “embarrassing
information, particularly of a sexual nature”).
5TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Tonti Mgmt. Co., No. 2:20-cv-02466-LMA-MBN (E.D. La. Sept.
11, 2020), granting Motion, id. (Sept. 9, 2020) (“major depressive disorder,
anxiety, and PTSD caused by a sexual assault”).
7TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. School Dist. 214, No. 1:16-cv-07642, at 10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 2017)
(“petit mal seizures, developmental disabilities and a learning disability”).
Doe v. Trustees of Indiana Univ., No. 1:12-cv-1593-JMS-DKL, 2013 WL
3353944 (S.D. Ind. July 3, 2013) (risk of mental injury from disclosure of
unspecified mental disorders).
9TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. State Bar of Cal., No. 3:20-cv-06442-LB (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2020),
granting Motion, id. (Sept. 14, 2020) (ADHD, generalized anxiety disorder,
trichotillomania [compulsive pulling out of hair]).
Doe v. Unitedhealthcare Insurance Company, No. 3:20-cv-06574-EMC
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2020), granting Motion, id. (Sept. 18, 2020) (“confidential
psychiatric treatment notes, which include accounts of childhood sexual abuse”).
Doe v. Spahn, No. 1:21-cv-03409-TNM (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2021),
granting Motion, id. (Oct. 12, 2021); see Motion to Dismiss, id., at 12 (Oct. 26,
2021) (“major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder”).
Beach v. United Behavioral Health, No. 3:21-cv-08612-RS (N.D. Cal.
Nov. 15, 2021), granting Motion to Proceed Anonymously, id., at 3 (Nov. 9,
2021) (depression and anxiety).
Doe v. Lincoln Life Assurance Co. of Boston, No. 3:22-cv-00694-JSC
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2022), granting Motion, id. (Feb. 2, 2022) (“serious
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psychiatric health problems that resulted from bearing witness to the suicide of
a coworker in her workplace”).
11TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Garland, No. 2:21-cv-00071-LGW-BWC, at 5 (S.D. Ga. July 30,
2021) (“PTSD, Major Depressive Disorder and suicidal ideation or Suicidal
Behavior Disorder”).
D.C. CIRCUIT
Doe v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-0004-RC, 2018 WL 4637014, at *4 (D.D.C.
Sept. 27, 2018) (“Asperger’s Syndrome, Acute Stress Disorder, Panic Disorder,
[PTSD], and anxiety”).

APPENDIX 3B: MENTAL ILLNESS OR CONDITION: PSEUDONYMITY NOT
ALLOWED
1ST CIRCUIT
MacInnis v. Cigna Grp. Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F. Supp. 2d 89, 90 (D. Mass.
2005) (“depressive/anxiety disorder”).
2D CIRCUIT
Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:96-cv-1789-AHN, 1997 WL 114700,
at *1 (D. Conn. Feb. 25, 1997) (“manic depression”).
Wescott v. Middlesex Hosp., No. MMXCV186020250, 2018 WL
2292916, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 1, 2018) (bipolar disorder and
schizoaffective disorder).
Rives v. SUNY Downstate Coll. of Med., No. 20-cv-00621-RPK-SMG,
2020 WL 4481641 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2020) (“ADHD and intermittent
depression”), reconsideration denied, id., 2020 WL 7356616 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
14, 2020).
P.D. by H.D. v. Neifeld, No. 21-cv-6787-CBA-SJB, 2022 WL 818895, at
*1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2022) (autism).
Mottola v. Denegre, No. 12-cv-3465-LAP, 2012 WL 12883775, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2012) (“psychiatric history”).
Vega v. HSBC Securities (USA) Inc., No. 16-cv-9424, 2019 WL 2357581
(S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2019) (“major depressive disorder and attention deficit
disorder”).
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4TH CIRCUIT
Roe v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 4:13-cv-3481-RBH, 2014 WL
12608588, at *1, *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 11, 2014) (“mental and emotional disabilities”).
Doe v. Lees-McRae College, No. 1:20-cv-00105-MR, 2021 WL 2673050,
at *6 (W.D.N.C. June 29, 2021) (“ADHD and anxiety disorder”).
5TH CIRCUIT
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Harris, No. 14-cv-00802, 2014 WL 4207599, at *2
(W.D. La. Aug. 25, 2014) (disorder that “rendered [plaintiff] perpetually
childlike and vulnerable”).
Doe v. Univ. of the Incarnate Word, No. 19-cv-00957-XR, 2019 WL
6727875, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2019) (ADHD).
6TH CIRCUIT
G.E.G. v. Shinseki, No. 1:10-cv-1124, 2012 WL 381589, at *2 n.1 (W.D.
Mich. Feb. 6, 2012) (“Attention Deficit Disorder/unspecified learning disorder”
and “anxiety disorder”).
Doe v. Carson, No. 1:18-cv-1231, 2019 WL 1978428 (W.D. Mich. May 3,
2019) (“mental illness”), aff’d, No. 19-1566, 2020 WL 2611189, at *3 (6th Cir.
May 6, 2020) (finding no abuse of discretion).
Doe v. Univ. of Akron, No. 5:15-cv-2309, 2016 WL 4520512, at *4 (N.D.
Ohio Feb. 3, 2016) (“ADHD, anxiety, depression”).
7TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 112 F.3d 869, 872
(7th Cir. 1997) (“obsessive-compulsive disorder”).
Doe v. Indiana Black Expo, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 137, 140 (S.D. Ind. 1996)
(past psychiatric hospitalization).
Doe v. Indiv. Members of Indiana State Bd. of Law Examiners, No. 1:09cv-00842 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 8, 2009) (anxiety disorder and PTSD).
Doe v. Trustees of Indiana Univ., No. 1:12-cv-1593-JMS-DKL, 2013 WL
3353944, at *2–3 (S.D. Ind. July 3, 2013) (redacted mental disorders, including
“suicidal ideation,” would be insufficient by themselves to justify pseudonymity, but pseudonymity was nonetheless allowed because of a doctor’s affidavit
stating that identifying the plaintiff would likely cause mental harm).
8TH CIRCUIT
AB v. HRB Pro. Res. LLC, No. 4:19-cv-00817-HFS, 2020 WL 12675330,
at *1–*2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 31, 2020) (“mental health disorder”).
Doe v. Riverside Partners, LLC, No. 4:22-cv-00117-CDP, at 6 (E.D. Mo.
Apr. 22, 2022) (eating disorder).
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9TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 164 F. Supp. 3d 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2016)
(“general anxiety disorder”).
Doe v. Standard Ins. Co., No. 3:22-cv-00519, at 1 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2022)
(“‘highly confidential medical information’ including ‘psychiatric health
problems,’” apparently including “major depressive disorder and anxiety,”
Complaint, id. at 3).
A.G. v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 3:17-cv-01414-HZ, 2018 WL
903463, at *4 (D. Or. Feb. 14, 2018) (“Ehrels-Danlos syndrome,” an “incurable”
neurological disorder, see Gary v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 3:17-cv01414-HZ, 2021 WL 5625547 (D. Or. Nov. 29, 2021)).
Doe v. Zuchowski, No. 2:21-cv-01519-APG-EJY, 2021 WL 4066667, at
*2 (D. Nev. Sept. 7, 2021) (“stress-induced Tinnitus (non-stop ringing in the
ears) for ten (10) months now as well as a total collapse of his mental health
induced by the condition”).
10TH CIRCUIT
Peru v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 10-cv-01506-MSK-BNB, 2010 WL
2724085, at *2 (D. Colo. July 7, 2010) (“bipolar disorder” and PTSD, see
Complaint, id. at 8 (June 25, 2010)).
Doe v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 20-cv-01033-PAB-NRN, 2020
WL 3429152, at *1, *3 (D. Colo. June 23, 2020) (PTSD).
Doe v. Regents of Univ. of N.M., No. 98-cv-725-SC-DJS, 1999 WL
35809691, at *2 (D.N.M. Mar. 10, 1999) (“[c]linical depression”).
11TH CIRCUIT
Alexandra H. v. Oxford Health Ins., Inc., No. 11-cv-23948, 2012 WL
13194938, at *1–3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2012) (rejecting pseudonymity when
plaintiff was suffering from “anorexia nervosa, obsessive compulsive disorder,
severe depression and suicidal ideation,” though noting that she “presents a more
compelling case for allowing anonymity with her untimely Reply memorandum,” albeit a case that the court rejects on procedural grounds: “[t]o grant her
Motion . . . would be to reward Plaintiff for unfair briefing practices where
[Defendant] is not permitted to respond to new factual and legal assertions”).

APPENDIX 4A: ALLEGEDLY IMPROPER UNIVERSITY INVESTIGATIONS:
PSEUDONYMITY ALLOWED
The cases all involved Title IX investigations alleging sexual misconduct,
unless otherwise noted.
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1ST CIRCUIT
Doe v. Univ. of Me. Sys., No. 1:19-cv-00415-NT, 2020 WL 981702, at *6
(D. Me. Feb. 20, 2020).
Doe v. Univ. of Mass.-Amherst, No. 3:14-cv-30143 (D. Mass. Mar. 30,
2015), granting Motion, id. (Aug. 11, 2014).
Doe v. Ahmerst College, No. 3:15-cv-30097-MGM (D. Mass. June 30,
2015) (“allowed, without opposition” but without any further analysis).
Doe v. W. New England Univ., No. 3:15-cv-30192-MAP (D. Mass. Feb.
2, 2016) (“allowed, without opposition” but without any further analysis).
Doe v. Williams College, No. 3:20-cv-30024-KAR (D. Mass. Feb. 19,
2020), granting Motion, id. (Feb. 18, 2020).
Doe v. Doe, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 1120, at *1 (2016) (upholding trial court’s
sealing of a college student’s abuse prevention order case against another
student, in which the trial judge had “determined that the standard for issuance
of an abuse prevention order had not been met”).
Doe v. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll., No. 18-cv-040-LM, 2018 WL
2048385, at *5–6 (D.N.H. May 2, 2018).
Doe v. Trustees of Dartmouth Coll., No. 1:22-cv-00018 (D.N.H. Jan. 21,
2022).
Doe v. Franklin Pierce Univ., No. 1:22-cv-00188 (D.N.H. May 27, 2022)
(“provisionally granted subject to de novo review after the defendant has
appeared and any interested person has had an opportunity to object”).
2D CIRCUIT
Doe v. Quinnipiac Univ., No. 3:17-cv-00364-JBA (D. Conn. Mar. 31,
2017), granting Motion, id. (Mar. 2, 2017).
Doe v. Univ. of Conn., No. 3:20-cv-00092-MPS (D. Conn. Feb. 11, 2020),
granting Motion, id. (Jan. 20, 2020).
Doe v. Yale Univ., No. 3:19-cv-01663-CSH (D. Conn. Sept. 3, 2020),
granting Motion, id. (Oct. 22, 2019) (accusations of honor code violation related
to alleged failure to note assistance on graded project).
Doe v. Colgate Univ., No. 5:15-cv-1069-LEK-DEP, 2016 WL 1448829, at
*3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2016).
Doe v. Syracuse Univ., No. 5:17-cv-00787 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2017).
Doe v. Colgate Univ., No. 5:17-cv-01298 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2018).
Doe v. Syracuse Univ., No. 5:18-cv-00377-DNH-ML (N.D.N.Y. June 4,
2018).
Doe #1 v. Syracuse Univ., No. 5:18-cv-0496-FJS-DEP, 2018 WL 7079489,
at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2018), report & recommendation adopted, No. 5:18cv-00496-BKS-ML, 2020 WL 2028285 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020) (accusations
that fraternity members engaged in actions that were “racist, anti-semitic,
homophobic, sexist, and hostile to people with disabilities”).
Doe v. Syracuse Univ., No. 5:19-cv-00190 (N.D.N.Y. May 13, 2019).
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Doe v. Syracuse Univ., No. 5:19-cv-01467-TJM-ATB (N.D.N.Y. July 15,
2020).
Doe v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., No. 1:20-cv-1185 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,
2020).
Doe v. Trustee of Hamilton Coll., No. 6:22-cv-00214 (N.D.N.Y. June 6,
2022).
Doe v. Columbia Univ., 101 F. Supp. 3d 356, 360 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
Doe v. Vassar College, No. 19-cv-09601-NSR, at 3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13,
2019).
Doe v. New York Univ., 537 F. Supp. 3d 483, 496–97 (S.D.N.Y. 2021)
(accusation of violations of COVID lockdown rules).
Doe v. Hobart & William Smith Colleges, No. 6:20-cv-06338 EAW, 2021
WL 1062707, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2021).
Doe v. Brown Univ., No. 1:16-cv-00017 (D.R.I. Mar. 23, 2016), granting
Motion, id. (Feb. 8, 2016).
Doe v. Brown Univ., No. 1:17-cv-00191 (D.R.I. Dec. 11, 2017), granting
Motion, id. (Nov. 30, 2017).
Doe v. Brown Univ., 327 F. Supp. 3d 397, 403 n.1 (D.R.I. 2018).
Doe v. Johnson & Wales Univ., No. 1:18-cv-0010 (D.R.I. Mar. 12, 2018).
Doe v. Middlebury College, No. 1:15-cv-00192 (D. Vt. Dec. 18, 2015),
granting Motion, id. (Aug. 28, 2015).
Doe v. Vermont Law School, No. 2:22-cv-00085-cr (D. Vt. June 13, 2022),
granting Motion, id. (Apr. 19, 2022) (allowing pseudonymity when plaintiff
sued based on allegedly discriminatory grading, plagiarism accusations, and and
disciplinary measures).
3D CIRCUIT
Doe v. Moravian College, No. 5:20-cv-00377-JMG, at 2 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Jan.
11, 2021).
Doe v. Penn. State Univ., No. 4:17-cv-01315-MWB, at 1 (M.D. Pa. Aug.
3, 2017).
Doe v. Penn. State Univ., No. 4:18-cv-00164-MWB, at 1 (M.D. Pa. Jan.
26, 2018).
Doe v. Penn. State Univ., No. 4:18-cv-02350-MWB, at 1 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 8,
2019).
4TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Univ. of S.C., No. 3:18-cv-00161-TLW-PJG, 2018 WL 1215045,
at *1 n.1 (D.S.C. Feb. 12, 2018), report & recommendation adopted, id., 2018
WL 1182508 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2018).
Doe v. Rector & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 179 F. Supp. 3d 583,
593 (E.D. Va. 2016).
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Doe v. Hampton Univ., No. 1:22-cv-00133-LMB-IDD, at 1 (E.D. Va. Feb.
10, 2022).
Doe v. Alger, 317 F.R.D. 37, 42 (W.D. Va. 2016).
Doe v. Wash. & Lee Univ., No. 6:14-cv-00052 (W.D. Va. Dec. 16, 2014),
granting Motion, id. (Dec. 16, 2014).
Doe v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 7:18-cv-170, 2018 WL
5929647, at *3 (W.D. Va. Nov. 13, 2018).
Doe v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 7:18-cv-320, 2018 WL
5929645, at *3 (W.D. Va. Nov. 13, 2018).
Doe v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 7:18-cv-492 (W.D. Va.
Apr. 12, 2019).
Doe v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 7:18-cv-523 (W.D. Va.
Apr. 15, 2019).
Doe v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., No. 3:19-cv-00038 (W.D. Va.
July 12, 2019).
Doe v. Wash. & Lee Univ., No. 6:19-cv-00023-NKM-RSB (W.D. Va. July
25, 2019).
Doe v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 7:19-cv-00249, 2020 WL
1287960, at *3 (W.D. Va. Mar. 18, 2020) (allowing pseudonymity when
plaintiff sued over discipline for allegations of “domestic and dating violence”;
“[l]ike sexual misconduct, allegations of domestic violence or abusive dating
relationships involve sensitive and highly personal facts that can invite
harassment and ridicule”).
Doe v. Liberty Univ., Inc., No. 6:22-cv-21, at 1 (W.D. Va. May 3, 2022).
5TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. La. State Univ., No. 3:20-00379-BAJ-SDJ, at 3 (M.D. La. June 30,
2020).
Doe v. Univ. of Miss., No. 18-cv-138, 2018 WL 1703013, at *2 (S.D. Miss.
Apr. 6, 2018).
Doe v. Univ. of Miss. Bd. of Trustees, No. 3:21-cv-201-DPJ-FKB, 2021
WL 6752261, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 14, 2021).
Doe v. Texas Christian Univ., No. 4:22-cv-00297-O, at 1 (N.D. Tex. May
2, 2022).
Doe v. Texas A&M Univ.-Kingsville, No. 2:21-cv-257, at 1 (S.D. Tex.
Nov. 4, 2021), granting Motion, id. (Nov. 2, 2021).
6TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Coll. of Wooster, 243 F. Supp. 3d 875, 896 n.6 (N.D. Ohio 2017)
(dismissing university but allowing plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously against
his individual accuser).
Noakes v. Case W. Rsrv. Univ., No. 1:21-cv-1776 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 5,
2021), granting Motion, id. (Sept. 15, 2021).
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Doe v. Ohio State Univ., No. 2:15-cv-02830 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 6, 2015).
Doe v. Miami Univ., No. 1:15-cv-605 (S.D. Ohio June 22, 2016).
Roe v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 1:18-cv-312 (S.D. Ohio June 21, 2018).
Roe v. Dir., Miami Univ., Off. of Cmty. Standards, No. 1:19-cv-136, 2019
WL 1439585, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 1, 2019).
Doe v. Kenyon College, No. 2:20-cv-4972, 2020 WL 11885928 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 24, 2020).
Doe v. Univ. of South, No. 4:09-cv-62, 2011 WL 13187184, at *19 (E.D.
Tenn. July 8, 2011).
Doe v. Belmont Univ., No. 3:17-cv-01245 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 27, 2017).
7TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ill., No. 2:20-cv-02265-CSB-EIL, at 4
(C.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2020).
Doe v. Columbia College Chicago, No. 1:17-cv-00748 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31,
2017).
Doe v. Univ. of Chicago, No. 16-cv-08298, 2017 WL 4163960, at *1 n.1
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 2017).
Doe v. Loyola Univ. Chicago, No. 1:20-cv-07293 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 2020)
(allowing pseudonymity in “the case’s initial stages,” such as before the decision
on the motion to dismiss, though noting that “as the case moves forward, the
balance of factors may tilt back in favor of the presumption of public
disclosure”).
Doe v. Purdue Univ., 321 F.R.D. 339, 342 (N.D. Ind. 2017).
Doe v. Purdue Univ., No. 4:18-cv-89-JEM, at 6 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 18, 2019)
(Title IX lawsuit brought by two women whom the university had disciplined
because it had found that they had falsely accused another student of assault).
Doe v. Ind. Univ., No. 1:19-cv-02204-JMS-DML (S.D. Ind. Oct. 2, 2019).
Doe v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., No. 1:21-cv-00973-JRS-MPB (S.D. Ind.
Apr. 27, 2021), granting Motion, id. (Apr. 20, 2021).
Doe v. Bd. of Trustees of Ind. Univ., No. 1:22-cv-00524-RLY-MG (S.D.
Ind. Apr. 28, 2022).
8TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Univ. of Ark.-Fayetteville, No. 5:18-cv-05182-PKH, at 2 (W.D.
Ark. Dec. 17, 2018).
Doe v. Dordt Univ., 5:19-cv-04082-CJW-KEM (N.D. Iowa Mar. 3, 2020).
Doe v. Grinnell Coll., No. 4:17-cv-00079-RGE-SBJ (S.D. Iowa July 10,
2017).
Moe v. Grinnell Coll., No. 4:20-cv-00058-RGE-SBJ, at 2–3 (S.D. Iowa
Apr. 24, 2020) (but reserving question “[w]hether plaintiff may be permitted to
utilize a pseudonym during trial”).
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Doe v. Univ. of St. Thomas, No. 16-cv-1127, 2016 WL 9307609, at *2 (D.
Minn. May 25, 2016).
Doe v. Wash. Univ., No. 4:19-cv-300-JMB, 2019 WL 11307648, at *2
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 2, 2019).
Doe v. Univ. of Nebraska, No. 4:18-cv-3142 (D. Neb. Nov. 20, 2018),
granting Motion, id. (Nov. 19, 2018).
9TH CIRCUIT
Unknown Party v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, No. 18-cv-01623-PHX-DWL,
2019 WL 4394549, at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 13, 2019).
Heineke v. Santa Clara Univ., No. 17-cv-05285-LHK, 2017 WL 6026248,
at *22–23 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2017) (pseudonymity for defendant who had
accused plaintiff of sexual harassment, and who was being sued for defamation).
Doe v. Thompson, No. 20STCV31772 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cty. Oct. 28,
2021).
Doe v. Univ. of Mont., No. 12-cv-00077-M-DLC, 2012 WL 2416481, at
*5 (D. Mont. June 26, 2012).
Doe v. Univ. of Ore., No. 6:17-cv-01103-AA, at 3 (D. Ore. Sept. 27, 2017).
Doe v. Elson S Floyd Coll. of Med. at Wash. State Univ., No. 2:20-cv00145-SMJ, 2021 WL 4197366, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 24, 2021) (accusations
of domestic violence by medical school student).
10TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Univ. of Denver, No. 1:16-cv-00152-PAB-STV, at 3 (D. Colo. Apr.
21, 2016).
Doe v. Univ. of Colo., No. 16-cv-01789-KLM, at 4 (D. Colo. Oct. 4, 2016).
Doe v. Univ. of Denver, No. 1:17-cv-01962 (D. Colo. Aug. 22, 2017).
Doe v. Regis Univ., No. 1:21-cv-00580-DDD-NYW, 2021 WL 5329934,
at *3 (D. Colo. Nov. 16, 2021).
11TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Univ. of S. Ala., No. 17-cv-0394-CG-C, 2017 WL 3974997, at *2
(S.D. Ala. Sept. 8, 2017).
Doe v. Rollins Coll., No. 6:18-cv-1069-Orl-37-LRH, 2018 WL 11275374,
at *4 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2018).
Doe v. Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Univ., Inc., No. 6:20-cv-1220-WWBLRH (M.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2020).
D.C. CIRCUIT
Doe v. American Univ., No. 1:19-cv-03097, at 5–6 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 2019)
(though noting special risk stemming from Doe’s being a citizen of a Middle
Eastern country, “where ‘sexual activity outside of marriage goes against
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religious and cultural values’ and ‘sexual relations outside of marriage are
illegal’”).

APPENDIX 4B: ALLEGEDLY IMPROPER UNIVERSITY INVESTIGATIONS:
PSEUDONYMITY NOT ALLOWED
1ST CIRCUIT
Doe v. Brandeis Univ., No. 1:19-cv-11049-LTS, at 2 (D. Mass. Sept. 18,
2019), aff’d sub nom. Dismukes v. Brandeis Univ., No. 21-1409 (1st Cir. Apr.
19, 2022) (holding that the district court order was not an abuse of discretion).
Doe v. W. New England Univ., No. 3:19-cv-30124-TSH, 2019 WL
10890195, at *1 (D. Mass. Dec. 16, 2019).
Doe v. MIT, No. 1:21-cv-12060 (D. Mass. Dec. 21, 2021), appeal pending,
No. 22-1056 (1st Cir.).
2D CIRCUIT
Balerna v. Bosco, No. HHDCV176082264S, 2017 WL 6884041, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 2017) (rejecting pseudonymity in non-Title-IX case
arising out of alleged sexual assault at college).
Doe v. Cornell Univ., No. 5:15-cv-0322-TJM-DEP, at 6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar.
25, 2015).
Doe v. Colgate Univ., No. 5:15-cv-1069-LEK-DEP, 2015 WL 5177736, at
*2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2015).
3D CIRCUIT
Doe v. Rider Univ., No. 16-cv-4882-BRM, 2018 WL 3756950, at *4
(D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2018).
Doe v. Princeton Univ., No. 19-cv-7853, 2019 WL 5587327, at *4 (D.N.J.
Oct. 30, 2019) (concluding that “the fear of social stigmatization associated with
being accused of a sexual assault as related to educational and employment
prospects does not rise to the requisite level favoring anonymity,” though
allowing pseudonymity because this particular plaintiff alleged that he was a
victim of sexual assault as well as having been accused of sexual assault).
Doe v. Princeton Univ., No. 20-cv-4352-BRM, 2020 WL 3962268, at *3
(D.N.J. July 13, 2020) (same).
Doe v. Temple Univ., Docket No. 14-cv-04729, 2014 WL 4375613, at *2
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 2014).
K.W. v. Holtzapple, 299 F.R.D. 438, 442 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
6TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Univ. of Louisville, No. 3:17-cv-00638-RGJ, 2018 WL 3313019
(W.D. Ky. July 5, 2018).
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Student PID A54456680 v. Mich. State Univ., No. 1:20-cv-984, 2020 WL
12689852 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 15, 2020).
7TH CIRCUIT
Ayala v. Butler Univ., No. 1:16-cv-1266-TWP-DML, at 8 (S.D. Ind. Jan.
8, 2018).
11TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Valencia Coll., No. 6:15-cv-1800-Orl-40DAB, 2015 WL
13739325, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2015).
Doe v. Rollins Coll., No. 6:16-cv-2232-ORL-37-KRS, 2017 WL 11610361
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2017).
Doe v. Samford Univ., No. 2:21-cv-00871-ACA, 2021 WL 3403517 (N.D.
Ala. July 30, 2021), appeal dismissed as moot, 29 F.4th 675, 693 (11th Cir.
2022) (“Our affirmance of the dismissal of the Title IX claim renders moot the
appeal from the denial of the motion to proceed under a pseudonym.”).

APPENDIX 5: COURTS CITING GENERAL UNFAIRNESS TO OPPOSING
PARTIES IN REFUSING PSEUDONYMITY
These decisions speak about unfairness to opposing parties generally; cases
that offer specific reasons why pseudonymity is unfair to the opposing party are
cited supra Parts I.E.2–I.E.4.
1ST CIRCUIT
Doe v. Bell Atlantic Bus. Sys. Servs., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 418, 420 (D. Mass.
1995).
2D CIRCUIT
Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 3:96-cv-1789-AHN, 1997 WL 114700,
at *1 (D. Conn. Feb. 25, 1997).
K.D. v. City of Norwalk, No. 3:06-cv-406-WWE, 2006 WL 1662905, at
*2 (D. Conn. June 14, 2006).
Doe v. McLellan, No. 20-cv-5997-GRB-AYS, 2020 WL 7321377, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2020).
Pierre v. Cty. of Broome, No. 3:05-cv-332, 2006 WL 8453057, at *2
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2006).
Doe v. Colgate Univ., No. 5:15-cv-1069-LEK-DEP, 2015 WL 5177736, at
*2 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2015).
Doe v. NYSARC Tr. Serv., Inc., No. 1:20-cv-00801-BKS-CFH, 2020 WL
5757478, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2020), report & recommendation adopted,
id., 2020 WL 7040982 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2020).
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Doe v. Cornell Univ. No. 3:19-cv-1189-MAD-ML, 2021 WL 6128738, at
*7 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2021), aff’d, 2021 WL 6128807 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22,
2021).
Doe v. Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Mateer v. Ross, Suchoff, Egert, Hankin, Maidenbaum & Mazel, P.C., No.
96-cv-1756-LAP, 1997 WL 171011, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 1997).
Anonymous v. Simon, No. 13-cv-2927-RWS, 2014 WL 819122, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2014).
Doe v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 310 F.R.D. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, 672 F.
App’x 48 (2d Cir. 2016).
Doe v. Skyline Automobiles Inc., 375 F. Supp. 3d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
Doe v. Gong Xi Fa Cai, Inc., No. 19-cv-2678-RA, 2019 WL 3034793, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2019).
Doe v. Townes, No. 19-cv-8034-ALCO-TW, 2020 WL 2395159, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2020).
Rapp v. Fowler, No. 20-cv-9586-LAK, 2021 WL 1738349 (S.D.N.Y. May
3, 2021) (Kevin Spacey).
Doe v. Freydin, No. 21-cv-8371-NRB, 2021 WL 4991731, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 27, 2021).
Doe v. Leonelli, No. 1:22-cv-03732-CM, 2022 WL 2003635, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2022).
3D CIRCUIT
B.L. v. Zong, No. 3:15-cv-1327, 2017 WL 1036474, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar.
17, 2017).
Doe v. Ct. of Common Pleas of Butler Cty., No. 17-cv-1304, 2017 WL
5069333, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2017).
R.W. v. Hampe, 426 Pa. Super. 305, 316–17 (1993).
4TH CIRCUIT
Candidate No. 452207 v. CFA Inst., 42 F. Supp. 3d 804, 810 (E.D. Va.
2012).
Doe v. Briscoe, 61 Va. Cir. 96, 3 (2003).
5TH CIRCUIT
Southern Methodist University Ass’n v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707,
712–13 (5th Cir. 1979).
Doe v. BrownGreer PLC, No. 14-cv-1980, 2014 WL 4404033, at *3 (E.D.
La. Sept. 5, 2014).
Doe v. Merritt Hospitality, LLC, 353 F. Supp. 3d 472, 474–75, 482 (E.D.
La. 2018).
Plaintiff Dr. v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. #3, No. 18-cv-7945, 2019 WL 351492, at
*3 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2019).
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Doe ex rel. Doe v. Harris, No. 14-cv-00802, 2014 WL 4207599, at *2
(W.D. La. Aug. 25, 2014).
Doe v. Hallock, 119 F.R.D. 640, 644 (S.D. Miss. 1987).
Rose v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 240 F.R.D. 264, 266–67 (E.D. Tex.
2007).
Doe v. Compact Info. Sys., Inc., No. 3:13-cv-5013-M, 2015 WL 11022761,
at *7 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2015).
Doe v. Univ. of the Incarnate Word, No. SA-19-cv-957-XR, 2019 WL
6727875, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2019).
6TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Webster Cty., No. 4:21-cv-00093-JHM, 2022 WL 124678, at *2
(W.D. Ky. Jan. 12, 2022).
Doe v. Wolowitz, No. 01-73907, 2002 WL 1310614, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
May 28, 2002).
Doe v. Bruner, No. CA2011-07-013, 2012 WL 626202, at *3 (Ohio Ct.
App. Feb. 27, 2012).
Ramsbottom v. Ashton, No. 3:21-cv-00272, 2021 WL 2651188, at *5
(M.D. Tenn. June 28, 2021).
7TH CIRCUIT
In re Boeing 737 MAX Pilots Litig., No. 1:19-cv-5008, 2020 WL 247404,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2020).
Doe v. Trustees of Ind. Univ., No. 1:21-cv-02903-JRS-MJD (S.D. Ind. Jan.
3, 2022).
Doe v. Smith, 429 F.3d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 2005).
8TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027, 1048 (N.D. Iowa 1999).
9TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. JBF RAK LLC, No. 2:14-cv-00979-RFB-GWF, 2014 WL 5286512,
at *9 (D. Nev. Oct. 15, 2014).
10TH CIRCUIT
Coe v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Colo., 676 F.2d 411, 417 (10th Cir. 1982)
(quoting favorably Southern Methodist University Ass’n v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599
F.2d 707, 712–13 (5th Cir. 1979)).
Doe v. Heitler, 26 P.3d 539 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
Sherman v. Trinity Teen Solutions, Inc., 339 F.R.D. 203, 206 (D. Wyo.
2021).
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11TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323–24 (11th Cir. 1992).
Doe v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., No. 1:07-cv-1262-TWT-CCH, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105268, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 17, 2007).
D.C. CIRCUIT
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1463–64 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 17-5217,
2019 WL 2552955, at *28 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 2019) (Williams, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
Bird v. Barr, No. 19-cv-1581, 2019 WL 2870234, at *2 (D.D.C. July 3,
2019).
Doe v. Benoit, No. 19-cv-1253-DLF, 2020 WL 11885577, at *4 (D.D.C.
July 27, 2020).
Doe v. Baird, No. 1:20-cv-11579-DJC, at 7–8 (D.D.C. July 27, 2020).

APPENDIX 6: COURTS REFUSING PSEUDONYMITY ON THE GROUNDS THAT
THIS CASE IS JUST LIKE MOST OTHER CASES
These cases are sorted by subject matter.
A. CRIMINAL RECORD/CONDUCT/ALLEGATIONS
United States v. Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1013 (9th Cir. 2008) (“If the nature
of Stoterau’s offense alone [child pornography and child sexual abuse] could
qualify him for the use of a pseudonym, there would be no principled basis for
denying pseudonymity to any defendant convicted of a similar sex offense. Such
a significant broadening of the circumstances in which we have permitted
pseudonymity is . . . contrary to our requirement that pseudonymity be limited
to the ‘unusual case.’”).
Doe v. U.S. Healthworks Inc., No. 15-cv-05689-SJO-AFMx, 2016 WL
11745513, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2016) (“[I]f the Court were to permit Plaintiff
to proceed under a pseudonym in this case, such a ruling would logically extend
to any opportunistic litigant with a criminal background seeking to initiate suit
against any number of potential employers regardless of their culpability.”).
A.B.C. v. XYZ Corp., 282 N.J. Super. 494, 503–04 (App. Div. 1995)
(“While we recognize that disclosure of intimate personal information or the
potential that a litigant might be forced to admit engaging in or the desire to
engage in prohibited conduct are considerations with respect to obtaining
protective orders, many tort claims and personal injury claims involve personal
and intimate information.”).
T.S.R. v. J.C., 671 A.2d 1068, 1074 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1996) (“If, as
J.C. suggests, these mere accusations are tantamount to an irreparable injury
sufficient to outweigh the public’s interests in open proceedings, then he is really
asking us to effectively grant all defendants accused of sexual abuse in civil
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cases the right to defend anonymously, a result which hardly comports with a
philosophy granting anonymity only in rare circumstances.”).
Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d 1160, 1167 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996) (“As in T.S.R. v.
J.C., it is difficult to see how defendant [who is being sued for alleged child
molestation] has set himself apart from any individual who may be named as a
defendant in a civil suit for damages. It seems to this court that any doctor sued
for medical malpractice, any lawyer sued for legal malpractice, or any individual
sued for sexual molestation can assert that the plaintiff’s allegations will cause
harm to his reputation, embarrassment and stress among his family members,
and damage to his business as a result of the litigation. Any such doctor or lawyer
can also assert that the plaintiff’s act of naming him as a defendant is a bad-faith
tactic to induce settlement and reap economic gain at the defendant’s expense
through baseless allegations.”).
A.K. v. Ill. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 2017 IL App (1st) 163255-U
(“[T]he privacy concerns that plaintiffs raise exist in many cases in which a party
is accused—perhaps wrongly—of some misconduct.”).
Chalmers v. Martin, No. 21-cv-02468-NRN (D. Colo. Dec. 28, 2021)
(“The supposed harm from being the target of a lawsuit alleging sexual abuse is
not enough to justify shrouding this case with a veil of secrecy. . . . ‘In nearly all
civil and criminal litigation filed in the United States Courts, one party asserts
that the allegations leveled against it by another party are patently false, and the
result of the litigation may quickly prove that. However, if the purported falsity
of the complaint’s allegations were sufficient to seal an entire case, then the law
would recognize a presumption to seal instead of a presumption of openness.’”)
(applying this reasoning to pseudonymity and not just total sealing).
B. ALLEGATIONS OF MALPRACTICE
Doe v. Milwaukee Cty., No. 18-cv-503, 2018 WL 3458985, at *1 (E.D.
Wisc. July 18, 2018) (“No doubt lots of parties would prefer to keep their
disputes private. For example, a plaintiff alleging he was discriminated against
by his employer when his employment was terminated typically will have to
disclose the employer’s reason for terminating the plaintiff’s employment—a
reason that the plaintiff disputes is the real reason and which is often
embarrassing or even damaging to his or her reputation. But there is no
suggestion that such a plaintiff may proceed under a pseudonym to protect his
or her reputation.”).
Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d 1160, 1167 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996) (“[I]t is difficult
to see how defendant has set himself apart from any individual who may be
named as a defendant in a civil suit for damages. It seems to this court that any
doctor sued for medical malpractice, any lawyer sued for legal malpractice, or
any individual sued for sexual molestation can assert that the plaintiff’s
allegations will cause harm to his reputation, embarrassment and stress among
his family members, and damage to his business as a result of the litigation. Any
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such doctor or lawyer can also assert that the plaintiff’s act of naming him as a
defendant is a bad-faith tactic to induce settlement and reap economic gain at
the defendant’s expense through baseless allegations.”).
C. MEDICAL, DISABILITY, AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE INFORMATION
Doe v. Suppressed, No. 21-cv-50326, at 2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2021)
(“[C]laims brought under the ADA (which by their nature include personal and
medical information) are brought publicly through the federal courts every
day.”).
Doe v. Apstra, Inc., No. 18-cv-04190-WHA, 2018 WL 4028679 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 23, 2018) (“[T]he professional harm plaintiff fears is similar to that faced
by many plaintiffs who allege disability discrimination.”).
Doe v. Main Line Hosps., Inc., No. 20-cv-2637, 2020 WL 5210994, at *5
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 1, 2020) (“[W]e do not discount Doe’s very real concerns about
reputational harm, both personally or professionally [from revelation of her past
drug addiction], or her fears of relapse in the event of such backlash. But those
types of fears are similar to those of other plaintiffs who have alleged that they
were discriminated against because of their histories of substance abuse, and it
is clear that several similarly-situated plaintiffs have publicly identified
themselves in their own litigation.”).
Rankin v. New York Pub. Libr., No. 98-cv-4821-RPP, 1999 WL 1084224,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 1999) (“On Plaintiff’s reasoning [regarding the need for
confidentiality of medical information], a claim for Doe status would apply to
all cases brought under the ADA.”).
Doe v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 744 F. Supp. 40, 41–42 (D.R.I. 1990)
(“Many litigants prefer that the lawsuits in which they are involved not be
publicized especially when they involve matters that may be viewed as personal
or private. They may also experience varying degrees of embarrassment from
the prospect that such matters may become public information. However, to
prevent disclosure of their identities in all such cases would create an exception
that virtually swallows the rule.”) (the confidential information here was about
plaintiffs’ son, who had died of AIDS).
D. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
S. Methodist Univ. Ass’n of Women L. Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599
F.2d 707, 713 (5th Cir. 1979) (“Plaintiffs argue that disclosure of A–D’s
identities will leave them vulnerable to retaliation from their current employers,
prospective future employers and an organized bar that does ‘not like lawyers
who sue lawyers.’ In our view, A–D face no greater threat of retaliation than the
typical plaintiff alleging Title VII violations, including the other women who,
under their real names and not anonymously, have filed sex discrimination suits
against large law firms.”) (quoted in, among other cases, Doe v. N. State
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Aviation, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-346, 2017 WL 1900290, at *1 (M.D.N.C. May 9,
2017), and Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 228 F.R.D. 8, 12 (D.D.C. 2005)).
Doe v. Zinke, No. 17-cr-2017-SRN-FLN, 2018 WL 1189341, at *2 (D.
Minn. Feb. 14, 2018) (“Plaintiff’s claim[s] against Defendant are typical in
employment discrimination cases.”), report & recommendation adopted, id.,
2018 WL 1189329 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2018).
Doe v. Fedcap Rehab. Servs., Inc., No. 17-cv-8220-JPO, 2018 WL
2021588, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2018) (“At bottom, Plaintiff wants what most
employment-discrimination plaintiffs would like: to sue their former employer
without future employers knowing about it. But while that desire is understandable, our system of dispute resolution does not allow it.”).
Michael v. Bloomberg L.P., No. 14-cv-2657-TPG, 2015 WL 585592, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2015) (“To depart in this case from the general requirement
of disclosure would be to hold that nearly any plaintiff bringing a lawsuit against
an employer would have a basis to proceed pseudonymously. The court declines
to reach such a holding.”).
Doe v. Bush, No. SA04-cv-1186-FB, 2005 WL 2708754, at *4 (W.D. Tex.
Aug. 17, 2005) (“When a plaintiff does not claim any greater threat of retaliation
than any typical plaintiff, there is no compelling need to grant leave to proceed
anonymously.”), report & recommendation adopted sub nom. Sims v. Bush, No.
04-cv-1186-FB, 2005 WL 3337501 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2005).
Doe v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, No. 1:17-cv-213, 2018 WL 1312219 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 14, 2018) (“In the Court’s view, concerns about annoyance,
embarrassment, economic harm and scrutiny from current or prospective
employers do not involve information ‘of the utmost intimacy’; rather, they
constitute the type of concerns harbored by other similarly situated employees
who file retaliation lawsuits under their real names.”); see also Doe v. Ky. Cmty.
& Tech. Coll. Sys., No. 20-cv-6-DLB, 2020 WL 998809, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Mar.
2, 2020).
E. OTHER DISCRIMINATION/RETALIATION
Doe v. Univ. of the Incarnate Word, No. 19-cv-957-XR, 2019 WL
6727875, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2019) (“[W]hen a plaintiff does not claim
any greater threat of retaliation than any typical plaintiff, there is no compelling
need to grant leave to proceed anonymously.”) (educational discrimination).
Smith v. Patel, No. 09-cv-04947-DDP-CWx, 2009 WL 3046022, at *2
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 2009) (“Plaintiff offers no specific information suggesting
that disclosure of his identity would expose him to a risk of physical or mental
harm, relying instead on vague generalizations about risks that all civil rights
plaintiffs bear . . . (explaining that civil rights plaintiffs are ‘sometimes thought
of as troublemakers’ . . .). It cannot be, however, that every plaintiff alleging . . . discrimination has the right to litigate . . . pseudonymously. A rule so
broad would be inconsistent with both the plain language of Rule 10(a), and the
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federal courts’ general policy favoring disclosure.”) (public accommodations
discrimination).
Hundtofte v. Encarnación, 330 P.3d 168, 174–75 (Wash. 2014) (“[W]e
generally place the burden on the party who moves to seal court records and why
a court may order a sealing only in the most unusual of circumstances. These are
not the most unusual of circumstances. The parties settled their dispute, as do
many other parties in unlawful detainer actions.” (citations omitted)) (unlawful
detainer, with risk of retaliation by future landlords).
Doe v. United States, No. 1:20-cv-01052-NONE-SAB, at 5 (E.D. Cal. Dec.
16, 2020) (“This Court regularly sees similar allegations and Plaintiff has failed
to show that his case is unusual.”) (alleged assault, coupled with risk of
retaliation, by prison officials).
In re Boeing 737 MAX Pilots Litig., No. 1:19-cv-5008, 2020 WL 247404,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2020) (“If the fear of retaliation were enough, public
disclosure would be the exception rather than the rule.”) (lawsuit by pilots
against aircraft manufacturer, claiming risk of retaliation by manufacturer).
Reimann v. Hanley, No. 16-cv-50175, 2016 WL 5792679, at *5 (N.D. Ill.
Oct. 4, 2016) (“[C]ases in which plaintiffs allege that they have been placed at
risk of harm due to being branded a ‘snitch’ are routinely litigated by inmates
under their own name. [Citations omitted.] Plaintiff presents no special
circumstances that would justify a departure from the general rule that parties
litigate under their own names.”).
F. SEXUAL HARASSMENT/ASSAULT
Doe v. Moreland, No. 18-cv-800-TJK, 2019 WL 2336435 (D.D.C. Feb. 21,
2019) (“[I]f the Court were to credit the purported risks cited by Plaintiff—like
the matters he alleges are of a ‘sensitive and personal nature’—doing so would
open the door to parties proceeding pseudonymously in an incalculable number
of lawsuits in which one party asserts sexual harassment claims against
another.”).
Doe v. Townes, No. 19-cv-8034-ALC-OTW, 2020 WL 2395159, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2020) (“Allowing Plaintiff to proceed anonymously for these
reasons would be to hold that nearly any plaintiff alleging sexual harassment and
assault could proceed anonymously. Despite sympathizing with Plaintiff, the
Court declines to reach such a blanket holding.”).
F.B. v. East Stroudsburg Univ., No. 3:09-cv-525, 2009 WL 2003363, at *3
(M.D. Pa. July 7, 2009) (“Finding that these allegations are a valid reason to
permit a plaintiff to proceed with a pseudonym would open up the court to
requests for anonymity each time a plaintiff makes allegations of sexual
harassment.”) (quoted in Doe v. Ct. of Common Pleas of Butler Cty., No. 17cv-1304, 2017 WL 5069333, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2017)).
Doe v. Ocean Reef Cmty. Ass’n, No. 19-cv-10138, 2019 WL 5102450
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2019) (“The facts alleged here place this case in the same
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category of the unfortunately numerous cases of sexual harassment that have
been filed, litigated, and tried before a jury without the need of anonymity.”).
G. CONCERNS ABOUT CHILDREN LEARNING ABOUT CASE
Luckett v. Beaudet, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1030 (D. Minn. 1998) (in a sexual
coercion and discrimination claim) (“Plaintiff expresses concern for her
children. . . . [P]laintiff’s concerns are no different from those which could be
asserted in virtually any lawsuit.”).
H. CONCERNS ABOUT CONFIDENTIALITY OF SETTLEMENTS
Tarutis v. Spectrum Brands, Inc., No. 13-cv-761-JLR, 2014 WL 5808749
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2014) (“The concern they raise—the difficulty in maintaining confidentiality in settlements once litigation has begun—is present in nearly
every case filed with the court.”).
I. CONCERNS ABOUT REPUTATIONAL HARM
Doe v. FBI, 218 F.R.D. 256 (D. Colo. 2003) (“If [the plaintiff’s interest in
reputation justified pseudonymity], then any defamation plaintiff could successfully move to seal a case and proceed by pseudonym, in order to avoid ‘spreading’ or ‘republishing’ the defamatory statement to the public. However, this is
not the customary practice.”).
Doe v. Bogan, No. 1:21-mc-00073, 2021 WL 3855686, at *3 (D.D.C. June
8, 2021) (“The allegations in defamation cases will very frequently involve
statements that, if taken to be true, could embarrass plaintiffs or cause them
reputation harm. This does not come close to justifying anonymity, however,
and plaintiffs regularly litigate defamation claims on the public docket even
when the allegedly defamatory statement could, if taken as true, cause them
some reputation harm.”).
Doe v. United States, No. 19-1888C, 2020 WL 1079269, at *2 (Fed. Cl.
Mar. 5, 2020) (“Plaintiffs expressed generalized fear of retaliation and reputational harm appears to be consistent with the sort of concern that might exist
whenever a plaintiff elects to bring this type of [employment law] case.”).
J. CONCERNS ABOUT FRUSTRATING TRADEMARK ENFORCEMENT
XYZ Corp. v. Partnerships & Unincorporated Associations Identified on
Schedule A, No. 21-cv-06471, 2022 WL 180151, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 20, 2022)
(“Plaintiff[] . . . does not distinguish this Schedule A case from any of the
hundreds of other similar cases filed in this District . . . . It is difficult to perceive
any circumstances so exceptional in this case as to differentiate it from the
hundreds of other pending Schedule A cases. To permit pseudonymity/
anonymity here, while many other Schedule A plaintiffs proceed under their
actual names, would threaten to allow the exception of ‘exceptional circumstances’ to swallow the general rule barring pseudonymity.”).
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APPENDIX 7: RISK OF REPUTATIONAL OR ECONOMIC HARM NOT ENOUGH
FOR PSEUDONYMITY
The parentheticals indicate just what kind of harm the court said is
insufficient to justify pseudonymity, though ultimately they all amount to
reputational and economic harm.
1ST CIRCUIT
Doe v. Bell Atlantic Business Sys., Inc., 162 F.R.D. 418, 420 (D. Mass.
1995) (“[e]conomic harm”).
Doe v. W. New England Univ., 3:19-cv-30124-TSH, 2019 WL 10890195,
at *1 (D. Mass. Dec. 16, 2019) (“economic harm”).
2D CIRCUIT
Doe v. Delta Airlines Inc., 672 F. App’x 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2016) (“economic
or professional concerns”).
Doe v. Conn. Bar Examining Comm., 263 Conn. 39, 70 (2003) (“economic
and social harm”).
Mercer v. Blanchette, 133 Conn. App. 84, 94–95 (2012) (“economic
harm”).
Vargas v. Doe, 96 Conn. App. 399, 408–09 (2006) (“economic harm”).
Doe v. Diocese Corp., 647 A.2d 1067, 1073 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994)
(“economic harm,” harm to “reputation”).
Balerna v. Bosco, No. HHDCV176082264S, 2017 WL 6884041, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 6, 2017) (“economic harm”).
Nyarko v. M&A Projects Restoration Inc., No. 18-cv-05194-FBST, 2021
WL 4755602, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2021) (blacklisting), report &
recommendation adopted, No. 1:18-cv-05194-FB-ST, 2021 WL 4472618
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2021).
Doe v. Edmunson, No. 5:01-cv-01781-FJS-GS, at 2–3 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19,
2001) (“economic harm”).
Free Mkt. Comp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 98 F.R.D. 311, 313 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (“economic harm”).
Doe v. United Services Life Insurance Co., 123 F.R.D. 437, 439 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“economic or professional concerns”).
Abdel-Razeq v. Alvarez & Marsal, Inc., No. 14-cv-5601, 2015 WL
7017431, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2015) (risk of “blacklisting”).
Agerbrink v. Model Serv. LLC, 14-cv-7841-JPO-JCF, 2016 WL 406385,
at *9–10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2016) (risk of “blacklisting”).
Rosenberg v. City of New York, No. 20-cv-3911-LLS, 2020 WL 4195021,
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2020) (embarrassment and humiliation).
P.D. & Assocs. v. Richardson, 64 Misc. 3d 763, 767 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019)
(“economic harm,” “professional embarrassment,” “injury to reputation”).
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Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1095 (R.I. 2002) (“risk of embarrassment
or allegations of economic harm”).
3D CIRCUIT
Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 2011) (“economic harm”).
Doe v. Rider Univ., No. 16-cv-4882-BRM, 2018 WL 3756950, at *4
(D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2018) (risk to “future employment”).
Doe v. Princeton Univ., No. 20-cv-4352-BRM, 2020 WL 3962268, at *3
(D.N.J. July 13, 2020) (risk to “future employment”).
A.B.C. v. XYZ Corp., 282 N.J. Super. 494, 504 (App. Div. 1995)
(“economic harm”).
T.S.R. v. J.C., 671 A.2d 1068, 1074 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1996)
(“embarrass[ment] or stigma[]” and “damage” to “reputation[]”) (defendant).
Doe v. Main Line Hospitals, Inc., No. 2:20-cv-02637-KSM, at 10 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 1, 2020) (“reputational harm”).
Doe v. Johns-Manville Corp., 15 Pa. D. & C.3d 135, 145 (Pa. Com. Pl.
1980) (“ostracism”).
4TH CIRCUIT
Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 274 (4th Cir. 2014) (“a company’s
reputational or economic interests”).
Doe v. N. State Aviation, LLC, No. 1:17-cv-346, 2017 WL 1900290, at *2
(M.D.N.C. May 9, 2017) (risk to “future employment”).
Candidate No. 452207 v. CFA Inst., 42 F. Supp. 3d 804, 808 (E.D. Va.
2012) (“embarrassment, criticism, and reputational harm”).
Doe v. Liberty Univ., No. 6:19-cv-00007, 2019 WL 2518148, at *3 (W.D.
Va. June 18, 2019) (“harm to her professional reputation”).
5TH CIRCUIT
S. Methodist Univ. Ass’n of Women L. Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599
F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979) (risk of employer retaliation) (“economic harm”).
6TH CIRCUIT
D.E. v. Doe, 834 F.3d 723, 728 (6th Cir. 2016) (“potential negative scrutiny
from future employers”).
Doe v. Ky. Cmty. & Tech. Coll. Sys., No. 20-cv-00006-DLB, 2020 WL
998809, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 2, 2020) (“scrutiny from current or prospective
employers”).
Doe v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, No. 1:17-cv-213, 2018 WL 1312219 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 14, 2018) (“scrutiny from current or prospective employers”).
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7TH CIRCUIT
In re Boeing 737 MAX Pilots Litig., No. 1:19-cv-5008, 2020 WL 247404,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 16, 2020) (“economic harm”).
Doe v. Doe, 668 N.E.2d 1160, 1167 (Ill. Ct. App. 1996) (“harm to reputation” and “embarrassment”) (defendant).
Doe v. Trustees of Indiana Univ., No. 1:21-cv-02903-JRS-MJD, at 9 (S.D.
Ind. Jan. 3, 2022) (harm to reputation).
Doe v. Milwaukee Cty., No. 18-cv-503, 2018 WL 3458985, at *1 (E.D.
Wisc. July 18, 2018) (harm to reputation).
8TH CIRCUIT
Patton v. Entercom Kansas City, LLC, No. 13-cv-2186-KHV, 2013 WL
3524157, at *3 (D. Kan. July 11, 2013) (“damage to . . . personal and professional reputations”).
9TH CIRCUIT
Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th
Cir. 2000) (annoyance and criticism).
Roe v. Skillz, Inc., 858 F. App’x 240, 241 (9th Cir. 2021) (“economic or
professional concerns”).
Doe v. Georgia-Pac., LLC, No. 12-cv-5607-PSG-JCFx, 2012 WL
13223668, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2012) (risk to “future employment”).
Doe v. State Bar of Cal., 415 F. Supp. 308, 309 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (harm
to reputation), aff’d as to other matters, 582 F.2d 25 (9th Cir. 1978).
Tarutis v. Spectrum Brands, Inc., No. 13-cv-761-JLR, 2014 WL 5808749,
at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2014) (harm to reputation).
10TH CIRCUIT
Coe v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Dist. of Colo., 676 F.2d 411, 417, 418 (10th Cir.
1982) (“economic harm,” quoted favorably from Southern Methodist University
Ass’n v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 712–13 (5th Cir. 1979), and “professional privacy rights,” which in context referred to professional reputation).
Nat’l Commodity & Barter Ass’n, Nat’l Commodity Exch. v. Gibbs, 886
F.2d 1240, 1245 (10th Cir. 1989) (“economic or professional concerns”).
Raiser v. Brigham Young University, 127 F. App’x 409, 411 (10th Cir.
2005) (harm to reputation).
United States ex rel. Little v. Triumph Gear Sys., Inc., 870 F.3d 1242, 1249
n.10 (10th Cir. 2017) (“economic or professional concerns”).
Doe v. FBI, 218 F.R.D. 256, 259 (D. Colo. 2003) (harm to “reputation”).
Does 1 through 11 v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Colo,, No. 21-cv-02637RM-KMT, 2022 WL 43897, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 5, 2022) (“risk of embarrassment damage to plaintiff’s professional reputation”).
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Brez v. Fougera Pharms., Inc., No. 16-cv-2576-DDC-GEB, 2018 WL
2248544, at *1 (D. Kan. Apr. 20, 2018) (“economic harm”).
Doe v. Kansas State Univ., No. 2:20-cv-02258-HLT-TJJ, 2021 WL 84170,
at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 11, 2021) (harm to reputation).
11TH CIRCUIT
Doe I v. City of Alabaster, Alabama, No. 2:11-cv-3448-VEH, 2012 WL
13088882 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 26, 2012) (“economic harm”).
Harapeti v. CBS Television Stations, Inc., No. 20-cv-20961, 2021 WL
1341524, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 9, 2021) (“economic harm”).
D.C. CIRCUIT
In re Sealed Case, 931 F.3d 92, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (annoyance and
criticism).
Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 228 F.R.D. 8, 12 (D.D.C. 2005) (“economic harm”).
Doe v. Von Eschenbach, No. 06-cv-2131-RMC, at 6 (D.D.C. June 27,
2007) (“economic harm”).
Roe v. Doe, 319 F. Supp. 3d 422, 428 (D.D.C. 2018) (“economic harm”).
Doe 1 v. Benoit, No. 19-mc-59-BAH, 2018 WL 11364383, at *3 (D.D.C.
Nov. 20, 2018) (harm to “employment” prospects).
Doe v. Roe, Inc., No. 1:21-mc-00043, 2021 WL 3622423, at *3 (D.D.C.
Apr. 28, 2021) (harm to “generalized reputational interest”).
Doe v. Bogan, No. CV 1:21-mc-00073, 2021 WL 3855686, at *3 (D.D.C.
June 8, 2021) (“reputation harm”).
Plaintiff v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 22-cv-00018, 2022 WL 168324,
at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 19, 2022) (annoyance and criticism).
Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:22-mc-00028-UNA, at 6
(D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2022) (“damaging his reputation with his clients and the legal
community,” “economic harm”).
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Doe v. United States, No. 19-1888C, 2020 WL 1079269, at *2 (Fed. Cl.
Mar. 5, 2020) (“reputational harm”).

